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THE NEW FAD IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

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THERE are fads in philosophy and theology even as there are fads in psychology, in educational theory, in women's apparel, in the card game of Canasta, or anything else that is human.

When some of us who are older were going through the academic mill, we heard much about the philosophy of Hegel which once dominated European and American thought; some of us may have been at Columbia University or students under teachers trained at Columbia, and drinking in some form of pragmatism or instrumentalism—particularly if the influence came by way of Teachers' College; some of us were in seminaries or denominational colleges and heard much about the wisdom of Borden P. Bowne and his personalism (particularly if we were Methodists); some of us were trained in the physical sciences of an earlier day and drank in the halfway philosophy of positivism.

Today there is a new vogue that is making its influence felt in the thought of many princes of philosophy and theology, a vogue which is drifting down to those who sit on school benches and in the pews of our churches and which has become almost a social fashion in the Latin quarters of Paris and from there on the theatrical stages of metropolitan cities. Books are being displayed in out-of-the-way bookstores which silently bear witness to it. Even the august American Theological Society has taken it up as its chief topic for its annual meeting for 1950.

I refer to the new philosophy and theology of existentialism.

When I was in graduate school more than a quarter of a century ago and prepared for the examinations in my field I never heard the word *existentialism*. I suppose the professors hadn't either—or surely they would have asked a question or two about it. All of which goes to show that things do move in such stable realms as philosophy and theology. Students now come to the desk and ask: "What is this thing 'existentialism'?" and as their teacher I must try to find out. I read some of the books coming out on the subject, and they seem to give me no clear conception—it all seems so vague. And they tell me, those who have seen stage plays purporting to be grounded in this mysterious philosophy, that the plays are

interesting because they are sordid but the philosophy isn't too clear. Finally, in desperation, I have found the one person who seems to have given light to the subject—a professor in a German university—and I pass on, in this brief essay, what seems to have emerged by way of his help toward clarification.

Very briefly, existentialism holds that most philosophers in the past (under the influence of Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the like) have been trying to think *about* reality by means of a complex of ideas or principles, and in the process of thinking *about* the world they have lost contact with it. Are not ideas removed from the world-as-it-is? Is not real *existence* something *more* than our ideas about it?

Now, the philosopher Hegel (following the idealistic tradition) had set up a wonderful system of philosophy in which he showed that the whole universe is a system of ideas. As we think through these ideas—so he taught—we come into contact with the nature or essence of the world. The slogan: the real is the rational and the rational is the real.

The trouble with such philosophies—say the existentialists—is that they present a pattern of ideas which remain ideas and the world itself exists independent of and beyond such idea patterns. Does not the world antedate man's ideas? Did not the universe exist before human beings came upon the scene to give thoughts to it? In our own experience do we not find or come upon something before we give to it our conceptual meanings?

The *essence* of anything is *what* we say a thing is. But the *existence* of anything is not this *what* but the *that* which is prior to and beyond the *what*. *Definitions* of existence thus move in a realm of essences. But essences are not existents. Any definition, accordingly, is unsatisfactory since existence is out of reach of essence. There is a surd, a stubborn otherness to existence which is unanalyzable.

This is existentialism in the raw: the doctrine that existence has priority rights over essence or any thought about it.

The movement of contemporary existentialism arose before and after the first world war. Its roots lay in a revived interest in the Danish religious thinker, Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kierkegaard had become thoroughly provoked at the philosophy of Hegel and set out to destroy it. (Like most iconoclasts, he was influenced by that which he attempted to destroy.) What Kierkegaard sought to emphasize was this: man is confronted with something, the world, the universe; he doesn't create it by his ideas; it is already there. Existence is an irreducible term. The human mind is incapable of imaging what reality itself is. Existence is transrational. One just bumps up against it. It simply is.

Now, presumably, no one would pay too much attention to this dogma were it not profitable to some purpose. And purpose there was because Kierkegaard was giving testimony of what may well have been for him a religious experience and there were those (and now are) who found in him and his dogma a confirmation of what they already believed and wish to continue to believe. In other words, the popular vogue today of Kierkegaard may be said to be confirmatory. The average Christian traditional theologian wants to believe in a supernatural revelation of some kind. When he is argued with, immediately comes the answer: "You can't argue about revelation. Revelation comes from outside; it has its rootage in another world. You don't work yourself into a revelation. It just is. Take it . . . or leave it." And then comes the great final pronouncement: "Philosophers and theologians are always trying to distort things by reason, by argument, by analogy, by dialectic, by definitions." The transrationalist is supposed to stand with both feet on the head of the thinker who is supposed to lie prostrate by a hit below the belt.

Another reason why the Kierkegaardian existentialism is a vogue today is because with great and sincere feeling he spoke of a *crisis* as the place of encounter with revelation. By crisis is meant some extraordinary experience in life. What Kierkegaard presumably meant by crisis was an experience of separation from the world or God and the accompanying anguish of being helplessly on one's own. Anybody experiencing this kind of anguish crisis can find no words to express it. Words belong to the realm of essence not existence. Thus, when one can't think through a problem and one feels utterly helpless and finally reaches the emotional distress of despair—then, and then only, will there be precipitated the *encounter* with what is real or God (existentially beyond all "natural reason"). Such an encounter is a matter of the heart, not the head. The door that opens to God is the one door of anguish, sickness unto death, utter misery. Before one can thus enter, one must forswear the pride of intellect! One, in other words, must be miserable before one can get God! Sick souls have the edge; the healthy minded are unregenerates. Once the encounter comes—so the dogma—then comes freedom, assurance, salvation beyond conceptual analysis. One has arrived.

Now, many contemporary Christian theologians love this. Have they not often quoted the words of Pascal: the heart has reasons which reason knows not of? And have they not desired intensely to believe in a supernatural revelation beyond and above all reason? Is not the very heart of the Christian religion something inexplicable? Conservative theological professors in seminaries hailed Kierkegaard as the saviour of their theology. It makes Luther and Calvin and the Protestant reformers (not all of them, such as the early Protestant humanists among them) contemporary and

up-to-date. And so we have another generation of ministers coming forth out of theological seminaries deprecating the philosophical and theological enterprise as altogether speculative without the true ring of Christian authenticity—apart from "revealed" theology. Philosophy is bad because it represents the pride of intellect taking man away from reality and not toward it—unless . . . unless . . . it is but a fenced-in apologetic for the very philosophy and theology which is supposed to rest on the affirmations of revelation.

Another exponent of existentialism is the theologian, Karl Barth, who also affirms the bankruptcy of reason in the face of ultimate reality. Christianity is a religion set apart from all other religions and rests upon what God does for man, including self-disclosure in a supernatural way and not upon man's searching. The anguish is still there until the complete surrender is made. The "Word of God" must take possession. The Word is in essence the same as Luther proclaimed in his Christological emphasis. Thus, again, the reaffirmation of a long tradition: man the sinner, man a derelict, who is bedeviled by his thoughts and ever-helpless until he becomes possessed by a transrational experience of otherness. Biblicism takes the place of even the most exalted type of ordinary reason and experience. Philosophers are playboys, and so are all theologians who do not fit the pattern. Thus, hail to the major early Protestant Reformers and a return to Reformation theology (even as steeped as it was in the mediæval Catholic and Augustinian pattern). True, Barth has softened. The fad got out of hand. And then cometh Brunner who says almost on the very first page: reason is one thing and faith is another. A Christian builds on faith not reason; faith is higher than reason. And some of us can't turn the page because we have no such dichotomy between reason and faith. For some of us all reason is an adventure of faith! But "Brunner's "faith" builds its own reasons and you have rational theology all over again (only sanctified). Paradox? Certainly. But why worry about paradox when man is only a finite and helpless little creature before naked existence!

Such is current Protestant theological existentialism of that variety. And there are many kittens drinking from this saucer!

There is something in me that rebels against all this. Is reason so unregenerate? Why, in the name of a good Creator, was reason ever given to man? To fool him? Is the world so utterly different from man's spirit (at its best) as to compel him to forswear the divinest he has within him: the capacity to think? I, for one, detest such a dogma as traitorous to all that is fine and noble in man and an affront to the spark of divinity that lies within the world fashioned by a benevolent architect and providence.

Existentialism of such a type heads directly into the pit of dogmatism —the archfoe of philosophy and genuine theology. It invites agnosticism—

unless one capitulates to a kind of theology which denies consecrated status to anything other than itself.

There are other varieties of philosophical existentialism—Jaspers, Heidegger, Husserl—and there are other theological shades. One variety, however, is of particular interest since it has been sweeping France (since World War II) and is now seeping across the seas. It is a strange bedfellow, of an entirely different character. Its manifesto was published in 1947—only three years ago—in a book by Jean-Paul Sartre (born 1905) called *Being and Nothing*. Sartre's existentialism dates before the second war. Only recently has he come to be one of the gods of contemporary thought. He has philosophy, but no theology; and he, too, is an existentialist. It all adds up to atheism because in his encounter there was Nothing there to encounter but naked existence! He has the anguish, but there is nothing there to assuage it.

A look at Sartre: Consider man. Man turns up in the universe as nothing. Then he begins to think—whatever he may think. He becomes whatever he thinks and wills to think. Beyond what he thinks, he just *is*. If he thinks there is a God, well, that is his thought. He can never affirm the existence of God; all he can affirm is what he *thinks* as to God's existence. What is beyond that thought cannot be said to *be*. How can you affirm beyond your affirmations? Man creates himself to become whatever he thinks. In this he has utter freedom. He chooses his values. In choosing there is responsibility—a responsibility that is terrifying (anguish). Whoever is not anxious about his choices is only hiding his anxieties. Values appear as choices. Why is there such anguish? Answer: because outside ourselves, our desires, our choices, there is nothing. It is distressing to man to realize that objective values do not exist, that there is no universal guide or norm or good. Man is alone with himself. He cannot make excuses. If he fails, it is because of his choices. There is nothing except the bare existence with which we are born and upon which we decorate our own ideas. Man is condemned to be free; he cannot help his existence.

Is this not the darkest of pessimisms? No, says Sartre. It is optimistic toughness. A coward is one who makes himself a coward by his own free will and actions. He may choose to be heroic as he must if he is to get on with the business. Such a choice is resolute optimism, manly, tough, and real.

Existentialism, says Sartre, is nothing else than the attempt to draw all the consequent conclusions of a coherent atheism. It is not a plunge into despair. It is a doctrine of activity, choice, responsibility, value creating, a rugged optimism. Thus we exist. We become what we will. What we are in bare existence we shall never know since bare existence is

simply bare existence. Being, therefore, is nothing for itself. Being is valueless.

An evident criticism of Sartre's position can be framed into a question: Like *all* existentialists, has he not clothed his existentialism with a set of ideas or a philosophy which, by defined affirmation in the premise, is supposed to be without any character or essence? Is there, thus, not a fundamental inconsistency? The answer is, of course, Yes.

But . . . consider one more type of existentialism: that of such contemporary Roman Catholic thinkers as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. These Catholic thinkers talk about a superessential existentialism which is God, A That which is descriptively beyond all reason, A That which becomes A What in the encounter through revelation alone and not through thought. Such Roman Catholic existentialism may be traced to the thought of Thomas Aquinas who, in the fierce controversies of the thirteenth century, plagued his beloved church by affirming, against the Platonic tradition and Augustine, that God is bare existence who is A That, apart from the world and known only *analogically* by reason and only *truly* by revelation and the faith of tradition. Catholic existentialists move out of agnosticism into dogmatism, the way contemporary Protestant existentialists do. The premises cannot be argued and thus neither can the conclusions. The structure rests upon an arrogant dogmatism. Sartre's existentialism is as dogmatic and arrogant. And the "unregenerate" philosopher looks on with pity. Who is it that hath the sin of pride and conceit in his theology? Is the genuinely free philosopher—unhampered by such dogmatism—the one and only sinner?

In my judgment, existentialism, like most philosophies, possesses certain virtues. It is true that we are confronted by a Reality greater than ourselves before which we feel our inadequacy. God's existence surely does not depend upon anyone's thoughts. A Divine Reality surely is much more than our conceptualizations. But the vice of existentialism rests upon the utter arrogance of employing a philosophy woven out of the whole cloth of reason to sustain premises beyond reason—in the name of sanctity. But what is worse: I, for one, would abhor the thought that I lived in a kind of world in which thinking is held to be futile so far as one ventures into the paths of ultimate reality. Not that I would expect, as a finite individual, to encompass the Infinite as the Infinite encompasses itself. But surely something—and even much—of the Infinite must be similar to the human spirit and present to it unless the whole drama of life is a farce. The vice which lies back of Christian existentialism (above considered) is the premise of a kind of radical supernaturalism which is always haunted by the difficulty of making meaning out of God when God is placed

so far off from the world of experience. In other words, existentialism of that type is supernaturalism gone mad.

Why in the name of all that is decent in the simple religion of the simple gospel of the Founder of the faith should we hesitate to say that in the Divine we live and move and have our being, and that therefore the human mind is capable, in some measure, of becoming neighborly in thought and spirit with its Maker? The cure for existentialism that now runs riot in ecclesiastical circles is a revolt against the utter transcendence premised and a strong affirmation of the immanentism of the Real in the world and in experience. Is there not a revelation which comes in and through life's common experiences (as of old), in the more enriching experiences of saints (recorded or unrecorded), in healthy-mindedness as well as in sickness, in joy as well as in despair?

Let us beware of the fad in present-day philosophy and theology which denies all spiritual reliability to thoughts and thus invites a dogmatic transrationally-based theology on the one hand or a dogmatic irrational atheism on the other. It may well be that another form of existentialism may be constructed. If so, it would hardly be the existentialism that is now rampant in high circles. There is no philosophy or theology that can take the place of a *reasonable* interpretation of the world as the spirit of man broods upon experience. All other ways are fads which eventually must give way to something more akin to the rational human spirit which is man created in the image of his God.

HOSEA, PROPHET OF DOOM

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THE LATEST book on the prophets, by John Paterson, a Religious Book Club selection, may be taken as representative of the popular view of Hosea. Paterson says:

"Hosea is subdued and awed by the vision of the divine love. . . . To Amos judgment is irrevocable and the day of grace has passed; to Hosea mercy finally triumphs and love wins the final victory. To Amos love was exhausted, but to Hosea it was inexhaustible. Hosea sounded depths which Amos could never fathom; in a most intimate fashion the word of Jehovah came to Hosea through a tragedy in his own home."[1]

And so it goes. Everywhere in books and sermons one finds the contrast between Amos, the prophet of stern and even cruel justice, and Hosea, the prophet of love and hope.

Not only is Hosea represented as a prophet of love, mercy, and hope, but much is made of his domestic situation, or tragedy, as it is usually called. In fact, so much is made of this woman problem by some writers that they use up all their space with it and never get around to the real message of the book. Not only so, but it is the fashion to wax highly sentimental and postulate a touching drama of love, estrangement, and reconciliation in the prophet's personal life. Typical is Alex R. Gordon's version:

About the time when he began to feel the moving of the Spirit of God within his breast, Hosea had married a maiden of Israel, Gomer the daughter of Diblaim, in whose love he found his only human refuge amid the sadness and sorrow of his ministry. Three children came to add sunshine to their love: then the light of his life turned to darkness. Like so many of the daughters of Israel, Gomer had yielded to the seductions of Baal worship, and betrayed her husband's affection . . . she gave her heart to another, and fell into the grossest sin . . . she became a common drudge, and was exposed on the marketplace for the price of a slave. The sight of her degradation kindled the old passion in Hosea's breast . . . and with his own hand he bought her of her masters, to keep her awhile in some sequestered place, where she might think, and come to herself, and realize how much better it was when she reposed in her husband's affection, and then bring her back to his home, that they might once more enjoy the sacred intimacies of the happy days of old. . . .[2]

Like-minded exegetes then go on to use this personal melodrama as a key to the religious teaching of the book with regard to the nation Israel. A sufficient example is provided by H. H. Rowley:

[1] John Patterson, *The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets* (Scribner, 1948), pp. 41, 42.

[2] Alex R. Gordon, *The Prophets of the Old Testament* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), pp. 76, 77.

The prophet learned from his own tragic experience the depth of God's love. Though his own wife was unfaithful to him, and utterly unworthy of the love he gave her, yet did he love her still. And from the agony of his personal experience he learned to know what the love of God was like. If human love could thus survive the bitter wounds that faithlessness inflicted, how much more must the love of God, who chose Israel in her weakness and bondage and made her His bride, survive the cruel faithlessness of Israel? Though Israel was perverse and worthless, yet would He continue to love her until He won her. For His love was unconquerable.[3]

All this, too, from so-called "liberal" or "critical" scholars, the very men who find Amos, Isaiah, Micah, and even Jeremiah to be prophets of "doom," hurling denunciations against Israel and Judah for their sins and holding out little or no hope that the impending punishment could be averted. For example, few, if any, of these scholars would attribute the "Prince of Peace" and the "Age of Gold" oracles in Isaiah 9 and 11 respectively to the prophet Isaiah. But they will attribute every sort of glowing hopefulness or even sentimentality to Hosea. They postulate a theological development belonging to a time far beyond Hosea's. And they throw Hosea out of context with his time and out of harmony with his contemporary prophets.

Or at least so the writer began to suspect several years ago, after he had been teaching the sweetness-and-light interpretation of Hosea for alas! too long. A careful re-study confirmed this suspicion. Some of the conclusions may be stated as follows:

1. There is no real logic in the position that the "happy ending" of Amos is secondary, while the corresponding "happy ending" of Hosea is genuine. J. P. Hyatt has recently defended this position,[4] but the reasons are not convincing.

The "happy ending" of Hosea (chap. 14, vss. 1-8[5] is just as inharmonious with what precedes as is the case with Amos. The last verse of chap. 13 is the real end of the book and the most terrible word of doom ever uttered by any prophet. After this the happy ending comes as a weak anticlimax, especially when we know that the Northern Kingdom fell never to rise again. If these kindly words did come from Hosea, he may have been a good prophet, but he was a poor predictor. Therefore it is somewhat amazing to have Hyatt on one page (98) quote with approval R. E. Wolfe's dictum: "It is unthinkable that Amos and Hosea or other great prophets would have hurled thunderbolts one moment and handed out roses the next," and on the very next page (99) say: "yet it is entirely probable that Hosea 14:1-8 is from Hosea, as a natural outgrowth of his thinking."

2. Chap. 3 is no real chapter at all in the same sense as the other

[3] H. H. Rowley, *The Relevance of the Bible* (Macmillan, 1944), p. 69.

[4] J. P. Hyatt, *Prophetic Religion* (Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947), p. 99.

[5] Biblical references are given according to the English versions.

chapters, but is a brief five-verse prose interpolation entirely of a later age. Nearly every critical scholar has been able to see that vss. 4 and 5 are secondary, postexilic and Messianic. But many have failed to see that all five verses of this so-called chapter belong to the same fabric and must stand or fall together. First there is a sort of parable or figure of speech of a man who loves an unfaithful woman; then there follows the interpretation of the figure. In the very first verse the interpretation is suggested by the words, "even as the LORD loves the Israelites, though they turn to other gods and are lovers of raisin-cakes."[6] And then the interpretation continues in vss. 4 and 5. Thus the interpretation is interwoven with the figure and cannot be separated from it. Vss. 2 and 3 are incomplete in themselves, presenting no conclusion. They cannot stand alone, but require vss. 4 and 5 to complete them. And since 4 and 5 are so obviously secondary, then 2 and 3, and of course 1 also, must be secondary.

It must also be kept in mind that these five verses are prose, while the rest of the book is poetry, and that they are couched in the first person while all the rest of the book is in the third person, so far as the prophet is concerned. Someone tells about him in the third person, then the prophet addresses Israel in the second person, and then the LORD speaks through the prophet in the first person. Only the LORD speaks in the first person in the genuine parts of this book.

Since the third chapter is irrelevant to the original purpose of the book of Hosea, the long-standing argument about which verb the word "again" (Heb. *'ôdh*) in 3:1 modifies is also irrelevant to the exegesis of the book. However, the current fashion, as exemplified in the Chicago Bible, is to read, "The LORD said to me again, 'Go love a woman,' " instead of "The LORD said to me, 'Again go love a woman.' " R. H. Pfeiffer,[7] taking this into account and also noting the fact that the verse says merely "a woman" and not "Gomer, my wife," or words to that effect, sees plainly that the woman of chap. 3 has nothing to do with the wife of Hosea in chap. 1. But instead of going on to see that the woman of chap. 3 and chap. 3 as a whole have nothing to do with Hosea either, Pfeiffer introduces *a second woman* into the Hosea story, when the exegesis of the message of the prophet is already overloaded by too much concern with the woman problem. According to Pfeiffer, Hosea had a perfectly good and loyal wife, Gomer, and there was no domestic problem; in chap. 3 Hosea rehabilitates a prostitute, but this "has nothing to do with Hosea's family life." Pfeiffer apparently has overlooked the fact that the command of the LORD in 3:1 says "Go, *love* a woman." The Hebrew word is *'ehabh*, the imperative of the ordinary verb for "love." It is a strange word to use of an

[6] The *American Translation* or "Chicago Bible" is used unless otherwise noted.
[7] R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (Harper, 1941), pp. 567-569.

act of charitable rehabilitation. No, Pfeiffer's novel explanation cannot be accepted. It raises more problems than it solves. It comes close to making Hosea the adulterer instead of Gomer. This is just about what is done by W. A. Irwin, who also supposes two women, with both of whom Hosea had "a dubious union."[8] Really, Irwin's conclusion is quite logical for anyone who insists on connecting chap. 3 with Hosea.

3. It is generally agreed that at least some of the "doom" prophecies in certain of the prophets have been interpolated by "hope" editors seeking to reverse the message of doom. Chap. 2 of Hosea is a good example. Vs. 1 is the conclusion of chap. 1. The next twelve verses constitute an oracle of doom in which Israel is castigated under the figure of an adulterous woman. It ends thus (vs. 13):

> So I will punish her for the days of the Baals
> to whom she offered sacrifice,
> And decked herself with nose-ring and necklace,
> And went after her lovers,
> But forgot me, is the oracle of the LORD.

Then follow ten verses that say the exact opposite, of which vs. 15 may be cited as an example:

> Then I will give back her vineyards there,
> And the valley of Achor as a door of hope.
> And she shall respond there as in the days of her youth,
> As in the day when she came up from the land of Egypt.

These ten verses of hope would seem to be a unit standing in sharp contrast to the twelve verses of doom. It is hardly conceivable that any one man, even an ancient Oriental, could have contradicted himself so completely. Yet so firmly fixed is the idea that hope must be found in Hosea that two such eminent scholars as Hyatt and Pfeiffer seek to salvage certain of these hope verses for Hosea, though they do not agree entirely on which verses are genuine. Hyatt[9] accepts vss. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20; Pfeiffer,[10] vss. 14, 19, and 20.

4. In chap. 1, a similar situation is found. Vss. 2 to 9 (omitting 7) give a cumulative message of doom against Israel symbolized by the increasingly harsh names of the three children. Then follow three verses (1:10, 11, and 2:1) of completely opposite tenor. Both Hyatt and Pfeiffer reject these verses; hence it would seem unnecessary to argue the case further at this point. But one cannot help wondering why they apply one method to chap. 2 and another to chap. 1 (and to Amos, Isaiah, and Micah).

[8] J. M. P. Smith, *The Prophets and Their Times*, 2nd ed. revised by W. A. Irwin (University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 70-76.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 569, 570.

5. Coming now to the heart of the book and the heart of the problem, even if it be granted that every verse of hope in the Book of Hosea is genuine, there is still the stark fact that we have in this book ten solid chapters of the most devastating denunciation in the Bible. In these chapters, 4–13, there is only one possible ray of hope in one verse, as will be noted below. These ten chapters constitute a bulk of doom and denunciation, compared with which the hope passages are few and weak in any case. These ten chapters are seldom read, but will not be quoted or summarized here, for lack of space, and for fear of frightening tender-minded romanticists. But the last verse of chap. 13 must be repeated here, because in it the denunciation rises to a shocking climax and because it is probably the end of the Book of Hosea, though it is seldom given any attention:

> Samaria must bear her guilt;
> For she has rebelled against her God;
> They must fall by the sword,
> Their children be dashed in pieces,
> And their pregnant women be ripped open.

It should be remembered that ten chapters of similar material precede and that the hope material constitutes no more than one fifth of the book. Has anyone ever taken account of the sheer bulk of doom material in this book? Moreover, is it conceivable that the man who uttered the above-quoted words could have given a romantic message of sweetness and light?

6. It was mentioned above that there is only one possibly genuine verse in chaps. 4–13 that could contain a glimmer of hope. That verse is 11:8. On examining it in its context, it is found that the first six verses of chap. 11 are clearly doom verses. Vs. 7 is so corrupt as to be unintelligible. It shows no evidence of hope. The last verse (vs. 12) belongs with chap. 12. It consists of two lines of doom, plus a Judah interpolation. Vss. 10 and 11 are hopeful enough, indeed so much so that practically all scholars, including Hyatt and Pfeiffer, reject them. That leaves only vs. 8, the verse in question, and vs. 9. These two verses are paragraphed together in the Chicago Bible and translated as follows:

> 8. How can I give you up, O Ephraim!
> How surrender you, O Israel!
> How can I treat you like Admah!
> How make you like Zeboim!
> My mind turns against me;
> My sympathies also grow hot.
> 9. I will not carry out my fierce anger;
> Nor will I *again*[11] destroy Ephraim;
> For I am God and not man,
> The holy one in the midst of you;
> And I will not destroy.

[11] Emphasis added.

The last line is uncertain, since the Hebrew says literally, "And I will not come into the city." Otherwise, the writer approves of this arrangement and interpretation. The two verses seem to hang together. The word "again" in vs. 9 clearly shows that this verses is later than 722 B.C. For surely one cannot speak of destroying a country "again" until it has already been destroyed at least once.

Thus is vs. 9 eliminated, and only vs. 8 remains as possibly genuine. But the writer believes that the two verses hang together, as implied by the arrangement in the Chicago Bible, and that both verses together constitute a post-Hoseanic interpolation by a hope editor. Indeed, he considers vss. 8, 9, 10, and 11 as a solid interpolation.

But three recent writers seek to retain vss. 8 and 9, and thereby make a last stand for Hosea as a prophet of mercy and forgiveness. These writers are Hyatt,[12] Paterson,[13] and Rowley.[14] Realizing that the two verses hang together, they all seek to salvage vs. 9 by the same device, namely, getting rid of the crucial word "again" by refusing to translate according to the natural meaning of the Hebrew. 11:9b, as given above, is translated

Nor will I *again* destroy Ephraim.

There is no conjunction at the beginning of the clause in Hebrew; hence a more literal translation is

I will not *again* destroy Ephraim.

Hyatt translates

I will not *turn* to destroy Ephraim!

Paterson, Rowley, AV, and ASV translate

I will not *return* to destroy Ephraim.

But the Hebrew is

lō' 'āshûbh l'shaḥēth 'ephrāyim,

and the idiom is *shûbh* plus the infinitive. Of this idiom, the Gesenius-Kautzsch-Cowley *Grammar* says that it means "again"; no exceptions to this meaning are noted, and a number of examples are cited from various parts of the Hebrew Bible, including Hos. 11:9. And the following general description of the idiom is offered:

> In almost all these examples the principal idea is properly contained in the infinitive, whilst the governing verb strictly speaking contains only a subordinate adverbial statement, and is therefore best rendered in English by an adverb.[15]

[12] *Op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 56.
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 69.
[15] *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*, edited by E. Kautzsch, revised by A. E. Cowley (Oxford, 1910), p. 350, n. 2.

Now, it is understandable that the King James translators did not know Hebrew too well, that the Revisers slavishly followed the King James version, and that Paterson and Rowley would hardly think of questioning these authorities. But what is to be thought of a competent Hebraist like Professor Hyatt, when he thus follows tradition rather than modern grammatical science to change the crystal-clear statement,

I will not *again* destroy Ephraim,

into the weak and enigmatic,

I will not *turn* to destroy Ephraim?

Undoubtedly Hyatt's book is one of the best things on the prophets that has appeared in many a year, in spite of its modest size. Hence, it can only be concluded that the author is still *unconsciously* a victim to some extent of the romantic illusions mentioned at the outset—illusions which caused R. E. Wolfe to say of Hosea: "There is perhaps no other book in the Bible about which such a large percentage of what has been written is untrue."[16]

7. Conclusion. Nothing particularly new has been presented here, although some of the details are new. The view taken has been taken before by a few scholars. But the opposite view has been taken by so many, who have spilt so much ink in behalf of their interpretation, that Hosea treated as a prophet of doom still strikes the average reader or hearer as something shockingly heretical. Amos, Isaiah, Micah, and even Jeremiah are now easily regarded as prophets of doom. Yet Hosea, the most doom-minded of all the prophets, still remains to be properly rediscovered by most people, even most scholars. Hence the need for everyone to make up his mind on this question.

The writer has made up his. He stands with L. W. Batten,[17] who finds Hosea entirely a prophet of doom. He agrees with H. G. May,[18] who says that there was no "revelation that Yahweh would cast off Israel, only to take her to himself once more in a later period," and that "Hosea preached a message of uncompromising doom descending from a deity no longer compassionate toward Israel." Likewise R. H. Pfeiffer,[19] after some apparent uncertainties, concludes as follows:

> Thus Hosea's early hope for a national conversion gave way to tragic assurance that Jehovah would inevitably be forced, notwithstanding the urgent plea of his love, to execute the death sentence against the people. In sharp contrast to Hosea, the postexilic annotators of his book painted alluring pictures of a national resurrection

[16] R. E. Wolfe, *Meet Amos and Hosea* (Harper, 1945), p. 81.
[17] *JBL* XLVIII (1929), pp. 257-273.
[18] *JBL* LV (1936), pp. 285-291.
[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 573.

in the glorious millennium to follow devastation of the land and deportation of the nation.

Commendable too is the stand of R. E. Wolfe,[20] who says:

> In the last scene, Hosea told how the capital city soon would be subdued, fallen by the sword of conquest. *There would be no hope.* As the Israelites had done to others, so now they themselves were to be treated.

One may also quote Oesterley and Robinson,[21] who, after a somewhat fantastic discussion of Hosea's domestic life, nevertheless finally say:

> For Israel Hosea saw little hope. There are passages (of disputed authorship, as we have seen) which suggest the possibility of repentance and restoration. But the former was an indispensable condition of the latter, and, if it were lacking, the people's ruin was inevitable. It was better that the nation should cease to be than that it should continue as it was. Yahweh loved Israel with a passion so great that, while He would restore her if she would allow Him, He would yet, if need be, destroy her utterly.

But in agreeing with these scholars that Hosea was entirely a prophet of doom, the writer does not subscribe to their various and weird interpretations of the woman problem. It does not matter whether Hosea's wife was a good woman, a bad woman, or a prostitute, sacred or profane. But one should draw the line on Hosea's having two wives, or one wife and one mistress, or two concubines, not because such things did not happen in those days, but because no evidence for them is seen in the book. Otherwise, the less said about the woman the better. Very little can be known about her from the scant verses of chap. 1. The important thing about the woman is that she provides the figure of speech in chap. 2. Yahweh is the faithful husband. Israel is the erring wife. From there we should go on to the real message of the book, beginning in chap. 4. This message is a tough-minded grappling with the hard facts of human sin in ancient times. These facts have not changed much today, in spite of the era of romanticism through which biblical exegesis has recently gone.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 148. Emphasis added.

[21] *An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament* (Macmillan, 1934), pp. 353 f.

SOME THEOLOGICAL CONTINUITIES IN THE CRISIS THEOLOGY

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No THEOLOGICAL system comes *de novo* from the mind of a Christian. It is always determined, in part, by the thought and living faith which preceded and surround him. Usually, it has Jesus of Nazareth as its centre. The Christian theologian is invigorated by that personality to say what the Christian mind finds in God and man. The conceptions of other Christian thinkers may be employed to give strength and authority to the views of a contemporary Christian thinker as he draws forth his ideas from the fructifying centre in Jesus Christ. Thus he is always debtor to those beyond himself; as Paul put it, "I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians" (Rom. 1:14).

Those who regard the crisis theology of the present generation as something totally new in the stream of Christian thought should bear in mind the observation just made. Barth is as much tied to the past, indeed many would say more so, than are other present-day Christian thinkers. There are continuities in his thought, running back like tendrils to curl around conceptions in Kierkegaard, Calvin, Luther, Augustine, and Paul, to mention but the chief thinkers upon whom his thinking depends. Such continuities can be found in his pronouncements upon such major themes as God, man, sin, salvation, Jesus Christ, grace, faith, and revelation. In this introductory paper to so large a theme, we shall discuss only the theological continuities in connection with Barth's conceptions of God and revelation, believing these sufficient to establish the thesis that crisis theologies generally (Augustinianism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Kierkegaardianism) draw the same common elements from the reservoir of Christian faith and thought.

In tracing out the historical antecedents of Barthian conceptions of God and revelation, we are not doing something upon which Barth himself would frown. Indeed, in his basic book, *The Doctrine of the Word of God,* as in other of his writings, he cites considerable passages from Luther, Calvin, Kierkegaard, Augustine, and other Christian predecessors to support his key positions. We imply thereby that Barth in no way considers himself an innovator, but simply one who emphasizes and restates the essential Christian faith which has flowed down through the Christian ages.

God

Concerning God, Barth is always true to his conviction that the infinite God is always unknowable and indescribable. The hidden God

remains hidden. He is the Wholly Other. Even when we say we know him our knowledge is of an incomprehensible Reality. Consider, for instance, the personality of God. Barth writes: "God is personal, but personal in an *incomprehensible* way, in so far as the conception of His personality surpasses all our views of personality. This is so, just because He and He alone is a true, real and genuine person."[1] Although it is beside the point here, we may pause to ask: If God is above all our views of personality and above all which we breathe into that concept, how, then, can we possibly know he is a personal God? The truth is that, for Barth, God, even as personal, remains hidden from us. Even here the Swiss theologian does not abandon his emphasis upon the transcendental, majestic God.

Barth also contends that even through the knowledge which comes by faith, than which "no more objective and strict form of knowledge can exist, and [than which] no type of knowledge can lay claim more definitely to universal validity,"[2] no full knowledge of God comes to us. Even when God reveals himself to the man of faith, or, more accurately, to the man to whom he gives faith, still that man with faith "will confess God as the God of majesty and therefore as the God unknown to us."[3] To put it in brief conclusion, in Barth's thought we have the majestic, hidden, incomprehensible, though personal God, who is made known to us, mediated to us, in his Word made flesh in Jesus Christ.

To the student of Christian thought Barth's transcendentalism is essentially a philosophical conception of God. Against such an indictment our theologian would express furious dissent, since he abhors all philosophy and all rationalism. Yet his view of God is scarcely different from that presented by those philosophically motivated Christians of the second, third, and fourth centuries. Influenced by the Platonic tradition of a transcendental deity lifted high above the corruptness of phenomenality, they introduced this same emphasis into the stream of Christian thought. Their God was also a high God, far removed from earth, transcendent, indescribable, unknowable, hidden, coming into touch with men only through an intermediary, who, for most of them, was found in the Logos who was Christ. It is certainly clear that in such emphases these early, philosophically-minded Christians were not following Jesus or the early gospels, but rather the philosophic thought of the Greeks. Being transcendent, this God is above the reach of man, ineffable, unapproachable, and unknowable in his innermost essence. He is absolute, attributeless existence, by which they meant that he is in himself that which never can be known.

[1] Karl Barth, *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God According to the Teaching of the Reformation,* transl. by J. L. M. Haire and I. Henderson (Scribner, 1939), p. 31.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

It is not difficult to isolate concise statements concerning such a God in the writings of these early Christians. Justin Martyr, about the middle of the second century, emphasizes the divine transcendence by declaring frequently that there is no name for God which describes him. As he puts it: "For no one can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dare to say that there is a name, he raves with a hopeless madness."[4] That is an interesting way of declaring that all our descriptions of God never touch his essence. In his *Dialogue with Trypho,* Justin puts forth the thesis that the Jewish Scriptures speak of two gods. The first of these was the supreme and unbegotten God, the ineffable Father and Lord of all. This God never appeared on the earth, and human eyes have never seen him. He "neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is. . . ."[5] The second of these is the God of the theophanies, the divine Son, who repeatedly came down to earth, walking and talking with men. He was a second God, a distinct being from the first God, although one with him in purpose and will. This second God spake unto Moses, visited with Abraham, came down to see the tower of Babel, shut Noah within the ark, and was finally incarnated in Christ. But, and this is the point to be kept in the foreground, over and above this second God is the high God, incomprehensible, indescribable, whom men can never reach and who remains hidden.

Other writers of this early period also set forth conceptions of the Christian God reminiscent of the Platonic transcendentalism. Minucius Felix, who wrote his defense of Christianity under the title *Octavius* somewhere between A.D. 180 and 250, states therein concerning God: "Our heart is too limited to understand Him, and therefore we are then worthily estimating Him when we say that He is beyond estimation."[6] About the turn of the third century, Clement of Alexandria likewise declared: "We may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not. . . . The First Cause is not then in space, but above space, and time, and name, and conception."[7] In similar vein, a generation later, Origen was to declare in the first complete Christian work of systematic theology that God is incomprehensible, one "whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human understanding, even the purest and brightest."[8]

Such statements from Origen, Clement, Minucius Felix, as well as from Justin Martyr, make it clear that in the early Christian centuries thinkers thought of God as the "Wholly Other," just as Rudolf Otto and Karl Barth are doing in contemporary times. As many of the early Christians proclaimed the utter separation of the high God and the world, so

[4] Justin Martyr, *Apol.* i, 61, 11.
[5] Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 127.
[6] Minucius Felix, *Octav.* 18.
[7] Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* v, 11.
[8] Origen, *De Princ.* i, 1, 5.

now does Barth. The two are totally unlike and exclusive. At no point does God touch the external world with its corrupted nature and evil matter. No part of the world is, therefore, a manifestation or revelation of the infinite, majestic Deity. Here "otherness" implies "exclusive separation." Such thinking ends in the entire divorcement of God and our human experience. Through no experience of ours can we find God, nor through any effort of our minds can we comprehend him. We are complete aliens until he wills to give himself to us. As Barth puts it pointedly: "If we do not wish to end by really defining ourselves, when we think that we are defining God, we can only take the second way and therefore hold fast to the *incomprehensible* majesty in which God meets us in His revelation, the majesty of His person as Father, Son and Holy Spirit."[9]

How does this ineffable God reach mankind if he is transcendent and hidden from men? The answer of the early, philosophically-minded Christians whom we have been considering, as well as the answer of Karl Barth, is that the high God is linked with the race supremely through Jesus Christ, the Logos or the Word. We noted this emphasis in Justin Martyr. It is not necessary to labor the point, as abundant illustration of this truth may be found in Clement, Origen, and also in Barth. In this way the glory of God is reflected to men, but, it must be stressed, his full, indescribable essence is not thus brought to them.

Other aspects of the Divine Being particularly stressed by Barth reside in the sovereignty and majesty of God. The Barthian reaction marks a clear return to the all-powerfulness of God, who is above and unlike man, with a consequent emphasis upon the impotence of our human kind. Here are caught the twin concepts of majesty and sovereignty. God is majestic; that is, he is other than and above the world, completely unlike that which enters into this mundane sphere. God is sovereign; that is, he exercises absolute control over the world. Since his control is absolute, man is helpless in himself to do any good thing. In these formulations concerning God and man the student of Christian thought quickly recognizes that they represent no new departure, but rather a return to, or continuance of, that aloofness of God and that pessimism about man which have for fifteen hundred years muddied the waters of Christian theology.

Implicit in the ideas of the sovereignty and majesty of God is the view that God is one who "can and must be free and therefore have dominion over all existence which differs from His existence and over all essence which differs from His essence."[10] That position at once places man in the scheme of existence as an inferior, subordinate, and divinely-dominated creature. These emphases upon the plenitude of God's power and the pitiful impotence of man are characteristic of the pessimism of

[9] Karl Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 33. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Augustine, the Reformation, and Protestant orthodoxy. Augustine declared, for instance: "No one is sufficient for himself, either to begin or to perfect faith."[11] That means that no man can choose God for himself or by his own powers obtain knowledge of him. The will to believe is from God alone. As the bishop of Hippo states the matter: "It is God who works in man the actual willingness to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy."[12] All is done by God's grace, both the remitting of the evil things we have done and the aiding of us to depart from the evil and do the good.[13]

Similar propositions appear in Luther's thought. It was a basic doctrine with him that "God works all things in all things." If men are saved, it is not because of anything they have done or can do. "Just as faith," asserts the Reformer, "is proclaimed without merit or work on your part, it is also bestowed regardless of your works, without any of your merits. It is given of pure grace."[14] The fact is that in his natural condition man is totally incapable of turning to God and loving him for his own sake. His will is bent back upon itself. Until God straightens that out so that man can direct himself to the Father without ulterior motives, his salvation is necessarily abortive. Man cannot even lay the first stone in the structure of the saved life. "Before you can cry to God," Luther preached, "and seek him God must come to you and must have found you. . . . God must lay the first stone and begin with you, if you are to seek him and pray to him. He is present when you begin to seek. If he were not you could not accomplish anything but mere sin. . . ."[15] It is thus apparent that God triumphs over man's blindness, obtuseness, and unwillingness. The human individual is helpless before the divine attack. His free will is ground to powder insofar as any human ability to oppose the divine sovereignty is concerned. God alone has full freedom, by which Luther means the power to do what he wills when he wills it. Against such power man is impotent.

Luther, however, refuses to allow his quenching of free will in man to be interpreted as paving the way to a rigid determinism. He contends, on the contrary, that while God works in the wicked, it is their own fault if they do evil. To many that will not come as a convincing argument. Freedom means the power to cast the final vote; not to have some one else, not even God, drop a vote in the ballot box for you.

When we come to John Calvin, we find that he carries the Reforma-

[11] Augustine, *De prædest.* 5.

[12] Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* 60 [xxxiv].

[13] *Cf.* Augustine, *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* ii, 227; vi, 15.

[14] "The People of Law and Grace," in J. N. Lenker (ed.), *Luther's Epistle Sermons,* vol. I, p. 227.

[15] Christ Enters Jerusalem," in J. N. Lenker (ed.), *Luther's Church Postil Gospels,* vol. I, p. 25.

tion determinism through to its logical conclusion. God's omnipotent will controls the universe, determining all things. The divine will is final, there being nothing above it or back of it to determine or control it. To quote Calvin: "We make God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in his own wisdom, has, from the remotest eternity, decreed what he would do, and now, by his own power, executes what he has decreed."[16] For Calvin, divine causality causes all. Nothing has happened nor can happen except as God has willed it. Included in that is man's salvation or damnation. We are impotent to do any good thing unless God decrees it. "Whence we assert, that not only the heaven and the earth, and inanimate creatures, but also the deliberations and volitions of men are so governed by his [God's] providence, as to be directed to the end appointed by it."[17] The purely arbitrary will of God alone explains anything and everything. Justification is by faith, but by a faith which God's grace alone can create in the human heart and mind.

Thus it turns out that Barth's emphasis upon the divine majesty and sovereignty is simply a continuance of the emphasis in all crisis theologies upon the almighty power of God and the helpless plight of man.

Revelation

What, we now ask, are the antecedents of Barth's theory of revelation, of his doctrine of the Word of God? Suffice it to say here that whatever else the Word of God is to him, it is the elemental and indispensable condition of any saving work in man. The Word is directly God's work. In it *"Deus dixit"*; "God speaks." In it God gives or reveals himself to man.

The concept of the Word of God has functioned in Christian thought since its beginning. In the New Testament it is thought of as a heavenly summons,[18] a power which penetrates to the deep places of life,[19] a force which produces a new life in us,[20] and the power of God which preserves in us the new life of salvation.[21]

It is not until Augustine (d. 430), however, that we find a fully formulated doctrine of the Word of God. He is the first in Christian thought closely to connect the sacraments, which he considers essential for the building up of the church, with the word. It is to him that we owe the expression "by word and sacrament." He writes: "God begets of the Church sons. . . . We are born spiritually then, and in spirit we are born by the word and sacrament. The Spirit is present that we may

[16] Calvin, *Institutes*, i, 16, 8.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Hebr. 3:1; I Pet. 5:10.
[19] Hebr. 4:12.
[20] Jas. 1:18.
[21] I Pet. 1:23-25; Jas. 1:21.

be born."[22] The significance of this view is that the same divine reality which comes through the sacrament comes also through the word, exerting divine and saving power within us. Augustine tells us that we may hear this Word as it is preached, sung, or chanted by other men. Moreover, if we receive it properly, it brings God's grace to us. As he puts it:

> Therefore, as the Apostle James saith, "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak." . . . Let us rejoice in the hearing that comes from the noiseless speaking of the truth within us. For although, when the sound is outwardly uttered, as by one that readeth, or proclaimeth, or preacheth, or disputeth, or commandeth, or comforteth, or exhorteth, or even by one that sings or accompanies his voice on an instrument, those who do so may fear to defile their feet, when they aim at pleasing men with the secretly active desire of human applause. Yet the one who hears such with a willing and pious mind, has no room for self-gratulation in the labours of others; and with no self-inflation, but with the joy of humility, rejoices because of the Master's words of truth. Accordingly, in those who hear with willingness and humility, and spend a tranquil life in sweet and wholesome studies, the holy Church will take delight, and may say, "I sleep, and my heart waketh."[23]

It is not difficult to see in such a declaration the germ of Karl Barth's theory that the Bible becomes the Word as God speaks to us through it. Here is Augustine writing of "the noiseless speaking of the truth within us." Moreover, that desirable result is not dependent upon the way in which vain or self-seeking men utter the truth or sing it, but rather upon God doing something within the "willing and pious mind" of the listener. The lineaments of Barth's doctrine are here drawn in the early fifth century.

The independence of the spiritual result in the life of the hearer from the way in which the truth is spoken by preacher, comforter, or reader, is eloquently stated by the bishop of Hippo in an earlier passage of his *Lectures on the Gospel according to St. John.* Indeed, man can utter words which appeal to the ear, but Someone higher than man alone can speak to the heart and the understanding. So Augustine asks: "Hearing has been wrought by me, but by whom has understanding?" Immediately he proceeds to answer in these words which we quote at some length:

> I have spoken to the ear, that you might hear; who has spoken to your heart for understanding? Doubtless some one has also said something to your heart, that not only the noise of words might strike your ear, but something also of the truth might descend into your heart. Some one has spoken also to your heart, but you do not see him. If, brethren, you have understood, your heart also has been spoken to. Intelligence is the gift of God. And who, if you have understood, has spoken so in your heart, but He to whom the Psalm says, "Give me understanding, that I may learn Thy commandments?" For example, the bishop has spoken. What has he said? some one asks. You repeat what he has spoken, and add, He has said the truth. Then another, who has not understood, says, What has he said, or what is it

[22] Augustine, *Lectures on the Gospel acc. to St. John* xii, 5.
[23] *Ibid.*, lvii, 3.

you are praising? Both have heard me; I have spoken to both; but to one of them God has spoken. If we may compare small things with great (for what are we to Him?), something, I know not what, of an incorporeal and spiritual kind God works in us, which is neither sound to strike the ear, nor colour to be discerned by the eyes, nor smell to enter the nostrils, nor taste to be judged by the mouth, nor anything hard or soft to be sensible to the touch; yet something there is which it is easy to feel,—impossible to explain. . . . God, as I was saying, speaks in our hearts without sound.[24]

Certainly it is not difficult to see that if we had not tagged Augustine's name to such a quotation, we might easily conclude that Karl Barth was presenting his doctrine of the Word of God. Here, in the bishop of Hippo, is the declaration, as in the contemporary theology of crisis, that God works through his Word to impart grace and to save.

When we come down through the Christian centuries more than a thousand years from Augustine, we discover a similarly emphatic doctrine of the Word of God in the thought of Martin Luther. Casting aside all works and speculations as useless for salvation, he places his faith in the all-sufficiency of "the most holy word of God, the gospel of Christ." Compared to it sacred offices, fasts, prayers, abstaining from certain meats, or whatever works can be done through or in the body, are ruthlessly excoriated as of no profit whatsoever. Hence the Christian should "hold it for certain and firmly established that the soul can do without everything except the word of God, without which none at all of its wants are provided for. But, having the word, it is rich and wants for nothing, since that is the word of life, of truth, of light, of peace, of justification, of salvation, of joy, of liberty, of wisdom, of virtue, of grace, of glory, and of every good thing."[25]

While Luther distinguishes between the outward and the inward Word, he contends that the former is always productive of the latter when properly used. That is to say, there is an outward Word in the pages of the Bible, but this is not sufficient for us. Somehow, it must become a living Word within us. As Luther puts the matter: "When the outward [Word] goes rightly, the inward [Word] does not fail to appear; for God never suffers his word to go forth without (bringing) fruit. He is with it, and himself teaches inwardly what he gives outwardly through the priest." [26] Scarcely could any declaration on the doctrine of the Word be a more accurate harbinger of what the Barthian position was to be than that.

Barth himself, in his *The Doctrine of the Word of God,* cites Luther extensively in support of his conception of the Word, thereby acknowledg-

[24] *Ibid.*, xl, 5.
[25] Luther, "Concerning Christian Liberty," in Henry Wace and C. A. Buckheim, *Luther's Primary Works* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1896), pp. 257 f.
[26] Luther, "Auslegung deutsch des Vaterunsers für die einfältigen Laien," in his *Werke,* Weimar ed., vol. II, p. 112.

ing that he is not putting forth anything fundamentally new, but is simply recovering what strikes him as a necessary, but neglected, Christian truth. Indeed, so complete is the resemblance between Barth's and Luther's doctrines of the Word that one has to look twice when he reads such quotations as the following, to be sure he is reading Luther's words rather than Barth's:

God's Word is not named, for it is sent. That is: let none think that God's Word cometh to earth of man's device. If it is to be God's Word, it must be sent. Otherwise it is impossible that Holy Writ could be understood and expounded by any arbitrary device. It availeth not that one should speak and he not called, for God's Word cometh alone because God sendeth it. Where not, the whole world cannot utter that which could redeem from sins and comfort consciences. If He had not sent the Word and the office, we had had nought. . . . It cometh not except it be sent from heaven. . . . But without God's sending cometh no Word into the world. Hath it grown out of my heart, cling I to Chrysostom, Augustine, and Ambrose, still 'tis not God's Word. For 'tis a vast difference 'twixt the Word that is sent from heaven and that which of my own choice and device I invent. As for Holy Writ, so it be grown on earth, thus saith John: He that is of the earth speaketh of earthly things. Therefore must we learn to base our blessedness soundly upon the power of God's Word and not upon our device or opinion (Luther, *Ausl. des* 3 *und* 4 *Kap. Joh.* 1538 f. W. edn. 47, p. 193, 1. 10).[27]

Now I and any man who speaketh Christ's Word may freely boast that his mouth is Christ's mouth. I am certain that my word is not mine but Christ's Word, therefore my mouth must also be His whose Word it speaketh (Luther *Eine treue Vermahnung,* 1522 W. edn. 8, p. 683, 1. 13).[28]

Hereby are all men upon earth subject to the preacher's office, as the apostles and their successors led on God's behalf, so that they must be submissive to the same and follow it, if they would otherwise have God's grace and be blest (Luther, *Sermon on John* 16:5 f., 1533 E. edn. 3, p. 434).[29]

On that last day God will say to me, Hast thou also preached that? I shall say, Yea, exactly. Then God will say to thee, Hast thou also heard that? and thou shalt answer, Yea. And He saith further, Wherefore hast thou then not believed? And then thou sayest, Oh, I held it for a word of man, since a poor chaplain or village parson uttered it. So shall the same word which sticketh in thine heart accuse thee and be thine accuser and judge at the last day. For it is God's Word, 'tis God Himself thou has heard, as Christ saith, "He that heareth you heareth me"; and I have sufficiently done mine office for the tribunal and presence of God, in that I have shewn up thy sins and offences and chastised thee therefor, and am pure of thy blood. See thou then to it, how thou standest (Luther, *Exposition of John* 3-4, W. edn. 47, p. 120, 1. 28).[30]

One further word is necessary regarding Luther's thought of the Word. He regards it, coming with the sacraments and through the written and spoken Word, as the creator of the inner, spiritual church. As he conceives of an outward and inward Word, so he thinks also of an outer

[27] Cited by Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God,* transl. by G. T. Thomson (Scribner, 1936), p. 101.
[28] *Op. cit.,* p. 107.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.* (pp. 107 f.).

and inner church; the one the visible organization, the other the communion of the saints. In his emphatic language: "For where baptism and the gospel are, there let no one doubt that there are saints, even though it should be only children in their cradles."[31] Without the Word, consequently, there is neither a true church nor any salvation possible for mankind.

In Calvin also we find similar emphases to those which we have discovered in Luther. He too finds Word and sacraments necessary for the creation of the church: "For wherever we find the word of God purely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ, there, it is not to be doubted, is a Church of God."[32]

In conclusion, let it be stated that what we find in the crisis theology is not something new, but a type of reaction common in Christianity whenever the adverse forces of life seem too much for men to handle. Augustine had his invading barbarians and the collapse of Roman civilization, Luther and Calvin the formidable age and titanic strength of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, Barth and Brunner the collapse of Western civilization on the heels of the first global conflict. In such crises two things generally happen. First, God is exalted into an estate of complete sovereignty so that he alone is held responsible for the successful conclusion of the human experiment. Secondly, an enervating pessimism regarding man is generated which pictures him as helpless to do any permanent or saving good until God works in him. The human capacities and qualities are debased and held in contempt. Such moods were characteristic of Augustine and the Reformers. In modern thought they enjoy rebirth in Kierkegaard, Barth, and, to lesser degree, in Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr. All of which reveals that in the crisis theology we witness a response which is to be expected in a generation when the civilization of the Christian world seems to be disintegrating. The unusual event is not the Barthian response to our perilous situation in the Western world; the unusual fact would rather have been the lack of the advent of a theology of crisis.

We need also to note that such a reaction as that which has come from Barth, Brunner, and others is not all loss. Their cries do call attention to the desperateness of the human situation. They do insist that religion begins with God and that men cannot have faith apart from him. They do stress the fact that faith is not a rational achievment, but a passionate belief that divine Reality is such as we find it in Jesus Christ. They do proclaim that apart from God our human efforts turn to ashes and our

[31] Luther, "Von dem Papstthum zu Rom wider den hochberühmten Romanisten" in his *Werke*, Weimar ed., vol. VI, p. 301.
[32] Calvin, *Institutes*, iv, 1, 9.

sunrises into darkest night. They do suggest that man is not sufficient unto himself for life, but is dependent upon the proclamation of God's living Word, through which, by means of Bible, preacher, and revealed Word, God himself comes to the consciences of men. Much of this is good, revealing that religion is a coöperation between God and man, with God always taking the initiative and himself constituting the fundamental item of faith.

The point at which Barthianism irks the liberal Christian mind and leaves it cold is in its twin and exclusive emphases of the divine transcendence and our human impotence. Not that God is not transcendent. The liberal so believes, but he also contends that God is also immanent, expressing his creative genius throughout the universe which he is ever creating and always sustaining, as well as through the essential goodness of the world and human life. It is not that God is above us to which the liberal objects, but he does demur when he is asked to affirm that God is with us only in a tiny segment of "experience" (Barth would not use this term, but rather "revelation" or "divine confrontation"); namely, in that which comes only when God gives his Word to us. The liberal also finds God in the beauty of the world, in the unpremeditated goodness of men, and in the moral order of reality within and without himself. He refuses to close these doors of *revelation,* keeping open only one aperture through which the Divine can come to man.

Moreover, the man of liberal, Christian persuasion finds the traditional, theological pessimism concerning man exceedingly distasteful. He is conscious that such pessimism stems from the theology of Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Kierkegaard rather than from the religion of Jesus of Nazareth. Of all whose names are written in the Bible, it is safe to say that none nourished such a moral optimism concerning man as did Jesus. Although he did speak of men as "being evil," he did not apparently mean by that an hereditary contamination which polluted the entire human race. Men were evil because of their evil minds and because they had directed their wills into wrong channels. If they would, they could be quite the opposite, forgiving their enemies, praying for those who despitefully used them, sharing their possessions, returning good for evil, and giving to him that would borrow of them. Through such a life, springing from the directing of their wills into spiritual ways of life, they could become the sons of the Father who is in heaven.[33] The liberal prefers to follow Jesus in his moral optimism about man rather than the crisis theologians with their devastating pessimism rooting in the Judæo-Greek stream of thought concerning human nature.

In a word, the liberal believes that the Barthian expects too much

[33] Matt. 5:38-48.

of God and not enough of man. Through his excessive supernaturalism, the Barthian has thrown out of balance, if indeed he has not completely exchanged it for a theological persuasion, the emphasis of coöperation between the human and the divine which constitutes a central stress of the gospel. Not only is it written that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son," but it is also stated that the Prodigal had to "come to himself" and arise and come to his father before the father received him. Moreover, it is stated that until men receive the Son of God they are not given "power to become the sons of God." Man is not helpless according to the "Word." He can and must do something before God will enter his life to give the increase. Here the liberal parts company with the Barthian.

One word more! Understanding that Barthianism is a crisis theology, we should comprehend that when the crisis is past it will likely lose a considerable amount of its present momentum. We need not, therefore, be unduly disturbed by its loud cries to the effect that there can be no deliverance apart from the moment of catastrophic judgment beyond all thought. On the contrary, the more liberally minded Christian will work on in the quiet though less dramatic faith that this is God's world, and that here in all kindness, and love, and truth, and self-denying sacrifice the same God who became incarnate in Christ continues, though in lesser degree, to impart himself to all sensitive souls. Hence the liberal Christian will refuse to toss lightly aside the dignity, the beauty, and the love discernible in human personality, both non-Christian and Christian. Perhaps, while these are never perfect revelations of the fullness of God, they may yet be broken rays of the divine beauty. Foolish indeed should we be were we to neglect even such partial lights leading to the full light of God in Christ. Such are minor notes of the Holy Spirit apart from which the full symphony of God cannot be heard. With the liberal Christian, therefore, it is not *either* God *or* the world, but it is *both* God *and* the world. He expects divine judgment to come to every man and nation sooner or later, but he also believes that God speaks to us in other ways than through the voice of judgment. If the judgment does not come to him now, consequently, the liberal refuses to grow desperate as every disciple of Barth must grow if God does not act directly in his life. He contends, on the contrary, that the ebbing and flowing tides of history disclose that in God's good time judgment and redemption alike come to men and societies. In that calmer faith of long perspective the liberal Christian works through today, thankful for whatever light breaks into his darkness from the world, his fellows, and the divine Spirit, but also confident that, as he is faithful to the highest and the best, the good God will bring judgment out of time in his good time and redemption out of his love for his faithful followers.

UNITY, BUT COMMON SENSE TOO

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MANY YEARS AGO at the very beginning of my ministry I made arrangements for an exchange of pulpits with the minister of another denomination in an adjoining town. While we were talking over the exchange, I spoke rather sorrowfully of the denominational differences which kept us apart. "Well, Brother Thurlow," he replied, "you know that while we hope to be prophets of God, we are compelled to be priests of our denominations." As I have heard through the years more and more talk of the sins of our divisions and how we ought to have one great Protestant church, I have felt—perhaps it is because I am somewhat ornery and individualistic by nature—that our denominations were not so evil after all, that in our present state of spiritual development they were and are a good thing, and that the prayer of Jesus that they all may be one had nothing whatsoever to do with bringing us all into one great external fellowship.

Very possibly my own religious experiences have influenced my thinking in this direction. As a boy I was in Sunday schools of three denominations: first a Unitarian, next a Universalist, later on a Congregational. I was converted when eighteen years of age by the preaching of a Methodist minister in the Y.M.C.A., became a member of a Baptist church, went to a Baptist college and theological seminary, was a Baptist minister for ten years, and then transferred to the Congregational fellowship. While my children were small, I exchanged pulpits for six summers with pastors of other denominations—Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist, and The United Church of Canada. I preached the same sermons that I had preached during the winter in my own church, and enjoyed the same Christian fellowship in these various churches which I had experienced in my own parish. I found during these summer ministries the oneness for which Christ prayed, the only unity which has any value and is the great fundamental unity in Protestantism beneath all its differences. We are one in the belief in the universal priesthood of believers, that every Christian may receive the gift of God's redeeming love in Christ, that no one needs to come or can come between our souls and our God. We are one in our sense of freedom in Christ, that we are free to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling knowing that it is God who worketh in us. We are one in our sense of obligation to God and our fellow men. We are united in our conviction that it is our duty and privilege to love God with all our hearts and minds and soul and strength and our neighbor as ourself. We emphasize our freedom. We resist any coercion or compulsion by

ecclesiastical powers—whoever or whatever they may be—in matters of faith and practice; and we desire and demand this same freedom for others as well as for ourselves. We would agree with the writer who said, "I do not believe a word you say, but I will fight to the death for your right to say it."

Protestantism thrives in a democracy. In fact, Protestantism produces democracy, for free men create a free society. One is our Master, even Christ, and all we are brethren. As soon as we insist on the right of private judgment and the right to follow Christ according to the dictates of our own conscience, we have differences and variety because God in his mysterious mercy has made us different. We know in part, we prophesy in part, and new light is forever breaking forth from the word of God.

Can we not learn a lesson from the trees? Many years ago I called on a man in my parish who, while he sent his children to Sunday school, informed me that he had no belief in religion because there were so many varieties of it. I remember saying to him (he lived in the country), "My friend, look out of your window. I presume that you do not believe in trees because you can see maples, elms, birches, and other varieties from your living room window. I have seen the giant sequoia and the great redwood trees of California, the catalpas imported from Australia because they could stand six months of drought, the Joshua trees growing in the desert, the orange groves and the palms of Florida, the great elms and maples of New England. Trees are the same in having a woody trunk, branches which issue from it, and roots growing down into the ground. There is a great oneness about trees, together with marvelous variety. And how different are men. They differ in color, in race, in nationality, in language, in ability, in emotional and rational response to life. We do not want all trees to be the same, nor do we men. One of the great advantages of traveling comes from seeing the differences in folks of many lands. Is it any wonder that we differ also in our modes of worship, in our ecclesiastical organizations, in our confessions of faith and our creeds, in our interpretation of the ordinances or sacraments? What a dreary world it would be if there were only one kind of tree or one kind of people; if, in other words, we were all alike!"

Last Sunday morning a woman came to me at the close of the morning service and announced: "I am an Episcopalian. I felt very much at home in the arrangements of the pulpit, lectern, and altar with its cross and candles. It was just like an Episcopal church. I like the general confession with which you opened your service, only why didn't you give us all an opportunity to repeat it with you?" One of my revered teachers in the theological seminary was convinced that baptism by immersion was the only adequate way in which to express one's new found faith in Christ,

and that when the world understood its symbolism and its New Testament origin everyone would choose that way and all would become Baptists. Our Methodist friends are convinced that their system, in which every church is organized like every other church, in which every minister fits as a useful cog, and in which every church has a minister and every minister has a church, is the best possible system for bringing in the kingdom of God.

And so we might continue with denomination after denomination and with the groups both large and small who feel, and probably truly, that some phase of truth had been neglected or overlooked until they proclaimed it. Thus even today the church continually breaks out into new fellowships and denominations. In some cases it can be and is a great tragedy. It can also be to the glory of God.

Man has not advanced far enough in moral and spiritual stature to be trusted with a monopoly in religion or anything else. Man is not God; he is man. He knows in part, he prophecies in part, he organizes in part. When that which is perfect is come, that which is not perfect will be done away.

There is just one basis on which we can get together and in which we are together now. We are never going to be Roman Catholics; we shall never all be Episcopalians; we shall never agree on one particular form of baptism; we shall never all subscribe to the same creed; we shall never agree to dispense with all ordinances or sacraments like the Quakers. We can agree, and we do agree, that in Christ Jesus we that once were far off are made nigh in the blood of Christ—that he is our peace who made both one and broke down the middle wall of partition. When we endeavor to make any one test, organization, or institution, the repository of our faith, all-inclusive of the mind and purpose of God and his Christ, we belittle both our faith and our God. The words of Solomon, when he dedicated the temple are still most apt: "Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded! Yet have thou respect unto the prayer of thy servant. . . . that thine eyes may be open toward this house night and day. . . . yea, hear thou in heaven thy dwelling-place; and when thou hearest, forgive." So would we pray toward the houses of our denominations, worthy temples of our God, through which we have access to him and are consciously recipients of his mercy and love.

I would close as I began. Our unity is in Christ. Our oneness is in our loyalty to and our love for him. As St. Paul truly says: "There can be neither Jew nor Greek . . . bond nor free . . . no male and female, for ye are all one man in Christ Jesus." We are not divided, all one body we, one in hope and doctrine, one in charity.

I know not how that Bethl'hem's babe
Could in the Godhead be.
I only know the Manger Child
Has brought God's life to me.

I know not how that Calv'ry's cross
A world from sin could free;
I only know its matchless love
Has brought God's love to me.

We rejoice in our Christian freedom and in the varied expressions of that freedom making it possible that in nonessentials we can differ while in essentials we are one, and that there are various divisions of the army of the Lord. We rejoice even more that we are drawing closer together, that through our state and national councils of churches, services of world communion, our interdenominational ministerial and laymen's groups, we are more and more recognizing our common faith and are uniting in our common tasks. We are grateful that with all our differences we are spiritually united in one Lord, one faith, and one baptism.

Some day we may have a united world, one great government which will hold mankind together, a government truly of and by and for the people. Some day we may have one great external church in which one will be our master, even Christ, and all we shall be brethren. Until then the governments of the world can and will explore every avenue in which they can work together in understanding, tolerance, and brotherhood. Until then the churches can and will explore every avenue in which they can work together for the coming of the kingdom of God in the lives of men and the realization in fact of the word heard centuries ago by the seer on Patmos: "The kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his Christ: and he shall reign for ever and ever."

THE MINISTER IS IMPORTANT

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"The chief problem of a congregation is to find the right minister." This was the conclusion categorically reached in a recent conversation with a layman who takes a really constructive part in the work of his own congregation and who has also had a great deal of experience in the wider work of the church.

Under discussion was the splendid success of a young minister in his first charge. He took a congregation which was greatly run down—attendance was poor, interest was low, and contributions to the work of the church at large were small. He had brought the congregation to the point where it was a going concern, on a really spiritual basis. Even a comparison of statistics reveals that the congregation is practically twice as strong as it was at the time when this young minister took up the pastorate a few years ago. On the basis of this revealing incident, this layman made his unequivocal statement: "The chief problem of a congregation is to find the right minister."

With this little story as a beginning, the thesis is offered for consideration that *everything in a congregation depends upon having the right pastor.* This thesis does not say that even the best-qualified minister can make a success out of every church, or that the best-qualified minister can make a success out of a poor church. It is easily conceivable to have a highly-qualified pastor in the wrong church. Above all, the minister must be a purposeful *worker* who knows what it's all about, who knows where he is going, and who knows how to reach his goal in a tactful manner. The word *worker* must be especially emphasized, because a pastor who is a worker can inspire others to work in like manner. A term that has come into use in recent years is "key man." By this is meant that the pastor is the one who must open the door to the congregation to let influences from the outside come in; namely, new spiritual riches, opportunities for mission work, and presentation of various benevolent causes.

Here it seems to be necessary to point out that each congregation has its own individuality, because it seems that every congregation has some dominant note in its make-up. This is not a matter of the size of the church at all. This dominant note continues through the years, and it is almost impossible to change it. Despite the complexity of any congregation, and no matter how large or small the congregation, the dominant note is there. It may be hard for the stranger to distinguish, or it may be transparently obvious, but it is there! Again, despite the changes in-

ternally in the congregation, and despite the changes due to new members, the dominant note remains.

How does a congregation acquire its individuality? The answer is that this usually comes from some pastor who remains in the congregation long enough to have a permanent influence. It is often the first pastor, or one in the early history of the congregation. Again, it may be some lay person or group of lay people. External or internal circumstances may be determinative. The influences from the chief source of the congregation's individuality may be dominatingly good or bad, and thus they determine the course of the congregation.

Once the congregation has established its personality, it is most likely to continue in it because pastors are called who can best minister to that personality and even conform to it themselves. Likewise, it attracts members who conform to its individuality, casting aside those who are too high above its level and those who are too far below it.

This thesis is, of course, subject to attack, especially by those who maintain that *conditions* govern even the best of men. Of course they do, because a minister may be a failure in one place, and then go to another church where conditions are so suitable to his personality that he makes a grand success. This happens so often that it is not even necessary to cite examples, although it is necessary to stress the importance of the right man in the right church.

Moreover, good congregations make good pastors, and good pastors make good congregations! This means that there is an interplay between the congregation and the pastor, by which each benefits from the development of the other. If the congregation does its utmost to support the pastor in all ways, he becomes a stronger pastor. If the congregation withholds its wholehearted support, then the pastor does not develop as he might otherwise. Many well-endowed ministers have actually been retarded in their personal development by congregations or members of congregations who willfully opposed them in their plans for the church. On the other hand, if the pastor gives of his utmost to the congregation, it develops all the more strongly, and both pastor and congregation benefit. If the pastor is halfhearted in his efforts, this will inevitably be reflected in the congregation, and neither the pastor nor the congregation will develop greatly. The only qualification is that there must at some time be a "good" pastor to start the cycle.

Again, there are considerable numbers of hopeless churches; that is, those which are actually on the decline, have no opportunity for growth in numbers, and have a poor future outlook spiritually. Most of these hopeless churches are in the downtown areas of the cities, although there are many flourishing downtown churches. Some congregations which are

midway between the heart of a city and the new suburbs are having large problems since the expansion of the cities which came in the prosperity of the nineteen-twenties and in the period of expansion, 1936-1941. Some hopeless churches are missions which have never grown. It is scarcely too much to say that these were weaklings from the beginning and never will grow. The case of rural congregations needs a little different emphasis. There may be little opportunity for growth in numbers, and it is likely that they have reached a good level of spirituality; thus the problem here is that of keeping the level already attained. This may mean that the future is hopeful despite the poor prospect for growth in numbers. At any rate, the rural church has the satisfaction of knowing that even though it may not grow much in numbers itself, it is constantly giving up its young people who leave the country for the town and city, where congregations have the opportunity to gather them in. Thus every effort should be made to maintain strong rural parishes.

What about these hopeless congregations? To begin, they will probably find it difficult to obtain a first-class minister, because such a man will have opportunities in places where the situation is not hopeless. On the other hand, if such a congregation does get a good man, he is quite likely to be called in about three or four years, on the basis of his record, by a large, successful congregation, although it may also be in a downtown location, with a bright rather than a hopeless future.

It ought to be made clear, too, that some churches are large, some churches are truly spiritual, but there is only a limited number that are both large and spiritual. Of course, there are only too many small churches that lack spirituality, that are rife with factionalism, and that are merely cogs turning within themselves, dealing in small matters in a small way.

Another unfortunate condition is the widespread practice of placing a man just graduated from the seminary in a recently established congregation. Here an experienced man is positively needed. Placing newly ordained men in new congregations has been done too frequently, and many pastors have thus been given a hard start in their lifework, although many such men have done most satisfactory work, and some have remained in their first congregation all their lives. Of course, many new churches have had the benefit of experienced pastors from the very beginning, and happily this seems to be the present tendency.

A few years ago a magazine article appeared which showed that certain ministers, no matter to what congregations they might be called, continued to have the same relative results in raising benevolent funds for the general work of the church at large; that is, if a man had a good record in one congregation, he would also have a good record in other congregations which he might happen to serve during his ministry. The reverse, accord-

ing to the article, is also true. While this is not disputed, an observation is in order from the standpoint of the thesis that everything depends on the minister; namely, if a congregation is already well trained in giving to the general work of the church at large, it is likely to choose a pastor who has a similar record, and thus perhaps even go to new heights of service. If it has a poor record, it is only too likely, regrettably, to choose a pastor who has a similar record, in order that its present way may not be changed. Some say that no church would choose a minister to conform to its poor ways, but it does seem that some churches do so deliberately. On the other hand, if a congregation with a poor record does call a pastor with a good record, he will probably reject the call on the basis that the congregation is not likely to respond to his efforts for the general work of the church. Thus, even a succession of the same type of pastors influences congregations over perhaps a long period of years.

Nevertheless, despite all the objections that might be made (and there are many besides those that have been mentioned), the real master is the one who overcomes even the most unfavorable conditions. In other words, it is not a question of conditions, but of men.

Why does the writer believe this thesis? It is because of having witnessed so many instances where it worked. For example, there is the minister who took a large, downtown congregation which he was told frankly was "on the toboggan," and brought it to the point where it became one of the most active congregations in its city. This particular pastor has now closed his work. He is rated as a splendid success from a material standpoint. His successor, however, has made the reputation, from the very beginning, of stressing the spiritual. Thus, it is possible to say of ministers that some build large congregations, some build spiritual congregations, but only a few build congregations which are both large and spiritual.

There is the young minister with less than ten years' experience who took over an old city church which had been served by a pastor for thirty years. It had been going down for about twenty years, on account of the changing neighborhood, to such an extent that the former pastor thought that it would surely have to be closed. The new minister, however, has made it a going congregation again. There is the newly ordained minister who took over a church which had actually been closed for several months, and brought it to the point where his success warranted his being called to a large congregation. Then there are three suburban congregations. Each of their pastors was just out of the seminary, but each of them in a comparatively few years brought into being a large, unified, spiritual congregation. There was the congregation about ten years old which seemed unable to make any progress at all, but which seemed rather to slip back-

wards gradually, at least to some extent because of a pastor who was always in some trouble or other. It now called a new pastor, and in only a year or so the difficulties were straightened out, and it has now taken a self-respecting place in the community and the church at large. There was another congregation about thirty years old, served by only one minister, but which had never made any particular progress beyond having a rather fine building. When the first minister retired, immediately the congregation began to grow in every way under its new pastor. And so the list of such instances could be extended almost indefinitely, dependent only upon the knowledge that one might have of a wide variety of congregations.

What should the goal of a minister be, or in other words, what is the success of a pastor?

One hears it said right along that certain ministers get $3,000 or $5,000 or $10,000 a year, and they are rated as successful. All people want money, need it, and can use as much as they can honestly place their hands on, but a minister's success does not depend on the amount of salary that he receives.

It is often said that certain ministers are successful because large crowds attend their services. Numbers do not necessarily make success, even though every preacher likes to preach to large numbers rather than small ones. It is often said that certain ministers conduct well-rounded liturgical services, and preach in beautiful Gothic churches, which were erected through their personal efforts, or which they built, as though they did all the work from basement to steeple cross with their own hands. Every minister would like to preach in a beautiful building, but surely that does not constitute success.

Perhaps the word *success* is being used too much here, but the only criterion for judging the success of a minister is the question as to whether the people in his parish and he himself are growing in Christian spirituality. Spirituality is also the only standard for judging the success of a congregation.

What is it that many pastors possess which has enabled them to do such splendid work for Christ and his church on earth?

Foremost is spirituality. Yet it cannot be taken for granted that the minister is sincerely consecrated to the Lord and to his Son, Jesus Christ. The spirituality of a candidate of theology ought to be a subject of constant inquiry throughout his training. After ordination, although his consecration can hardly be subject to examination, it ought to be kept before the minister constantly and forcefully.

The importance of spirituality it stressed here despite the obvious fact that this paper is more concerned with the material than the spiritual side

of the work. The year-by-year development of the minister's own spiritual life is of utmost importance. He cannot stand still, for that is the way of stagnation, and stagnation is a temptation and danger as real as moral transgression and disintegration of character. Even the Apostle Paul wrote, "But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway." It might be said, in a phrase, that the minister must be a student of the scriptures and of mankind. In addition to a working and preaching knowledge of the Word, this would also mean a working knowledge of sociology, psychology, and the like. In a word: it must be transparent to all that the minister is truly a man of God.

The successful minister must be a good preacher—not necessarily an outstanding public speaker. There is a difference between the two, although it is an invaluable asset if the preacher is also an able public speaker. He must know how to present religious messages in a way that is winsome and effective, for one real task of the church and of the minister is to find how to present the gospel to the best advantage to people who surely want and need this message.

Preaching is deliberately placed first, because, despite the proper emphasis in the last quarter of a century on the importance of worship, new people, even in the liturgical communions (except perhaps in a few high Episcopal congregations), are attracted to a church chiefly by constructive preaching. It may be said, however, that a true estimate would be that the sermon should be an integral part of the worship. This does not detract from the importance of worship or the sermon; rather it emphasizes both.

The importance of preaching is indicated in the report that comes from time to time of a man who has a reputation for high-type preaching being called from one congregation to another. The vacant congregation despairs of getting a minister who can preach as effectively as the former pastor, but after a careful search they find a man of whom they are able to say in only a few months that he is an even better preacher than they had formerly, and he is able to hold their esteem as long as he remains in the parish. There are also those ministers who begin with a grand flourish, make a wonderful impression on the congregation and community for a year, and then are looking for another parish at the end of a year and a half, because they have worn out their welcome, and have become nuisances to the extent that the congregation is glad to be rid of them.

The preaching meant is what might be termed "pastoral preaching." Other types of preaching have their place in the right circumstances, such as oratorical preaching in certain famous city pulpits and on the radio, philosophical preaching in university centres, literary (from a background

of rich culture) preaching in some few congregations, etc.; but for most congregations what counts is helpful sermons to a growing and changing congregation—sermons which touch upon and meet and help to answer the everyday problems of people in their contacts with their fellows, and in their thoughts of the Father in Heaven.

Many put pastoral activity first rather than preaching. Their reasoning, and it has many important illustrations, is that there are many congregations that have been built on sound pastoral practices by men who were only passingly good preachers. The people came and continued to come because they realized that the minister not only met their problems in the pulpit on Sundays, but also that he was understanding, helpful, and sympathetic in the crises of life—birth, sickness, death, marriage, confirmation, and the like. Certainly such a pastor deserves all honor, and it would be foolish to deny the position of those who place pastoral care above preaching. To be sure, such a minister will not receive the acclaim of the newspapers to the extent of the orator, but it is likely that there is a much greater bond between him and his people than there is between the orator and his auditors.

The trouble is that too many men in their preaching and pastoral work are just passing and not much more. There are many high-class ministers who are fulfilling great obligations well, but there simply are not enough men of this right type to go around to every congregation, and thus only certain congregations really have the right man.

The minister should have an attractive, friendly, sincere, and understanding personality, one who can draw people not only to himself, but chiefly to Jesus Christ. He must know where he stands and then be ready to assert himself diplomatically and tactfully, particularly against those who would pervert the church into a club, a commercial enterprise, or a means of personal profit. Especially, he must be able to overcome indifference. In addition, he must be a leader in the congregation and community, a good teacher, an organizer and administrator, a financier, and one who believes in the work of the church at large, with more than a parochial outlook. This catalogue of ministerial qualifications could be greatly extended, depending only upon one's personal views, because there is scarcely any quality or experience that would not be helpful to a minister.

Most of these qualifications are well understood; it does seem well to explain what is meant by financier. This does not mean that the minister should handle the congregation's funds, but it does mean that he should understand some of the fundamentals of finance and even bookkeeping, that he should be able to read and understand financial reports, that he should know enough about finances to check on the congregation's accounts, and that he should have enough understanding of financial mat-

ters to know when, at least approximately, it is possible to have special financial campaigns in his congregation. Timing is an important factor in such undertakings, and success in such campaigns rests largely on the initiative of the minister.

It is quite impossible for most ministers to be specialists in all these fields, in the sense that some men give all their time to full-time positions in evangelism, church finance, administration, etc.; but the pastor of even the most humble parish cannot neglect any of these phases of the work.

A quality that a minister needs almost above all others is enthusiasm, a word which comes from the Greek and which means to be inspired or possessed by God. The person who has enthusiasm can transmit almost any idea to another person. Ralph Waldo Emerson writes in his essay, "On Circles," "Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm." "Enthusiasm," says Henry Chester, "is the greatest asset in the world. It beats money and power and influence. It is nothing more or less than faith in action." Enthusiasm does not mean that mere pulpit presence is the only thing that counts, or that one has God-given enthusiasm merely because he is an illustration-come-to-life of the adage, "Keep Smiling." Too often this means to keep smiling—*grinning* might be a better word—merely because it is a good policy, just as it is said that honesty is the best policy.

Initiative is another prized quality. Someone in a congregation certainly must have initiative, and usually that someone must be the minister. Even beyond initiative, the minister must frequently anticipate many things in the congregation. If he has learned to anticipate difficulties and circumstances, then he will be able to meet and forestall much trouble. It may seem, in some congregations, that one of the chief duties of a minister is to weigh, evaluate, and administer the ideas that the lay people suggest on their own initiative. But there is more to church administration than this Even though this seems to be the case at times, there are bound to come other times when such outbursts of ideas will break down, and the minister will have to take the lead. If he lacks initiative, the whole work will drag along in a halfhearted way.

While the Christian virtue of humility is gladly accepted, yet it must also be said that the minister must have a high degree of self-confidence. Self-assertion or conceit is not enough; nor is refusal to see and understand the viewpoint of others. He must know where he stands, and, if necessary, tactfully and carefully let others know his position when the necessity arises. Surely, humility does not imply that he ought to let the laity or other ministers take advantage of him when he has thought out his position in any given situation.

Another quality that might be mentioned is a sense of humor. This

enables the minister, even when things seem blackest, to keep on in his work, because he has learned to understand the problems of life, and to realize, in a truly spiritual way—not in a Pollyanna spirit—that every black cloud has a silver lining, and that he can surely find it some day.

Love of people is another characteristic that a minister needs—the ability to like people for their own sake, despite their shortcomings, their sin, their meanness, their pettiness, their shortsightedness, their impishness, their selfishness, their impetuosity, and their willfulness.

Last of all the qualities that ought to be listed is sincerity. While there must be a solid foundation in every man's life, yet a great deal can be forgiven if he is sincere. There are some ministers who may not be brilliant preachers, or serve large congregations, or appear frequently in the newspapers, but whose sincerity is so obvious that they hold the loyalty of their congregations to an extent that many a highly placed minister might well wish to attain. Indeed, it is easy to understand why most people place sincerity high on the list of desirable qualities. If a man has sincerity, many a lesser fault can be forgiven—and forgiven gladly.

In a word, the effective minister must be a consecrated, alert *worker* who is fully, wholeheartedly, and intelligently committed to his tasks.

How shall the minister exercise his office? As with any other work, it may be done in various ways. There are perhaps two extremes: one of them is that of dictator, and the other is that of friend to all. Any church member can fill in details, because everyone has known pastors at both ends of the scale—yes, and at all other degrees in between.

It would certainly seem that in present-day broad-minded America one of the supremely needed qualities is tact. Perhaps pastors in the past could be abrupt and even rude toward their congregations and their fellow pastors at a time when most congregations were made up of unlettered, foreign-born people with few contacts; but surely (and happily) those days are gone. A pastor must still know where he stands, but he should be able to assert himself in a tactful manner rather than in the blunt fashion that seems to have been characteristic of another day.

The attitude of the pastor is shown in his presentation of the work of the church at large, of which he is representative. Moreover, he himself is a member of local, state, and national bodies. It is through the minister that their interests, and also the benevolent organizations of the church, such as mission societies, foreign missions, colleges, seminaries, and orphanages must be brought to the hearts, minds, and pocketbooks of his parishioners. The seeds of the spirit of sharing with the work of the church at large must be planted, cultivated, and brought to fruition, because there should be no question that every congregation should support the benevolence program of the church at large.

The minister should also take a personal interest in the work of the church at large by means of participation in the activities of the organizations which have been found necessary in order to carry forward the work to best advantage. Surely, ministers ought to make every effort to attend the various meetings, and take an intelligent interest in their discussions and deliberations. This may not mean speaking often at these meetings, but it ought to mean following intelligently what is going on, fulfillment of duties when appointed to committees, and faithful performance when elected to office, even though the work seems minor, routine, and unimportant.

Many pastors have also found a wider outlook, enrichment, and enjoyment in serving as officers of local associations for all ministers, and as officers of federations of churches. These contacts have surely changed, influenced, and broadened their outlook on the Christian religion, and they ought to be commended for their participation. The view has about passed away that one's particular type of Christianity will be tainted by contact with other manifestations of religion. Ministers of other communions may have different forms and different historical backgrounds, but the problems in this modern day of indifference and lack of interest in religious matters are about the same in all groups.

It must be remembered that ministers mature in this work at different rates—some quickly, some slowly, and, unfortunately, some not at all. For example, there are those who are born ministers, who seem to be fitted for the work by all the circumstances of their lives, from the time when they are mere boys. Thus, when ordained, they are fully ready for their duties and responsibilities. There are others who are still schoolboys, even playboys, in their outlook on life at the time of ordination, and so they mature more slowly. There are, of course, some who never mature academically or spiritually beyond, say, the first year of seminary.

The right kind of minister would have made out well in any profession or trade that he happened to choose: engineer, doctor, storekeeper, politician, or farmer. That is because the qualities required here are not essentially different from those required in other kinds of work. Diligence, diplomacy, industry, forthrightness, tact, courage, reliability, trustworthiness—these, developed in the direction demanded by the ministry, are indispensable.

The greatest and most harmful weaknesses of the pastor are within. Dwight L. Moody is reported to have said, "I have more trouble with myself than with almost any other person."

Perhaps a man's whole personality is not at all suited to this type of work. Nowadays, the army can make a soldier out of anybody who is physically fit, but not every one is suited to be a minister—not even every-

one who wants to be a minister—any more than everyone is suited to be a carpenter, a lawyer, or a bookkeeper. The preacher's outlook on his work probably goes back to the beginning of his course in college, or even earlier. What kind of reputation did he make in college and seminary? Did he really study, or did he do as little work as possible? Even more, the reputation made in the first few years after ordination is of utmost importance, because for many reasons it will be most difficult for him to rise above the reputation made in this most critical period of his active ministry.

The old saying still holds, "Nothing succeeds like success." Applying this to the work of the ministry, it means that if the minister can go from one successful step to another, he will gradually build up his confidence and his ability so that he can learn to handle ever-larger tasks as they come to him through the years. This is a process that starts in early school life, because the student learns through minor assignments on committees, activities in class, reporting for the school paper, and a multitude of other seemingly minor details how to work with others and to achieve satisfying goals in his tasks.

The most frequently heard lament of ministers is that they do not have enough people in their congregations who are able to assume the responsibilities of leadership. There is certainly a great deal of truth in this charge, because very few congregations have adequate leadership either in quality or numbers. The solution to this challenging problem on the basis of the success of the cases already cited is that the right pastor in a given congregation can draw to him and his church people who are willing to assume positions of leadership. In all communities, even in downtown situations which seem hopeless to many, there are people who can be reached for the congregation, but there must be the right minister to reach them.

How shall the pastor find the people to be leaders in the congregation? The answer is simple enough, although it involves all that he does; namely, high-class, attractive preaching, first-rate educational work, especially leadership training classes, diligent calling at homes of members and prospective members, a means of making contact with visitors at the services of worship, and the like. Through the methods listed, the pastor can learn of those who might make good leaders, and once he has the contacts, he can patiently and faithfully draw out and develop their abilities for leadership along the lines needed in his congregation.

Preaching has been deliberately placed first in the matter of attracting leadership and in the previous section on the chief work of the minister, but it must be acknowledged, as the proponents of placing first emphasis on pastoral work rather than on preaching point out, that the preaching

only attracts the people in the first place. It takes high-class pastoral work to hold them. Right after the work of preaching and pastoral work, evangelism must find next place. There must be a method of recruiting new people for the membership of the church, of seeing that they find a place for themselves in its life and activities, especially in the auxiliary organizations of the congregations. This is one of the most difficult propositions that any pastor and congregation face. All that can be done here is to indicate the importance of the problem.

Chiefly, then, the minister must be a leader who can inspire others. For example, one reads from time to time that an executive has changed from one business to another, perhaps from a wholesale business to a railroad. Some people do not understand how this is possible. They ask how can a man who has been in the wholesale business know anything about a railroad. What they overlook is that the most sought-after ability is that of leading people. They are right as far as they go, for the man may know little of the railroad business at the start. If he can lead men, however, he can soon understand the problems of the railroad, because what counts is not merely the ability to work, but to handle men. After all, the president of the largest construction company in the country probably could not, in the words of Nehemiah 4:6, build the wall of Jerusalem nearly as quickly as an ordinary mason, but he does have the ability to handle men, which is usually entirely missing in the worker.

As a matter of fact, just such transfers as have been described in the business world have taken place among ministers. Most church colleges have ministers as presidents, and many of these have come from the ranks of men in the active ministry of the gospel. Another illustration of the same thing, although not much is thought about it, is the transfer of a pastor from congregational duties to executive work in a state organization, a federation of churches, or the like. Less common, although it does happen, is the appointment or election of a parish minister to the leadership of a nonprofit foundation. After all, the duties of ministers in such executive positions are only different in degree and geographical territory from those in the parish, the chief necessity always being ability as a leader among men.

There is no use to deny that the pastor is the leader, for there is no one else to take his place. It does no good even to qualify his leadership by saying that his hands are tied, as is said frequently. This expression means that various local conditions make it impossible for the pastor to do his work properly, such as facing a burdensome mortgage debt, a small membership, people with greatly limited vision of the work of the Lord, and lack of financial means. The pastor cannot and dare not avoid or forget or neglect the fact of his leadership.

Most certainly, it is not meant by the thesis that all depends upon the minister, that the minister must do all the work himself, nor is it meant that the minister of a large congregation works harder than the minister of a small one, although the former may have learned to work more efficiently. Pastoral leadership is not at all a matter of the size of the congregation. The small congregation needs leadership as much as the large one. The reason why leadership is emphasized more in large than in small congregations is because capable ministers just naturally gravitate to large congregations.

It is not meant that the minister must personally perform all the small details of the church, as many do; but he must train people who will do this for him. In fact, it is not going too far to say that a minister should not do a single thing that he can get someone else to do. There are two reasons for this assertion: 1. letting someone do things gives duties to more people in the congregation, thus engaging their interest in and devotion to its work; and 2. this frees the minister from routine details so that he may devote himself to the spiritual ends of his ministry more than to the material ends. For example, one hears rather frequently that some pastors watch the finances of their congregations with an eagle eye, or even handle the money themselves, particularly large special funds. Although the pastor must watch finances, as well as many other items, yet actual handling of large funds seems to be wrong, for the minister ought to have men to whom he can turn in complete trust for such financial details; and if he does not have them, he ought to find them. As another example, a congregation ought to be well enough organized that the minister could go away for an extended period, say a long vacation, and then find on his return that there are no troubles or brand-new problems but that he can pick up the work at practically the point where he let it down some months before.

The efficient minister must do a great deal of checking and follow-up work. This is a type of work which requires patience and may even distinguish the successful from the unsuccessful pastor. For example, if a committee is appointed, the pastor has frequently to be the one who checks up to see that the members do the work. Presumably, here he is not much different from the executive of a business corporation—with one exception. If the business executive is not satisfied with the work of his assistants, he can replace them, discharge them, or hire others. The pastor, on the other hand, usually must make the best use of the people who are available. Sometimes his methods must be indirect, because, while he is working with volunteers the businessman works with trained paid workers. If the pastor is not able to effectuate his plans in one way, he may always try another, with perhaps new methods, new committees, new

names, and new people. This is where real patience is required, but the minister can finally accomplish his purposes if he is patient, tactful, and careful. Of course, it is no real solution at all if he himself has to do the work in the end.

The necessity for leadership on the part of the pastor, even in details, is indicated, for example, in the work of a nomination committee for the church board. The committee members may do their work as well as possible, but some member is likely to say to the minister: "Well, we asked Mr. Smith, but he is not sure if he will run for the board; but if you ask him, I'm certain that he'll let his name be put up." The Sunday-school superintendent is likely to enlist the aid of the pastor in much the same circumstances.

How is the church at large to get good pastors, since so much is dependent upon them? There are three chief factors that determine a man's outlook; namely, his training, his home, and the congregation in which he is reared. One who studies in college and seminary and succeeds there is most likely to succeed in his church later. Good Christian homes are also of the utmost importance, although it is possible for a man to rise above the level of his home. The home congregation during childhood and youth is also a lasting influence.

As an illustration, take the case of the late Dr. Maitland Alexander, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from 1899 to 1927. Dr. Alexander came of a sturdy line of Scotch-Irish ancestry, sifted in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. His great-grandfather was James Waddell, a well-known blind preacher of Louisa County, Virginia. His grandfather was Archibald Alexander, president of Hampden-Sidney College, Virginia, and pastor of churches in Virginia and Philadelphia, and moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and in 1813 one of the founders and first professor of Princeton Theological Seminary. On his mother's side, his grandfather was Dr. Matthew Brown, president of Jefferson College. This instance is cited merely because it happened to be at hand. In other cases, ministers have followed the steps of their fathers for a half-dozen generations. To be sure, it is not at all necessary to be a son of a preacher, because many of the best ministers have no ancestor at all who has followed this calling. The point has been made at times by psychologists that if a person wants to follow a certain course of action, he should be sure to choose the right great-grandparents. Surely this is a help in the ministry, even though the ancestry does not include a single clergyman.

One of the most important duties of a minister is to keep a watchful eye on the boys in his congregation in order to learn of those who might,

after proper training, make good ministers. Such watchful care would do much to eliminate the complaint of seminary professors that some of the students with whom they must work are of less than the highest quality. The time when this selection—hand-picking might be a suitable term—should be done is during the time the boy is in grammar school, because the modern American system is to begin specialization upon entrance to high school. In the case of the ministry, this means that the boy should be sure to select the academic course in high school, rather than a vocational course, because if he selects the latter he will be led directly away from the ministry, or if he is later led into it, it will be at the cost of retracing his steps, entailing the loss of perhaps several years. Moreover, the local congregation might very well, if necessary, support its hand-picked boys while they are in college and seminary. This will do two things: it will show the interest of the home congregation, and will relieve the church at large from supporting him.

Furthermore, ministers are likely to retain throughout their lives the influence of the congregation which they attended as boys. If the home congregation takes the genuine interest indicated, and tries to help them develop in all ways, then its boys will retain a respect and love for that congregation and its ways all their lives. On the other hand, many a minister has felt that the old home congregation took but slight interest in him while he was at home, and even less when he went away to college and seminary.

Beyond all the externals is the never-to-be-forgotten fact that the minister is the man with a call from God, or at least he ought to be. Therefore, he should remember that he can serve the Lord wherever he is. To be sure, it is only natural and human to want a church that is large, prominent, and well-paying, but the fact is that one can serve anywhere. Furthermore, it seems that there is some one place where each minister can serve better than anywhere else. Nevertheless, every pastor's best place of service at any given time is not in another field, or another state, but the very parish where he is *right now.*

Yes, despite all difficult conditions to the contrary, everything in a congregation does depend on having the right pastor in its particular situation. The best place for any minister is the congregation where he can put his abilities, many or few as the case may be, to best use. Viewing the ministry in this way places a tremendous responsibility upon every pastor in a congregation, but why should responsibility be side-stepped when it so evidently belongs to the clergy?

A PRAYER OF BENEDICTION

CHARLES O. WRIGHT

First Baptist Church, White Plains, New York

OUR FATHER GOD, Creator of worlds, Giver of life and of all good gifts, Cure of souls and Dweller in us—we praise thee.

Presented to thee in dedication to thy service through service to people are these young men and this young woman.

As they go out from the protection, the leading, the joy, and the criticism of these halls, this faculty, and of each other, wilt thou keep them from the affliction of loneliness; from the occupational disease of the ministry, laziness; from the stinging self-esteem that is the backlash of unthinking praise; from the love of money; from the anæsthetic power of satisfaction with their own sermons; and from the soothingly delightful murmurs of good aged people.

Give them a sense of discrimination in the realms of the important and the unimportant; a sense of high mission, of unalloyed hope, of the continuing presence of thy Holy Spirit; give them a well-grounded faith in the power of the eternal here in the temporal; and make of them good and true witnesses to thy power, O God, through the gospel of Jesus Christ.

May the grace, the ineffable, the winsome grace of our Lord Jesus Christ; the love, the powerful and empowering love of God our Father; and the communion, the holy, the pure communion and companionship, only help of the alone in spirit, the companionship of the Holy Spirit, be in each of you and in all of us forever. Amen.

I TOO WENT TO THE CAMP MEETINGS

CALVIN T. RYAN
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ALTHOUGH the peak of the frontier revivals was reached around 1805, they continued more or less until after the Civil War, and on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia, camp meetings in the summer and revivals in the winter were regular events well into the 1900's.

Before the coming of the automobile, truly in the "horse and buggy days," ten or fifteen miles was a long way from home. Nevertheless, people lived a correspondingly unhurried life, and did not mind driving horses and mules to buggies loaded down with young and old on their way to spend the day at a camp meeting. Often provisions for the family were included in baskets, and at noon friends might be asked to gather around the tablecloth spread out on the ground in the thicket or grove near the meeting, and despite the hearty eating there were always many crumbs, scraps, and bones to be gathered up after the feast.

Just as on the frontier in earlier days, the camp meetings I attended did serve a social purpose. Friends met there who had not seen one another for a year, and since letter writing was not practised and telephones were not yet, men and women related the year's happenings, discussed their crops, told of births and deaths.

Of course, those who moved into tents literally transferred their home to the camp grounds. The tents were made of board, usually with a partition separating the front from the back. All the front would be lined with sheets tacked to the wall. Some tents had straw on the ground, others had wooden floors decorated with rugs. In back would be the dining room, and back of that a lean-to for the kitchen range. Upstairs were the beds and dressing rooms. No special effort was made for comfort, but no one complained during the ten days.

Moving furniture, beds, cookstoves, buckets and pails, dishes, and staple groceries must have been a real task, and the amount of work for ten days of "happiness" would seem today all out of proportion. But today we have automobiles, radios, telephones, and moving pictures. We go places, see things, and hire others to entertain us with as little effort on our part as possible. Obviously the families who were willing to put forth the effort did not mind the work. Usually some member of the family had to make a trip back home each day. There would be the stock to look after, and fresh supplies to bring back to camp. The "men folks" did the heavy work, while the "women folks" did their part in making the occasion a real event. Often it was the only "vacation" that the farmers—and most

of those who attended for the week were farmers—and their families ever took.

These tents were usually located in an elongated circle with the tabernacle in the centre, and men, women, and children made the circle their promenade ground. There in the evening they walked round and round.

Back of the wooden tents I recall another row of covered wagons. These were much like the prairie schooners used by settlers going West. A man would cover his haul-wagon with canvas, and it would amaze one today to find how much like a one-room apartment those wagons became! The cooking was often done on the ground, just outside the wagon. But the entertaining, the eating, and the sleeping took place under the cover and in the wagon. The occupants were protected from the "night air," of which people were much afraid, especially while one slept. Likewise, they were protected from the damp ground, and had a dry place to sleep, provided the rain was not too severe.

I do not recall hearing anyone complain of the inconveniences or of the extra work entailed. Those people did not think first of comfort, or try to evade work, provided it brought a return in pleasure for the family and friends.

There was the pleasurable side on which I have dwelt, and for the young boys and girls the camp meetings were great events. They were holidays of love and romance, and the girl who "caught a fellow" was truly fortunate. And most of them made their catch. "Having a date" was not the terminology of horse and buggy romance. A boy "had a girl," and "went to see her." And at the camp meetings, he went to the "ice cream tent" and would spend as much as a quarter in an evening, on sheer entertainment of the lucky girl.

Of course there was the rowdy element. There was much drinking and much fighting. The trouble makers returned year after year, and usually the same law enforcing bodies returned also, and the two groups knew one another. The drinking and the carousing went on outside the camp circle, usually out around the "horse pound," the busiest concession connected with the camp.

The unpleasant elements connected with these camp meetings have been played up enough. Perhaps, considering the time, considering it was the only big community affair that brought so many people together, the unsavory part was not out of proportion, or no more than to be expected.

The purpose of the camp meetings was unmistakably religious. The accessories to the life under the conditions described were doubtless unavoidable. They afforded an outlet not found elsewhere in community life. The group psychology revealed itself in both the good and the bad. Obviously those who sponsored the meetings, and they were usually sponsored by

some particular church whose pastor assumed the responsibility of leadership, must have felt that the good accomplished outweighed the bad.

Three services were usually held each day. One in the morning, another in the afternoon, and the third in the evening. Preachers with special gifts in preaching evangelical sermons took turns. There were a choir and an organist. These functioned more or less formally in starting off the service. After the call for mourners there was no need for organ or choir. The congregation did the singing. The success of any given meeting depended on, first, whether the preacher awakened sinners to their condition; secondly, on the prayers by laymen; and finally, but often the most important of the three, was the singing of gospel hymns. Special songbooks for camp meetings and winter revivals were used, but often they were cast aside when the group went from one familiar hymn to another. There was no leader; they just sang. They sang lustily. Many of them were Methodists, but they forgot most of John Wesley's rules for singing, and had the Father of them all been present he might have thought there was much bawling! I do not think he could have accused them of not singing spiritually. They simply didn't know there was any other way to sing the old gospel hymns. "The Old Rugged Cross," "Give Me the Old Time Religion," and dozens of others no longer found in ordinary hymnals were well known.

Campers moved in on Thursday, Friday, or Saturday. Sunday the services started, and throughout the week, terminating the next Sunday night, preachers preached, prayed, and sang over those seeking salvation. Usually there was a short service on the Monday morning when the camp broke up.

Yes, there was much uncontrolled emotionalism. There was shouting, fainting, and frothing. You can belittle it all by speaking of "God in the straw pen," you can poke fun at the "jerks," you can question the genuineness of the conversions. If you do, I cannot join you. I saw some permanent spiritual changes in men and women. It must have been what was needed at that time. Billy Sunday and his Sawdust Trail was to come later. The same is true with Billy's method. I knew of some conversions which have lasted. Perhaps there was no special virtue in "going to the mourner's bench," but it was not done lightly at the camp meetings, nor was it taken lightly. One's friends and neighbors knew of the confession, and the newly converted did not find it easy to slip back and still live with those who had seen and heard him at the revival meeting.

The camp meetings have been discontinued. The winter revivals seldom last more than a week, and are not generally successful. Times have changed. But nothing has come to replace the part the camp meetings had in gaining converts. The poor farmers of the early 1900's have been

replaced by chicken raisers, and small truck and vegetable farms. Hard-surfaced roads make it possible to go many miles in a day, and the automobile has become a necessity. Except for the small evening gatherings at the local Parent Teachers Association meetings, or the Firemen's entertainments, those people have no community life.

And what of the religious life? That would not be fair for me to say. The churches are not so strong, not so influential in the lives of the people, as they were in the revival and camp meeting days. The Sunday morning Class Meeting has gone, and with it, naturally, the shouting that one saw. The Thursday night prayer meeting is no more, and laymen are unaccustomed to praying in public, and, of course the preacher no longer hears the amens from the congregation.

It meant something to those who attended the camp meetings. I think it meant something to those of us who were courting our first girls, for we all went to the services. Religion was a definite part in the life of the whole community.

I too went to those camp meetings. I am not sorry.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

IT IS A COMMONPLACE that words have a curious and often embarrassing habit of changing their meaning through the years. Thus, in the older translations of the Bible, especially in the King James Version, there are many passages which were presumably perfectly clear and intelligible when those translations appeared, but which now are most misleading, simply because in the course of the years the particular meaning there given to a word has become obsolete. An example often commented upon is *conversation.* It is safe to say that for many readers such an observation as "For our *conversation* is in heaven" (Phil. 3:20) or the injunction to wives to be in subjection to their husbands, so that "if any obey not the word, they also may without the word be won by the *conversation* of the wives" (I Pet. 3:1) fails to convey what the original writers intended, for *conversation* no longer is commonly employed of *behavior* or *manner of life.*

An even more mischievous example is found in the word *offend.* As commonly used today as a transitive verb, it suggests to *cause to feel hurt, vexed, or resentful;* to *wound* or to *annoy.* In such a sense the familiar admonition to "pluck out the right eye" or to "cut off the right hand" if they "offend" you is most misleading. Even worse is the more familiar injunction: "But whosoever shall *offend* one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck" (Matt. 18:6). It is safe to say that there are few parents who would not seem to stand in a perilous situation, if the meaning of this verse is as it appears, for in the course of trying to teach his children how to behave like human beings even the most indulgent and devoted parent most certainly causes them not infrequently to feel "hurt," "vexed," and "resentful," to say nothing of being "annoyed." Certainly the present-day lack of manners and considerateness for the rights of others, not to mention the more flagrant instances of parental neglect, might seem to suggest that a bit more —not less—of this sort of "offense" would be of distinct value.

But the fact is that the word *offend,* as used by the biblical translators of the yesteryears, did not mean this at all. Rather it meant to *oppose or obstruct in duty,* to *cause to stumble or sin.* When thus understood, the several passages are no longer obscure or "quaintly biblical" but pointed and apt.

Whether the "little ones" who are here referred to are actually little children or immature Christians—Paul's "babes in Christ"—is at the moment of little consequence. The peril involved in luring or enticing or encouraging or even permitting those to whom we have responsibility—

and in the complexity of modern life that number is far from limited to those of our several households—to sin is very real. So also in the other passages about the drastic acts to eye or hand. Quite regardless of whether the injunction is intended to be taken literally or is to be softened down as a case of "oriental hyperbole," the point of the word lies in the nature of the "offense." It is when these members lure their possessor to sin that they are a menace and to be curbed, not when they displease or annoy.

All modern translations have attempted to make this point explicit, but not always with perfect success. One of the most common translations has been that of the American Revised, namely, "cause to stumble." This avoids the misunderstanding involved in the King James, but it is far from happy. Many "babes in Christ" have wondered, not always, it may be surmised, too seriously, how one's "right hand" could cause him to stumble. The reason for the figure of speech, to *stumble* and *stumbling block,* lies in the meaning of the Greek words *skandalizo* and *skandalon.* Most scholars are now of the opinion that these words are more properly understood to signify not something against which one stumbles and so falls, but a lure or snare by which one is entrapped, and hence tropically, entrapped or led into sin.

In this particular case the rendering of the new Revised Standard Version is the simplest and clearest. Moffatt had translated by the use of "hindrance": "If your hand [foot, eye] is a hindrance . . . ," "Whoever is a hindrance to one of these little ones. . . ." Goodspeed has apparently still played with the idea of the stumbling block and so has translated in the one case ". . . makes you fall," preserving the incongruity of the ARV, in the other "hinders"—"whoever *hinders* one of these children." RSV on the other hand translates with perfect lucidity and common sense in both cases "causes you [or "one of these little ones"] to sin."

One of my former students assures me that he always looks up and studies his text "in the original Greek." That is a practice which more preachers could follow with profit. But since for too many their "Greek" would truly be all Greek, they may be urged to have several modern versions on their shelves. And conspicuous among such should be the Revised Standard Version, which not infrequently has a sobering effect on ignorance, blissful or otherwise.

From Off the Campus and On

An editor has many headaches. Dead lines mean more to him than to some of his contributors. There is a limit to the amount of material that can be squeezed into a given number of pages. His job is never done. No sooner is the current book put to bed than work on the new accelerates. But there are many compensations—at least there are in the case of Crozer Quarterly. Many delightful friendships have resulted from the necessary correspondence between editor and authors. Then there is that steady stream of appreciative letters from readers. Continue, gentle reader, to write them. They are balm more precious than ever came from Gilead. And if you have any criticisms or if you are patiently (or impatiently) waiting for a type of article which never seems to materialize, tell us about it. It will do you good to get it out of your system and—who knows!—it might do us good too. At least it's worth a three-cent stamp.

Vergilius Ferm is too well known to readers of these pages to need formal introduction. Many articles and reviews from him have appeared in Crozer Quarterly. In all his writing and thinking he stands revealed as a champion for all that will make men truly free. This distinguished thinker has been for many years a professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster.

Professor Stinespring is an eminent Semitist and head of the department of Old Testament at Duke. Many will recognize him as the able translator of Klausner's *From Jesus to Paul.* The Hebrew prophets have long been one of his special concerns. It is a pleasure to welcome him back to our pages.

Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, Colgate-Rochester, and Yale (Ph.D.). He came to Crozer in 1938, after several years in the pastorate.

Mr. Thurlow is a graduate of Colgate University and of the Newton Theological Seminary. He has held several pastorates in Massachusetts and Maine. For the past few years he has been minister of the First Congregational Church, Harwich, Massachusetts.

Mr. Kuhnle is a Lutheran minister, now pastor of the Lutheran Church of the Redeemer, Binghamton, New York. He holds degrees from Wagner College and the Lutheran Theological Seminary (Philadelphia). Few readers will wonder, after reading his essay with its down-to-earth common sense, why he has been so eminently successful as a pastor.

Dr. Wright has had a long and distinguished ministry: in the pulpit, as general secretary of the Christian Association of the University of Pennsylvania, and as executive secretary of New York's West Side Y.M.C.A. This striking and moving prayer of benediction was offered May 9, 1950.

at Commencement at Crozer, where he had graduated fifty years before. *Sermo animi est imago.*

Professor Ryan has been head of the department of languages at Nebraska State Teachers College since 1928. Following his graduation from Harvard (Ed.M.) in 1922, he was head of the department of English at Iowa Wesleyan College for six years.

Summer is, or should be, a time for reading. To aid in this praiseworthy undertaking CROZER QUARTERLY supplies reviews and notices of some thirty-nine books. We know our reviews are widely read. When you purchase one of the books surveyed in our pages, why not mention to the publisher or dealer where you saw the review that led to the purchase? To our thirty-two reviewers once again we extend our appreciative thanks. Dr. Adams is minister of the First Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. Dr. Aubrey is professor of religious thought at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer. Professor Beck is head of the department of biblical literature at Syracuse. Dr. Bertocci is a professor of philosophy at Boston University and secretary of the American Theological Society. Dr. Blanton is the new president of Crozer Theological Seminary. Professor Brightman is one of Boston University's most eminent philosophers. Dr. Bronk was for many years book editor of the American Baptist Publication Society. Dr. Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Cohen is rabbi of Beth Sholom Congregation, Philadelphia. Dr. Comfort is professor of Latin at Haverford. Dr. Cranston is dean of the School of Religion of the University of Southern California. Mr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer and editor of CROZER QUARTERLY. Dr. Ferguson is professor of English at Temple University. Mr. Gehr is minister of the (Universalist) Church of the Restoration, Philadelphia. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Hightower is professor of sociology at Kalamazoo. Dr. Hiltner, long head of the department of pastoral services of the Federal Council, has recently joined the theological faculty of the University of Chicago. Dr. Igler has been for many years Baptist student pastor at the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Kennell, a writer long acquainted with things Russian, was Theodore Dreiser's secretary at Moscow. Mr. Keighton is professor of homiletics and worship at Crozer. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology. Dr. McCasland is head of the department of religion at the University of Virginia. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Mr. Morey is supervising principal of the Swarthmore (Pa.) public schools. Dr. Morrison, whose recent death came as a sad shock to us all, was for many years professor of homiletics at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Outler is a professor of theology at Yale. Dr. Rose is minister of the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia. Mr. Starr is librarian of Crozer. Professor Wilder has the chair of New Testament at Chicago Theological Seminary. Dr. Wiley is professor of sociology at the University of Richmond. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

Christianity and Society, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. viii, 280, $3.75.

With the volume before us, Professor Ferré brings to an end Part I of his *magnum opus* on the Christian faith. Part I as a whole is entitled *Reason and the Christian Faith,* and consists of I, *Faith and Reason,* II, *Evil and the Christian Faith,* and III, *Christianity and Society.* The theological public is by this time familiar with the honest, irenic, and devout spirit of Nels Ferré, which is again manifest in this new volume.

Christianity and Society is at once an embryonic social philosophy, philosophy of history, and social ethics, as well as a branch of Christian theology. The governing concept of the book is Christian love, *agapē.* "The sin of the refusal of God's Agape," says Ferré, "is mankind's deepest problem." While many theologians would therefore make sin central to their thought, Ferré makes love central and ineradicable. He might almost be said to be an exponent of the doctrine of original love, as opposed to original sin. Sin is hateful to him, but he loves God more than he hates the devil. Even the cross is subordinate, as a means to love. There was no literal Eden or fall. In these respects and others, Ferré's mediating position is much nearer to liberalism than to neoörthodoxy. In general, his thought seems to be moving, under the generous influence of *agapē,* more and more in the direction of the universal, the social, the practical, and the liberal. He is more and more deeply concerned with the relation of the "eternally ultimate" or "the Eternal Purpose" to "the historic process" and "the immediately practical."

It would be interesting to compare Ferré with Dewey at this point. No one is more insistent than Dewey that there is no eternal purpose, nothing eternally ultimate. Yet very few are surer than Dewey of the ultimate nature of social categories and of respect for personality—which is as close to *agapē* as a secularist can get. Dewey, of course, is primarily concerned about "the historical process" and "the immediately practical." Yet he acts "as if" something like *agapē* were the eternal purpose of life. Ferré could well ask Dewey whether his commitment to the social is purely tentative, and whether such commitment implies or discloses something about the social nature of the real—something like *agapē.* One of Ferré's allusions to Dewey is to this social aspect (pp. 57-58). A modern reader could wish for a fuller interpretation of Dewey, and a real wrestle with the social views of naturalism and humanism. Surely they constitute the great intellectual challenge both to the traditional and to the liberal Christian faith; and their merits as well as their weaknesses deserve careful analysis.

In the work before us, Ferré restricts himself to an exposition of the social nature of the Christian faith as he sees it. The words *interim, apocalyptic,* and *eschatological* do not appear in the index any more than do *humanism* or *naturalism* (which, however, is mentioned in the text). Ferré assumes that *agapē* is basic and is social in its application. It is, to be sure, more than society (Chap. I)—so that even Hinduism with its *karma* and *samsara* "makes more sense of the total problem than does any earth-bound naturalism." Christian love implies "an absolute in relations," as Hartshorne has also been showing. The Christian God is in some sense absolute, above society; but this "more" in no way implies a transcendent irrelevance of God to human history. In general, the presentation of this view is admirably

clear, and is well supported in the theses of Chapter II, that "Christianity is true society," and of Chapter III, that "Christianity is completely for society." Purely doctrinal formulæ sink into the background, as compared with *agapē,* which is interestingly compared with *eros* and *philia.*

These three chapters deal with "ultimate principles." They rest on, but carry further and clarify, basic convictions set forth in Ferré's previous volumes. These chapters might have been more cogent had they been a little less repetitious. In particular, Chapters II and III might well have been combined into one. Here and there one finds obscurity. Ferré writes, "Agape is fully definite without being specific." The thought surely could be conveyed more lucidly! When he calls *agapē* "outgoing concern" and *eros* "intaking concern," it is not sure that he is true to the Greek *eros* at its best. *Eros* is not always self-centred!

In the next section, Chapters IV, V, and VI, Ferré sets forth his views of the church as the incarnation of the Holy Spirit, the world as "under the sway of the Spirit of God," Christian social action as a "distinctive dimension," and the rôle of the Spirit as "translating and transpowering." Here some of the distinctions made are more or less hairsplitting, but his basic emphasis on "the personal dimension"—what he calls "the primacy of the personal perspective"—is sound.

Yet he is oddly nervous about "personalism." He cannot "accept any personalism in which the discreteness of the individual is strongly stressed, except for hortatory purposes." A reader might ask what business one has using an idea for hortatory purposes if he does not believe it to be true! The context reveals that the opposition to the discreteness of persons derives from a desire to preserve the unity of the Trinity. But if the persons of the Trinity are dewdrops that slip into the shining sea of unity and this is a ground for attacking "discreteness of individuals," then all persons flow into a common sea, and Ferré is committed to pantheism or absolutism—a higher price than he intends to pay. Perhaps he means by "discreteness of the individual" something like a windowless Leibnizian monad; but then he fighteth as one that beateth the air. No modern personalist, who holds that every person is discrete and that no person is a part of any other person, would dream of denying that persons interact or communicate with other persons. A social world of love does not gain in love or meaning when the lovers are conceived as essentially one being.

The last section (pp. 181-275) is the most original and provocative part of the book. It is so well done, so relevant to social need, and so essential to the purpose of the book, that it might well have been expanded to twice its length.

The discussions of the Christian perspective on war, on property, and on education should stir up a good deal of discussion. Precisely the best things Ferré has to say will be most violently objected to. He treats the problem of war judiciously, presenting pacifism as "God's continuation of the incarnation" and pacifists as "forerunners of a new and better day." Rather incongruously, some excellent remarks on marriage and sex appear in the chapter on war. "Christian communism" is defended; Marxism is not only "the fastest growing movement" but "a prophetic movement, giving hope to the masses." It is pathetic that a Christian in these days cannot utter simple truths without laying himself open to bitter attacks. It is no crime to assert that we "need something better than capitalism" as it now exists.

In educational theory Ferré again runs counter to many dominant ideas. He (like the reviewer) is old-fashioned enough to make meditation and even memorization basic. He holds that "indoctrination is as natural as life," and is unavoidable. He wants to see family prayers revived. More strength to his arm!

The book as a whole is vigorous and challenging. If it presents little that is fundamentally new in theory, it is nevertheless a valuable confrontation of our modern world with the principle of love, boldly and concretely conceived. It provides a Christian focus for thought and action.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

As a Mighty Stream, by Julian Morgenstern, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1949, pp. x, 442, $4.

It was a happy thought on the part of the trustees of Hebrew Union College, upon the occasion of Dr. Morgenstern's retirement from the presidency of that institution after forty years of service—as instructor, professor, and president—to publish this volume of his addresses, not only for the general reading public but also for scholars. For while the layman will be able to read the book without difficulty—that is, those who are well enough informed to be interested in the vital social and religious issues of their time, which, one is compelled to admit, is not too large a number—he will not be able to appreciate the vast erudition reflected. Lay readers will be interested mainly in the realistic discussion of the nature and destiny of Judaism, especially of the problems which have been thrust upon the Jews by the liberal spirit which since the French Revolution has abolished the ghetto and brought emancipation, but also by the more recent resurgence of a boundless hatred which intended and partly accomplished the extermination of the Jewish people. Scholars will also be interested in following the analysis of these problems by one of their eminent colleagues, but in addition they will enjoy the refreshing boldness with which Dr. Morgenstern accepts the new light of scholarly research on the Bible and Jewish history. One encounters penetrating summaries of what is known about every age of Hebrew and Jewish history, but notably those of the biblical period, where Dr. Morgenstern himself ranks as an outstanding scholar and has been turning out prodigious labors for a generation. Since the book is constructed from addresses of a popular nature delivered over a period of some thirty years—some of which, to be sure, have been expanded—it has no footnotes. The historical judgments recorded are thus left unsupported. On the whole, this is satisfactory, for the facts used are accepted by most scholars. But where Dr. Morgenstern states as a fact his view that Jerusalem and the temple were destroyed a second time in 486 B.C. without providing the evidence, a good many readers will be left puzzled.

Dr. Morgenstern's own eminence as a biblical scholar qualifies him well to point out to his Jewish colleagues that the great body of sound knowledge of the Hebrew Bible has been the achievement almost exclusively of Christian scholars—labors which Jews themselves should have taken the lead in performing.

Two sections of the book deserve mention for their substantial qualities. These are "The Foundations of Israel's History," 64 pp.; and "The Reform Process in Jewish History," 103 pp. Here the historical nature of Judaism is worked out with care and the process of evolution in response to changing environments through the ages is documented in detail. There is first of all the nomadic life of the Arabian wastes, in which the unique spirit which to this day characterizes the Jewish people came into being—a concept which, like Rousseau's idea of primitive man, appears to me somewhat romantic. Settled life in Canaan brought generous borrowing of the Sabbath, numerous festivals, and rituals, and the process continued as contacts were made with the cultures of Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, and the hellenistic kingdoms. The materials taken over, however, were always assimilated and reinterpreted so that they gave fitting expression to the Hebrew spirit. Thus tribal life yielded

to national, and the religion of the Hebrew state in turn became Judaism. The cultural interchange between Jews and their neighbors has been a dynamic movement from the beginning, and it continues unabated today. In our time we see it especially as Reform Judaism. This religion which has a history of more than three thousand years is struggling now to assume the form which life in the new, free world of America indicates. What that will finally be, one cannot yet say, but it will freely absorb all that American culture has to offer. Then it will transform all that it takes over and suffuse it with its own spirit. At the same time, Judaism will continue to contribute to American life the ideals of democratic truth and freedom which it inherited from the ancient prophets.

Thus what we know as Reform Judaism, although it is ostensibly no more than a hundred years old, is in fact as old as Hebrew religion. The process of reform goes on forever. This thesis is very sound, and applies, one may observe, to all religion as well as to Judaism.

Naturally one is interested in what Dr. Morgenstern has to say about Zionism, an issue which every statesman of Judaism at this time must face. I think that he would agree that this is the most difficult question that he has attempted to answer. He admits readily that some early leaders of reform went too far with their melting-pot philosophy, which would lead to complete assimilation and disappearance of Jews, a goal to which he cannot subscribe. Yet he affirms that the real essence of Judaism does not require a political or national expression. But he is a Zionist to the extent of welcoming the rise of the new Israel in Palestine and wishing for it success. He makes no comments on the methods used by the Zionists in setting up the new state. There is room in Judaism for political expression, he says. Particularism and universalism must be held in balance as each struggles for ascendancy. The Hebrew religion has had a national basis for only some six hundred years of its three millenniums of existence. It has actually flourished most when dispersed among the nations, and this will continue to be true in the future.

The basis of unity of Judaism is not a nation. Nor is it a race, for much intermarriage has taken place, and will continue to take place as many proselytes embrace the Jewish faith. The real essence of Judaism is to be found in its people. It is a religious people—a people chosen of God as his servant to bear the divine message of love and peace to the world. It is therefore an eternal people whose prophetic and priestly obligation to mankind will not be finished so long as the race of man endures.

I find it difficult to grasp this concept of "people," with which Dr. Morgenstern operates. In my mind, a people has either a political basis, as the American people; or a racial basis, as the Negro people. But he denies that his people is either a nation or a race. He says instead that the bond of unity is religion. Jews are not a national or racial, but a religious people. But this idea appears to be ambiguous. Could one say that Christians or Buddhists are a people? Hardly, in the true sense of the word. Do Jews have more of a uniting bond than Christians? If so, what is it? If not, is "people" the right word for it?

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

The Christian Perspective, by Edward T. Ramsdell, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 218, $2.50.

This book by the professor of systematic theology at Vanderbilt University is an able, stimulating, and challenging volume, marked by broad scholarship, originality, and a compact and finished style. The special interest attaching to it

is that it seeks to present a synthesis of the personalistic and neoörthodox types of theology. Both of these schools of thought acknowledge the authority of Scripture and both are "evangelical" in their standpoint. But they differ in several respects. The personalistic theology is freedomistic or Arminian, while neoörthodoxy would more precisely be called neo-Calvinism. The latter is also more conservative than the former. And what is more significant is that it takes a different attitude toward philosophy. The personalistic theology is a philosophical theology, while neoörthodoxy claims to be a biblical theology, a theology of the Word of God. But whether its distinctive characteristic is its belief in the Bible or its disbelief in philosophy may be an open question. Without its philosophical skepticism neoörthodoxy would hardly have come into being as a separate theological movement.

The foregoing differences, however, between it and the personalistic theology are not regarded by Dr. Ramsdell as sufficiently deep-seated to exclude a synthesis of the two movements. So in the present volume he has set forth such a synthesis. In this respect the book is unique.

As a believer in the philosophy of personalism the author affirms its religious value and adheres to its essential tenets. He draws no sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. For him both are rational disciplines. And he is himself a rationalist in the broader sense of the term. He does not oppose faith to reason. This dualism he rejects. He rejects also the traditional dualism of the divine and the human. He holds to the divine immanence, a doctrine which Barth has stigmatized as the archheresy of the modern church. He is also a professed freedomist in the metaphysical and ethical senses of the term. He rejects the notion of inherited guilt, and declares that as individuals we are not responsible for the sins of society unless we actually participate in them. "Our guilt is the guilt of our sins," not the guilt of the sins of others.

The foregoing factors in the author's philosophical creed are not systematically elaborated. Most of them are briefly stated or assumed. His main concern is "to explore the possibilities of a biblical theology," and to assess the values of the neoörthodox version of such a theology. In this attempt he is manifestly guided by the conviction that neoörthodoxy despite its philosophical defects has had a profound and in the main wholesome influence on Christian theology.

Operating from this neoörthodox standpoint, he lays primary emphasis on the idea of a Christian perspective, which he regards as "the basic category of the Christian faith." This in my opinion is a valid category. It affirms the commonly accepted uniqueness of the Christian faith, and may be viewed as a specification under the Kantian primacy of the practical reason. Philosophically as well as historically it is thus justifiable.

The neoörthodox use of paradox, however, is a very different thing. Paradox, the author admits, may be "thoroughly irrational," and he might have added that this misuse of it has perhaps done more than anything else to bring neoörthodoxy into wide disrepute. Paradox need not, of course, be irrational. There is such a thing as "significant" or rationally intelligible paradox, and to its theological use there is in principle no objection. The question is simply one of literary taste. But paradox lends itself easily to gratuitous mystification, and in a field, where clear thinking is of the utmost importance, it ought in my opinion be used sparingly. Certainly its present use is a dubious credential of neoörthodoxy.

The author's discussion of the doctrine of sin is psychologically penetrating and instructive. But in his effort to account for the universality of sin he follows Reinhold Niebuhr rather closely and fails, it seems to me, to guard adequately the

elementary moral principle that a person is not responsible for an act or state of mind that he cannot possibly avoid. Necessitated sin is not sin. To make it such is to reduce sin to a subvolitional and subethical level and to violate the dictates of an enlightened conscience. In neo-Calvinism there is a strong tendency toward this kind of moral irrationalism, and it is not wholly avoided in the chapter on "Man and His Sin." Nevertheless there is much valuable material in this chapter.

One of the best things in the book is the section dealing with the earthly life of Jesus in its relation to the total revelation of God in Christ. The argument here is timely and convincing. It may also be noted that the author's interpretation of the incarnation and the atonement is fundamentally moral and spiritual by way of distinction from the mystical and legalistic types of interpretation in traditional theology.

On first reading, the book may seem to be in the main an attempted defense of certain characteristic features of neoörthodoxy. But a second and more careful reading leaves one, I think, with the impression that the rational motive is dominant in the book, provided one interprets the word *rational* in the light of Kant's primacy of the practical reason and of Troeltsch's religious a priori. It is to reason in this broader sense of the term that the book for the most part appeals, and not to any *super*rational or *non*rational or *ir*rational authority, however divine it may be reputed to be. But whatever may be our view of its dominant motive and whatever theoretical or practical value may be attributed to its attempted synthesis, the book is eminently worthy of careful study as a scholarly and able survey and critical analysis of two basic tendencies in contemporary Protestant theology.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man, by David E. Roberts, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. xiv, 161, $3.

This is a remarkable book, which we have needed for a long time, and which should be read by psychologists and psychotherapists as well as by pastors and theologians. For it is "an attempt to move in the direction of a synthesis" of the theological and the psychotherapeutic orientations. Since these are the only two methods "which can directly transform man's internal character-structure," it becomes immensely important that understanding be generated.

Beginning with a discussion of what psychotherapy is and what it really does to a man's inner life, the author then examines the development of personal belief, the meaning of man as in the image of God, and moralism in the light of the insights of psychotherapy. Next he turns more explicitly to building up his case for the relevance and meaning of theological insight to psychotherapy. He concludes with some general remarks on the relation of psychology to theology.

The book has two foci. On the one hand, the author is concerned to have the church examine "its own beliefs and practices in the light of what psychotherapy has to offer." On the other hand, there is little hope for mankind unless positive purposes are supported by "the religious energies of men," and "these religious energies can be turned from unworthy objects to a worthy one only by refusing to deify human qualities and purposes, and by directing them, instead, to God Himself, in whom human freedom and beatitude are grounded." A subsidiary argument is that "myths and symbols possess an evocative power which cannot be rivaled by the propositions of discursive thinking."

What do the insights of psychotherapeutic thought and practice suggest which is relevant to a Christian view of man? They make impossible, for example, any view which dichotomizes reason and emotion. ". . . failure to establish organic, mutually

enriching, connections between reason and emotion is neurotic." Psychotherapy has also shed much light on "the manner in which we are determined," namely, "by unconscious forces." Therefore, "the road to freedom" is not to be found in moralism, "putting on the pressure," but instead "by an expansion of self-acquaintance." Psychotherapy aims not at the "eradication" of conscience, but at its "transformation." Psychotherapy demonstrates not alone individual differences, but the absolute necessity for each person to be able to approach belief in a way consistent with his own inner structure of character and the residue of his own life experiences. Seen in this light, much can be learned from the apparently "neutral" attitude of the psychotherapist, who assumes this not because of social unconcern or immorality but "because he is seriously concerned with enhancing personal integrity and emotional maturity."

What kind of insights are found in the Christian view of man which affect psychotherapy? These are chiefly a matter of dimension. For example, in relation to the explanation of moral evil, the social theory, the evolutionary lag theory, and the ignorance theory are all important—but even together are inadequate unless a deeper dimension is considered, represented in theology in the doctrine of original sin as bondage of the will. The religious intension or "motive" of the Christian doctrine of sin "is not to drive in a sense of despair and insufficiency just because one enjoys seeing men wriggle in agony. The motive behind it is to reach full awareness of the depth of the human problem."

Theology which is not the mere imposition of something regardless of a man's particular needs and capacities is always an attempt to "express intellectually what he has already experienced." The deeper dimension is not inserted by theology but by life experience. Not to attempt expression of it is, in a fashion, to cut off from one's perception aspects of his real experience.

Psychotherapy suggests a new criterion in relation to salvation: Is it static or dynamic? ". . . a conception of salvation is static so long as it imposes an obligatory pattern without regard to the specific needs and capacities of the growing and changing individual." A dynamic view of salvation "removes man-made evils at the source by changing the man." Moralism, legalism, and rationalism are all equally powerless to withstand the insights of psychotherapy.

All of this, says the author, is of great importance not only because of the specific needs of men in our time but also because, even in an atmosphere of freedom which Protestantism has, "recent developments have tended to drive Christian belief and the sciences of man farther apart instead of drawing them together."

The author's case is enlightening, convincing, and important. Where does his view stand in relation to that of psychotherapists and of other theologians? Psychotherapeutically, his thinking is related to that of the progressive or neo-Freudian psychoanalysts, who are socially and culturally as well as psychologically oriented.

Theologically, his view seems more closely related to that of Paul Tillich than of any other contemporary theologian. To those who believe neoörthodoxy implies a Barthian kind of dichotomy between man and God, this is certainly not neoörthodoxy. It would appear more accurate to see the author's view as a movement through neo-orthodoxy, in the sense of recapturing the religious motive or intention of fundamental doctrines, toward a synthesis with the corrective elements which emerged in theological liberalism and in the sciences of man. He certainly transcends both liberalism and neoörthodoxy in their usual connotations. He demonstrates as much kinship with the department of religious education as with the department of Christian theology at his seminary.

The author denies being a supernaturalist in any sense which implies "a second

world." But man, he says, "is above nature" because of his capacity for self-consciousness, "even though he can never jump out of it." He implies he is not a naturalist in any sense which equates nature with what science means by it. Such a view is an attempt to transcend the naturalist-supernaturalist controversy, but at the expense of a narrow implied definition of nature.

Since the volume is about a view of man, there is no systematic discussion of a doctrine of God beyond the statement that "conceptions of God are attempts to characterize the ultimate context in which natural and human events take place." This implies a dynamic as against a static view of God as well as of man, sin, and salvation, and thus seems akin to Tillich or Whitehead and basically opposed to the dominant Continental theologies. Brief words about the meaning of Christ confirm such a judgment.

This book performs with brilliance the task it sets for itself. Basic criticism of it can come only from those holding quite different views on either psychotherapy or theology, which I do not. On a different level of comment, however, we may note the bias of this book, or what it does not accomplish which is nevertheless relevant to the title. It does not consider psychology in the broad, or the sciences of man, except as their knowledge converges in psychotherapy. The last is the most important datum, but it is not alone. It is the bull's-eye but not the whole target. This concentration on the centre achieves clarity and punch, but it tends to obscure the full dimensions of the knowledge emerging from the sciences of man.

The book professes to deal theologically only with the doctrine of man. Yet there emerges at least the foundations of a doctrine of sin and a doctrine of salvation as well. This means that, apart from very brief references, an introductory statement is made on the whole range of Christian theology except for the doctrine of God. This would appear to reflect a general tendency on the part of American theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr to consider the whole range of Christian theology more or less systematically except a doctrine of God. Curiously enough, it seems to be the theistic naturalists like Henry Nelson Wieman who believe that there can not be a systematic Christian view of man without concomitant struggle toward a systematic doctrine of God.

One wishes there were some way to indicate, on the printed page, that a word or phrase is being used in a special sense other than by quotation marks. The author employs them so liberally for such a purpose, instead of as real quotations, that the reader is constantly halted to ask himself what special meaning is intended to be attached to a phrase.

SEWARD HILTNER

Lust for Power, by Joseph Haroutunian, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. xii, 174, $3.

Lust for power is a corruption of man's love for power. Under the influence of this lust, at once insatiable and deceitful, modern man identifies his security with machine products and his good with hedonistic goods. Yet, these attempts to insure his destiny actually leave men with a deeper sense of insecurity, with bitter suspicion of his fellow men, and with a "joyless will to power" which makes his pursuit of good after good a hollow obsession.

Why do men develop this lust for power and bring upon themselves its evils? "There is nothing in nature or reason as concerned with finite goods which explains the lust in the human pursuit of goods" (p. 60). No finite need, but only man's desire for an eternal life, lies at the root of this corruption. For this yearning, a yearning for an eternal life, is constantly thwarted by the anticipation of death, and this frustration drives man to replace the qualitative "time-full infinite" with the

quantitative time-less infinite. "It is the despair of life and not the hope of gain that is the prior source of human vice" (p. 65).

Mr. Haroutunian will not accept "circular" explanations of unreason in terms of man's irrationality. The reason why men "react to the finite as if it were infinite" goes deeper than any emotional demand for finite good. "It is not the race's lack in reasoning power but the race's subjection to the power of death that makes our common existence the evil producing thing that it is. . . . Life confronted with death is absolutely impetuous, and exercises its impetuosity against other life" (p. 66).

At this point the reader wonders whether man, on Haroutunian's view, must seek to survive as though survival meant the victory of life over death. A spiritual tropism seems to be at work here. Pride is not the result of poor reason; it comes from the overthrow of reason by a power greater than itself, the power of life met with death (p. 66). It seems that it is because men despair before nonbeing and in that very act absolutize it, and then despair all the more, that we have people eating food, cherishing goods, and seeking power as if these were preventatives against death. Because power cannot overcome death, even the most powerful men are haunted by dread. Were there not this despair of nonbeing, which results in the lust for power, men might indeed succeed in being reasonable in their pursuit of life, but as it is, reason never succeeds in gaining consistent ascendancy, so anxious are men to be free from death.

Man's existence is also permeated by irrational feelings of guilt which are not due to societal pressure. "Guilt implies that man ought not to despair, even though he has no apparent reason not to despair. It suggests a self-imposed blindness to light, a radical estrangement from his true situation . . . man is guilty because the non-being he despairs of hides a Being whom alas he knows only in his ignorance of despair and guilt" (p. 99). "Guilt is a negative awareness of God who declares our despair guilty" (p. 100). If men would only not repudiate the fact that they must move and have their being in God, they would avoid this vicious circle of a guilt which leads to lust for power and a lust for power which increases guilt.

This is Haroutunian's basic theme, and he applies it to basic phases of human existence, using a passionate style which sometimes belabors the point rather than clarifying it. Wisdom, as he sees it, is the realization of the basic ambiguity of human existence. There is no real culture, no real art, no real philosophy, no real theology which does not make us both aware of this ambiguity, and encourage the faith in God which is the only ultimate hope of transforming lust into love. The catharsis needed by our souls "can come only from a faith inspired and empowered by the Christian Gospels" (p. 173).

This book is not easy to evaluate. There is no doubting the many insights into the struggle of the human spirit. But for this reader, at any rate, this spiritual psychoanalysis, while suggestive, leaves one asking: Is this the way men really feel, or is this the way they should feel, given this conception of their relation to God? Beyond the assertion that other explanations won't do, there is no adequate analysis of why this is so. There are many persons who are victimized by the lust for power, as Haroutunian describes, but he does not seem to realize that the lives of millions cannot be described in terms of such lust. But a deeper difficulty remains.

One takes it that man's refusal to accept the ambiguity of his existence is something which has gone on unawares. Unlike the prodigal son, man has no clear idea of his father's will. Yet, here he is, haunted by a sense of guilt for doing something he should not do, seeking to overcome death. Still, if man's existence is ambiguous with regard to the reality of God, and if man had nothing to do with creating this

original situation, would a good God plague man with irrational guilt? Haroutunian's whole thesis with regard to guilt presupposes, on the one hand, that men know they are placing false gods before them, and yet, on the other hand, his very thesis is that they cannot know owing to the ambiguity of existence. Can guilt be the shadow of God's light? Can there be *guilt, as opposed to anxiety,* if one is not convinced that he has knowingly done wrong?

PETER A. BERTOCCI

The Epic of Russian Literature: From its Origins through Tolstoy, by Marc Slonim, New York, Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. vii, 367, $5.

In the midst of the shooting, shouting, and recriminations of 1950, the calm philosopher (if you can find one) might say, "We're getting acquainted with the Russians." And, if we could hear him above the din, many of us would reply, "And how!" But our methods of getting acquainted (like those between France and Germany) are not likely to produce the best results. We need friendly visitors (not spies) and dozens of honest books (not twisted propaganda).

One of the honest books on Russia in 1950 is Marc Slonim's *The Epic of Russian Literature.* It contains no shouting or recriminations and is written by a calm philosopher who is in a unique position to know the truth. He was born and educated in Russia, has studied in Italy, taught in Czechoslovakia, lectured in France, Belgium, and Yugoslavia, and is now teaching in the United States. He has written in Russian, French, and English, and can act as an intellectual middleman between Russia and the West. He has been preparing his material for twenty-five years, he says (though the writer of the blurb modestly reduces the figure to twenty).

The title of the book may be momentarily misleading—yet it is a good title. He is not writing about epic poetry but about all the bewildering panoply of Russian literature as it stretches over a thousand years of troubled history. Like everybody else, he skips hastily across hundreds of dreary years from the introduction of Christianity (about the eighth century) to the time of Peter the Great (1682-1725), though he gives more detail here than I have seen in previous histories of Russian literature. To the outsider, this introductory material is discouraging because it demands a background of historical and cultural knowledge possessed by few people in the Western world. Then he settles down with poets, playwrights, and satirists of the eighteenth century (all of whom we have never heard of), but along the way he manages to insert comments about modern Russia and better-known writers.

He does not really hit his stride until he comes to Pushkin. If I were making reading assignments in the book with the hope of securing a favorable reaction I would begin with Chapter Four ("Pushkin"). Anyone who gets that far will read all of the book. From this point it proceeds smoothly, with chapters on leading literary figures interspersed with others on significant developments in Russian thought, culminating in three outstanding chapters which give an ample setting to the three crowned jewels of Russian prose fiction: Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy.

As the title indicates, the book is broad and comprehensive and complete. The author has a remarkable mental grasp and manages to bring in a great variety of things. He not only remembers the deep roots of Russian background behind the nineteenth century and the multifarious changes in Russian thought during that century, but he also makes incidental references to Greek, Latin, German, French, British, and American literature. Indeed, the remark he makes about Pushkin might almost be applied to Slonim: He "wrote French like a Frenchman, read and translated German, English, Italian; knew the Greek and Latin classics; and was amazingly

well read in the European authors of his day. There is proof that Pushkin knew American writers also. . . . Few Westerners were so *au courant* in contemporary European art and thought as this Russian writer. . ." (p. 96).

For example, he gives full place to British writers, mentioning Shakespeare, Milton, Goldsmith, Macpherson, Edward Young, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, Scott, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Macaulay, Radcliffe, Maturin, George Eliot, Conrad, and Henry James. Most of these references, though, are slight and incidental and confined to the Romantic movement. Byron gets the greatest attention because of his great influence on Pushkin. The author gives hardly enough about any of these foreign writers to indicate extent of knowledge, but his spelling of Macpherson as *Mac-Pherson* (p. 50) is not encouraging. One unusual touch was his tying up of the growth of Russian and English magazines in the eighteenth century. Looking from this side of Europe, we can readily see that he missed dozens of rich opportunities for comparison and analogy: Koltzov and Burns; Karamzin and Richardson; Gogol and Dickens; Pushkin and Shakespeare; Tolstoy and Thackeray; Dostoevsky and Dickens; but it would be too much to expect all this in one book.

His mental grasp includes the attitudes of contemporary Russia toward nineteenth-century figures, the backgrounds of the figures themselves, and modern developments from those figures. For example, he speaks of Soviet attitudes toward Dostoevsky (p. 307), Lermontov's world of inner conflicts behind Dostoevsky (p. 119), and Dostoevsky as a forerunner of the existentialists (p. 305). It is only fair to say that this book gives us Russian literature up to date and contains more within the covers of a single volume than has been written before in English—and this is only the first volume of a two-volume work.

When the author analyzes style and technique in the original Russian (as in the case of Tolstoy, p. 326) he is in a very strong position. He can speak to Westerners in their own language and yet talk with authority about the nuances of Russian style. So far this is a relatively rare phenomenon in the history of the literary criticism of Russian works.

As one reads the book thoughtfully, he becomes increasingly aware that many of its judgments are strongly influenced by the Soviet point of view—and yet the author tries to be completely objective. He is acutely aware, however, of Soviet attitudes and he knows how deeply the Russian present is rooted in the Russian past. The reader underscores certain comments because he can see in them at least oblique reference to the continual crisis in which we live today. Some of the best of these come in the excellent chapter, "Westernizers and Slavophiles." For example:

> Russian history was a terrible lesson for other peoples: it showed what slavery and isolation could lead to. Russia had always lacked the historical, religious, and cultural unity of the West, which was based largely on Roman law, Christian ethics, and the Catholic Church. Belonging to none of the great families of mankind, she was neither of the West nor of the East, for she was devoid of the traditions of either. From sheer barbarism she had passed to crass ignorance, and then had fallen under the yoke of a brutal foreign invader who left his impress on all aspects of the Muscovite State. An outsider in the universal race for progress, Russia had not contributed a single work of intellect or art to the rest of humanity. During the exciting periods of European upheaval when the whole world was aroused, searching for new ways of life (the Renaissance, the French Revolution, and so on), Russia had continued to vegetate in her wooden, straw-thatched huts. A deaf-and-mute bystander, she had become resigned to the fact that the destinies of mankind were decided without her. Even Peter the Great had been unable to change the tragic situation: while forcing his subjects to don European garments and manners, he could not destroy the "dead wall" between Russia and the West (p. 144).

And still more pertinent is the remark that pro-Western and anti-Western factions still persist in the ranks of the communist party today (p. 145).

But the major result of the Soviet influence upon the writer is to swing the

emphasis violently over on the side of "tendentiousness and realism" which "were destined to triumph in literature as well as in all other fields of art" (p. 230). This, of course, is not merely the author's personal opinion—it is the objective truth. But he has emphasized (as I have not seen it emphasized before) the contributions to literature by the *Raznochintsi*—the intelligentsia who emerged from the folk. All through the book the emphasis falls heavily on the contributions of workers or those sympathetic with workers, and whenever the author talks about a writer we must have a check on his dossier to see how he stands in terms of the Revolution. It is as if the history of American literature were written with an eye continually on 1776 or capitalism.

When the touchstone is always a man's attitude toward social change, everything is distorted by it, and we do not get literary criticism but literary and social criticism combined. Here Pugachev takes on a new significance because "after 1917 the Bolsheviks came to consider him one of the forerunners of their revolution" (p. 31), and the Decemberists get full attention for the same reason.

In view of the recency of the Russian Revolution and the sensitivity of the Russians to matters connected with it, this emphasis is understandable and almost inevitable. I have no particular quarrel with it, for it illustrates how historical developments cast new light on past events. Indeed, in some ways these comments on Soviet attitudes are the most interesting feature of the book.

Naturally the Russian Shakespeare gets high tribute, but his crowning accolade is that "at the present time Pushkin is the most popular and widely read classic in the Soviet Union" (p. 107). And Lermontov is commended for his intense nationalism: "His wistfulness and his revolt, his quest for freedom, and his refusal to accept reality, correspond to identical features of the cultured Russian society of his period. These features remained intact through many generations, and even today in the Soviet Union, where pessimistic ideas are banned and many of the feelings expressed by Lermontov are officially frowned upon, the poet is loved, widely read, and acclaimed one of the greatest and most original representations of the true 'Russian spirit' in native literature" (pp. 122-123). Nekrassov was "the forerunner and master of all poets of political struggle, popular feelings and revolution . . ." (p. 239). He was "the poet of the people's 'grief and sufferings'—and so he is regarded even today" (p. 234). Incidentally, Nekrassov was an atheist, a materialist, and a hypochondriac, and the author permits himself to refer to him as a "warped and twisted man" (p. 239).

Time after time the comments go on like this: Chernyshevsky was the first revolutionary socialist in Russian fiction (p. 213) and Dobroliubov scorned art for art's sake and included social criticism along with artistic criticism (p. 215). Pisarev discarded sentimentality, Platonic love, romanticism, idealism, mysticism, and poetry. He points the way to Bazarov and the "strong men" of modern Russia. Sometimes the new names come with dizzying rapidity, and many of these new figures (new to us) are resurrected because of their importance to the Soviet mind.

Surprisingly enough, the author manages to keep from discouraging the reader or confusing him. The style is readable and interesting. We do not find rhetoric or purple patches, but the English flows smoothly in a clear and flexible style. For the most part he writes English as if to the manner born, but occasionally the critical reader is aware of an ineptitude, such as *rather unique* (p. 244), *as* for *like* (p. 121), slang words or bad grammar (pp. 245, 328)—some of which should have been picked up in the editorial office.

I wish that the author would not try to be so completely impersonal in his criticism. Is he pro-Soviet? Does he have any feeling for poetry? Does he have a sense of humor? On what basis does he decide the difference between good and bad in literature?

If a literary critic will just put his cards on the table (his 3x5 cards, of course) and not try to be Mr. Eniac, we can see his weaknesses and limitations and (making the proper allowances) can form a pretty shrewd notion of what is what. Mr. Slonim seems to feel that Flaubert's ideal of *l'impersonnalité* is best. He even carries his reserve so far as to discuss himself in his own foreword so coldly that I looked to see whose name would be signed at the end. When he holds himself at arm's length like this, he seems un-Russian—certainly he is no Belinsky.

I would guess that he is mildly against the Soviet regime, that he loves Russia (Phelps says all Russians do), and that he has considerable skill in the analysis of poetry but little feeling for it. I like very much his comments about the hopelessness of really translating Russian poets, and I have a suspicion that the Russian translations of Shelley and Poe are not quite so wonderful as he imagines when he says that they "rival the originals." He certainly shows no sense of humor when he misses the exuberance and pure fun of some of Gogol, and the wonderful troika passage he quotes from *Dead Souls* (p. 177) lacks in the twentieth-century version which he uses the beauty that it has in the J. C. Hogarth translation (Everyman's Library).

By approaching his subject with cold scientific detachment and writing from the encyclopædic point of view he produces a work highly satisfactory on superficial levels but open to serious objection in the deeper realm of the spirit. If the portrait I am inclined to paint here is that of a distorted monster bearing no resemblance to the author, he is partly to blame because of what he did not say.

Perhaps the author believed it wiser to be completely detached because of the cold eyes of the N.K.V.D. and the hair-trigger suspicions of the American public at the present time. But he has given clues. His book would never be published in the Soviet Union. He is out of step with their philosophy in believing that the Western world has strongly influenced Russian writers. The Soviet government would order him to restudy the whole problem from the Leninist-Marxist point of view. In this book he has little to say of Marx, less of Lenin, and nothing at all of Stalin. The man's name is not mentioned! How he managed to discuss Turgenev's Bazarov without mentioning Joseph Stalin is beyond me. It was a triumph of self-control.

However, I don't believe that his emphasis on the intellectual and the æsthetic and his minimizing the religious and emotional is the result of deliberate policy. It merely represents a powerful trend in modern civilization. It started in scientific laboratories of the Western world and comes back to us today in exaggerated reflection from an unfriendly Russia, where Orientals (as Stalin calls his people) are trying to outdo the West in technology. The author may be seeking to free himself from cross winds of doctrine, blowing from Christian, pagan, sentimentalist, atheist, and other ideological sources; but he is caught inextricably in the meshes of his upbringing and temperament.

He was born in Russia and went all the way through to the university. He rebelled against Soviet propaganda, but it had its effect, nevertheless. Note this revealing statement: ". . . the uniform textbooks of literature authorized for the schools of the Soviet Union either completely omitted Dostoevsky, barely mentioned him, or discussed him sketchily in a page or two of small type. The students were left to wonder why a writer who (as some notes stated at the end) 'has received

universal recognition as a master genius of the psychological novel' did not deserve more than passing mention" (p. 307).

Dostoevsky was the archheretic—he doubted the efficacy of revolution. And, though our author rebelled against this mistreatment of Dostoevsky, he never quite escaped from its repercussions. He failed to appreciate the mystical and religious side of that strange genius. He tries hard to do justice to the man, but by minimizing religion and mysticism, he presents a Dostoevsky in whom gambling and perversion are inordinately prominent.

With Tolstoy the results are better; but, because of his proclivities, Slonim does still better with Turgenev. The chapter on Turgenev is the best one in the book. In Turgenev he can find stylistic qualities to describe and intellectual elements to analyze to his heart's content, and he is not troubled by disturbing overtones of mysticism and religion. All is firm and clear. "The prose of Turgenev has a singing, melodious quality; its rhythm is even, precise, and calm—very different from the nervous rhythms of Gogol or the feverish wordiness of Dostoevsky" (p. 254). Even the reader who knows only translations can see the aptness and incisiveness of this.

Maybe some day, when we are living on friendly terms with Russia, the taut, funambulatory technique of this book will be an object of amusement, and people like Mr. Slonim will not be immolated between two worlds; but when that time comes, I hope it will not be here because some badly frightened international Board of Reason sitting in owlish conclave has officially eliminated all emotion.

I recommend this book. Readers who have the patience to get beyond its formidable opening pages will be greatly enlightened and informed—they will become better acquainted with the Russians. The book has everything except the fourth dimension of life—and without that ". . . I feel chilly and grown old."

WALTER D. FERGUSON

Leaves From a Russian Diary—and Thirty Years After, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. ix, 346, $3.50.

It is not quite clear why the Beacon Press felt impelled to reprint this book after twenty-six years. It is badly in need of footnotes to correct "close-up" statements in the light of history. And why were the repeated anti-Semitic references not eliminated?

Leaves From a Russian Diary had a legitimate place among heated firsthand accounts of the Russian Revolution published here in the early twenties. It presented the counterrevolutionary side in a vivid, entertaining form. Today, the new edition merely swells the vindictive outpourings of more and more "escaped" Russians who weep, for substantial fees, on Uncle Sam's comfortable shoulder, at the risk of embroiling us in war against their native land. The postscript, "Thirty Years After," is little more than a confused, almost frenzied attempt to rationalize the original *Diary.* Significantly, this resurrected horror story appears simultaneously with *My Retreat From Russia,* in which former Soviet Citizen Vladimir Petrov boasts of his collaboration with the nazis during their bloody occupation of his country.

Professor Sorokin records in his *Diary* his activities, first as a social revolutionary in the overthrow of the czar, and a few months later, after the Bolshevik Revolution, as a counterrevolutionary conspirator.

Professor Sorokin shows clearly why the regime of "poor Kerensky" failed. "He is incompetent, weak-willed, and without mental direction—a good man, but

a poor leader, in fact, a perfect type of the Russian intelligentsia" (p. 76). The author "sometimes longs for some powerful force to appear and put a tight bridle on all these rabid and uncertain groups" (p. 32). Later, he exclaims, "If I were the Government I would arrest them (Lenin and colleagues) without hesitation. If necessary I would execute them in order to prevent the horrible catastrophe into which they plan to plunge the country." And on p. 72, "If it is necessary to execute a few thousand ruffians in order to save millions of Russians, then we must be prepared to do it." When General Korniloff marched an army on Petrograd intending to overthrow the provisional government and make himself dictator, Professor Sorokin approved.

However, when the Bolsheviks seized power, the professor promptly lost his enthusiasm for a powerful force, governing by arrests, executions, and dictatorship. He plunged with zeal into the cat-and-mouse work of counterrevolution. He actively promoted civil war. He incited to sabotage and mutiny. He denounced the Soviet regime in his university classroom and in the opposition press. He hid in the Northern forests, in constant touch with his coconspirators in Archangel who were plotting an uprising with British aid.

An equally moving and exciting account might have been written by a persecuted "tory" during the American Revolution, or by a Copperhead during our Civil War.

With such a record, he seems to have led a charmed life. He reports indignantly that all about him "tens of thousands" were being slaughtered by the Chekha for trivial reasons, or for no reason. But when he himself was arrested by the "head hunters," at last, he was soon released and reinstated in Petrograd University—this time as head of the sociology department. At most, he was "furiously assailed and threatened" in the government press for his continued counterrevolutionary activities, and was finally deported at his own request.

The author frequently uses "tens of thousands" as a nice, round figure. After describing with satisfaction the shooting of twelve suspected communists in his train coach by Antonoff's "avenging" bandits, he gloats that "tens of thousands" of these "avengers" were hunting down the communists (pp. 253-259). The impartial reader may be excused if he balances these "tens of thousands" one against the other.

This is the author's only reference to the civil war and White Terror. He fails to mention the armies of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel, and other White officers who were ravaging the Russian land. All blame for disorganization and killings is placed on the Bolsheviks.

In public libraries may be found a long-forgotten book, which deserves reprinting, *America's Siberian Adventure* by General William S. Graves who commanded the expedition in 1918-1920. General Graves says, "There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in Eastern Siberia, to everyone killed by the Bolsheviks" (p. 108).

The postscript to the Diary, "Thirty Years After," finds the professor still hating, still hoping. The unparalleled devastation of European Russia by the nazi invaders is disposed of summarily in this gem of sociological obscurantism:

> "After thirty years the standard of living of the people is, if anything, below that of the prerevolutionary period. The greater part of European Russia lies in ruins. Reference to the Second World War does not excuse this failure: without the Russian Revolution Nazism and Fascism would hardly have been possible, and without these, there would hardly have been a Second World War" (p. 330).

He declares, further, that the Soviet regime has not produced a single outstanding artist or scientist. They are all "of the pre-revolutionary vintage" (p. 327). In other words, they are more than thirty years old.

In the concluding pages of his postscript, the author belatedly proposes to apply the principles of "kindness, love and help" to "the complete unification of humanity—of all its parties, nations, creeds, races, classes." This is a startling conclusion to the preceding 344 hate-packed pages.

In the dangerous period of the hydrogen bomb, Christian men and women may well be disturbed when a religious publishing concern prints grievous words which stir up strife. The American people are turning to leaders who seek some basis for friendly coöperation with the Soviet Union. Here is the opportunity of Protestantism to assume leadership of this irresistable movement toward peace on earth, good will to men.

RUTH EPPERSON KENNELL

The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, by Karl Jaspers, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 188, $3.

One of the most distinguished exponents of existential philosophy makes in this little book an eloquent plea for the crucial need of philosophizing. As against a dogmatic and self-confident theology he insists that the work of the thinker is never ended. As against the hopeless abdication of the nihilist he urges the supreme necessity of finding truth.

He proposes to plumb the depths of nihilism: "Those who, when confronted by the terrible absurdities and injustices of the world, do not acknowledge them in their full reality, but pass over them with an almost automatic matter-of-factness by means of talk about God, sometimes seem less concerned with the truth than the nihilist himself." And again, "Faith is attained through unfaith."

But philosophic faith is a recognition that one *must* decide in his immediate situation, and a daring to use all available knowledge without being limited by it. It is an acknowledgment of a comprehensive whole which I cannot grasp, but which I know to be beyond any finite truth so that I must keep reaching beyond. In this sense it is the activity of transcending one's own experience and knowledge, and in this activity the eternal and the temporal are held together in creative tension. "Reason is the Comprehensive in us." Yet it may issue in the skepticism of a Pascal or the despair of a Kierkegaard. (Jaspers thinks Kierkegaard's Christianity excessive and unacceptable.) For Jaspers it is "the faith of man in his potentialities," even when he has faced in himself the worst that his relentless self-examination discloses.

With regard to theology and religion he speaks as an outsider. He sees in biblical faith not a system of ideas but a persistent polarity in thinking: priest and prophet, law and love, rigidity and openness, nationalism and universalism, solidarity and individualism, calculating legalism and faith in the divine mystery, magic and morality. When we comprehend these in some neat reconciling formula we miss the real meaning of the struggling faith of the Bible.

The secret of the philosophic life is transcendence: transcendence of the tradition into which we enter, transcending the society in which we must live, transcending the limits of that pure science by which we are intellectually disciplined, transcending our own self-enclosure by communication. This is "the daily labor of philosophy."

One cannot help feeling in this book the profound and agonizing quality of contemporary European thought. Their thinking is urged on by a more acute sense, an oppressive sense, of a crisis overtaking mankind. To read this volume is there-

fore an exercise in penetration, first to grasp the enormity of the problem, then to follow the author's relentless probing of both faith and unfaith. And this penetration may well expose to the thoughtful reader the shallowness of much of his own bland philosophizing. I therefore commend it especially to those whose philosophy of life is now well organized, wrapped in pleasing verbiage, and tied with string twenty-five or fifty years old.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

America's Spiritual Culture, by Bernard Eugene Meland, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 216, $2.50.

Here is a "theology" for the gospel of democracy, a naturalistic creed into which some of the motifs of historic Christianity are syncretized as auxiliaries to the democratic faith. Professor Meland defines his position as "a critical liberalism which stands essentially in the Renaissance tradition on the ground that a final and absolute discontinuity between religion and nature cannot be sustained, yet which recognizes discontinuities within a total pattern of continuity" (pp. 24-25).

He feels that the contemporary theological revival is a "retreat from modern culture," which amounts "to a betrayal of the church's most urgent and solemn duty to society at a time when democracy needs desperately to deal with its spiritual objective" (p. 30). This objective is: "to establish a way of living in this American community of diverse peoples that will steadily rebuild the tissues of a social organic unity" (*idem*).

Religion is significant as an aid in the development of this spiritual culture, because "religion is creativity" (p. 158); religion is "sensitive and patient inquiry into the meaning of the Sovereign Value to *which* loyalty and commitment are to be given" (p. 47; italics not in the original). "This universal value which the philosopher and the general public conceive vaguely, the Christian views more precisely. With reverent lips he calls *it* 'God'! The more conventional the Christian, the more precise does this reality appear" (p. 35; italics not in the original).

The main substance of the book is a utopian prescription of what would be required to build an ideal human commonwealth here in America. Much of it is eloquent, some of it really poetic after the manner of Whitman and Sandburg. There is an atmosphere of dauntless hope and unquenched optimism that pervades the book. Toward the end Meland turns ecstatic prophet:

> Our most recent American revolution . . . has started us on our way to a new America—a more mature America, an America in which a spiritual culture can really emerge. Almost as a fulfillment of an ancient prophecy we have laid foundations of justice and mercy in which the life of the spirit may grow (p. 202).

The ancient prophecy, interestingly enough, is Isa. 35:1-8!

It is curious how Meland has inverted so many of the themes of classical Christianity. The Christian creed speaks, in personal terms, of the "Maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible"; Meland speaks, in impersonal terms, of the Source of Value or Sovereign Value. The Christian social ethic is a fruit of Christian faith; for Meland, faith is a resource and aid in the development of a "spiritual culture." Christianity has affirmed that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself"; Meland speaks of redemption as "awakening to the Source of the psychical thrust that provides man's nascent spiritual capacity, thus advancing him to new possibilities of spiritual fulfillment" (p. 83). The early Christians were dauntless in hope, as they saw this world passing away and foresaw the parousia; Meland sees the heavenly world fading out of human imagination, and his hope springs up in the dawn of a secular apocalypse.

He himself says, quaintly enough, that "a militant theism always accentuates the tension between that order of life which frankly affirms God and that which only mildly assumes his existence" (p. 10). It would never have occurred to this reviewer to put it thus, but if the issue be so defined, he would confess himself a "militant" theist, a "conventional" Christian who thinks that the difference between the frank affirmation of God's Lordship and the *mild assumption* of his existence is as radical as any in human experience. Meland's desire to assimilate Christianity and secular culture each to other is hardly to be deplored as such. But this newest type of *Kulturprotestantismus* is in fact less impressive than some of its predecessors whose fate we know.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

The Age of Constantine the Great, by Jacob Burckhardt, translated by Moses Hadas, New York, Pantheon, ©1949, pp. 400, $4.50.

It is surprising that an English version of Burckhardt's important *Die Zeit Constantins des Grossen* should have awaited the passage of nearly a century since the first edition in 1853 at Basel. Both the "thoughtful readers of all classes, who are apt to follow an account only as it is able to present a definite and well-rounded picture," to whom Burckhardt particularly addresses himself, and the scholarly world are indebted to Professor Hadas and the publishers for having at long last recognized and remedied the omission. Burckhardt was not merely a master of the factual raw material of history, but also a keen, original interpreter and an amazingly modern "pioneer in the humanist reaction against the microscopic but unimaginative history of the 'scientific' historians"; Hadas observes that those who prefer the more systematic treatment, complete with bibliographies, will find it in the *Cambridge Ancient History* and *Cambridge Mediæval History*.

The interest of the original text and the smoothness of the translation are perhaps best attested by the reviewer's confession that frequently and for long passages he forgot to read critically and lapsed into reading for pleasure; he ventures to predict that anyone interested in the fourth century, which marked the transition from paganism to Christianity in the ancient world, will do likewise. The title of the book, which includes the third century as background, accurately epitomizes the ten chapters of brilliant depiction and interpretation of the changing religious climate, the politics, and the leading personalities of the declining Roman empire. At no point does the narrative drag; on the contrary, the reader not well acquainted with the details of this difficult period will sometimes wish that Burckhardt had enhanced his interpretations by the insertion of a few more pedestrian elementary facts. The author's chief and lasting contribution remains his portrayal of Constantine the Great (to whom he does not begrudge the epithet) as "a genius driven without surcease by ambition and lust for power" in whom "there can be no question of Christianity and paganism, of conscious religiosity or irreligiosity" (p. 292), and "an egoist robed in purple who measures and calculates all that he does or suffers to be done by the aggrandisement of his own power" (p. 323). Needless to say, this *ex parte* estimate has not been universally accepted; most recently the distinguished Hungarian classicist Alföldi has undertaken to rehabilitate Constantine's spirituality by showing that his policy "was produced by religious enlightenment and not by political calculation" (*The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome*, Oxford, 1948). Doubtless one's subjective attitude toward the Church of Rome itself inevitably colors one's attitude toward this one of its principal founders.

Every translator must adopt and maintain a certain attitude toward his original,

but it is rarely easy (*crede experto*) to be consistently lucid in doing so. In general, Hadas is wise in staying close to the original text—though it is questionable *pietas* to perpetuate Burckhardt's real errors and orthographic eccentricities, as he regularly does, at the same time introducing a few minor ones of his own. Among the actual renderings, I question whether "personal influence of the most intimate nature" as a means of securing advancement and preferment up the hierarchical ladder of the church (p. 309) does not carry in English a sinister connotation which the German *persönlichste Einfluss* did not imply. Again, Burckhardt's intent would have been more accurately reflected by rendering *Hofroman* as "historical novel" rather than as a "court romance" involving Crispus, Helena, the prefect Ablavius and others (p. 339); the unfortunate Crispus had too much "court romance" for his own good as it was.

But the translator's most serious misjudgment is his failure to realize that the modern average cursory "thoughtful readers of all classes" will tend to think of a new book as "new," rather than a century old, or will at least expect the translator to keep them up to date. Several times Hadas renders *heutig* and its equivalents as "modern"; there is no hint that Burckhardt's strictures on the "arrogant representatives of modern music" are presumably aimed at Wagner rather than at some others who might more readily and justifiably come to the modern reader's mind, nor have we any elucidation of the real value of the occasional *talers* and "sixty million francs of our money" in the text. Even *sesterces* and *solidi* would have been more illuminating. And in general Hadas could have made his translation more serviceable by modernizing more freely than he does; while his wholesale suppression of obsolete footnotes is all to the good, these could have been replaced by a more generous display of the fruits of subsequent scholarship. His only original footnotes are a citation of the edition of Diocletian's Edict (for which credit should have been given to Miss Graser) in Frank's *Economic Survey* V, and the rejection of an important but erroneous "earlier reading" on the Arch of Constantine.

More illustrations would also have been useful; the colossal head of Constantine is shown only on the jacket, which librarians will promptly discard, and the map of the Roman empire on the inside cover (reduced from Kiepert?) is a maze of hairline rivers and illegibly microscopic place names. Aside from the labor of translation, almost the only contributions that Hadas has given us of himself are a three-page evaluation of the principal ancient sources and a table of imperial reigns. This is regrettable, for he could have given much more that would have been useful without detracting from Burkhardt's own merits.

By and large, however, this translation is neither deficient nor inadequate. The occasional pursuit of the original into Teutonisms and obscurities is no more than the inevitable portion of any work translated from one tongue into another, and Mattingly's version of Alföldi, *op. cit.*, is not as successful. Burckhardt in English is cordially recommended to the readers of CROZER QUARTERLY.

HOWARD COMFORT

The Dilemma of the Idealist, by David Bryn-Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xv, 278, $3.

In this title, "idealist" is a tactful and complimentary substitute for "pacifist." His "dilemma" is how to adhere to his convictions and yet remain a loyal and practical Christian citizen. The author, a minister born and educated in Great Britain, has for some years been professor of international politics in a college in the middle west, the part of the country where indifference to international problems and consequent

isolationism and pacifism are today probably most likely to be found occasionally among students.

The author shows a general acquaintance with the history of pacifism since the origin of Christianity, and he has made an extensive study of pacifist thought in Great Britain and the United States since the opening of the present century. In Book I. he begins by stating the pacifist case very sympathetically, and more adequately than most pacifists could do. He then discloses its difficulties and inconsistencies in a very kindly and tactful manner, but so conclusively that it is hard to see how any pacifist could read these pages attentively without being forced to abandon or at least considerably modify his position.

A brief historical sketch calls attention to the ways in which Stoics and early Christians adapted themselves to environments not in harmony with their ideals, containing such institutions as war, slavery, and arbitrary government. Subsequently the mediæval and modern Catholic interpretation of the pacifist injunctions in the Sermon on the Mount as "counsels of perfection" is discussed. Protestants of course have always rejected this interpretation, but have not been particularly successful in formulating a satisfactory alternative. One Protestant attitude has been to say that the seemingly paradoxical teachings of Jesus are not to be taken literally; pacifists are unwilling to agree to this.

The fact of the matter, the author concludes, is that the majority of people will never live up to the standards of the more idealistic and morally sensitive members of society. It would probably be disastrous if governments were habitually to try to act on the highest moral principles and Christian ideals; consider, for instance, the history of Calvinism in Geneva and of alcoholic prohibition in the United States. On the contrary, the task of leadership in a political order is to put into operation the best that people at the time are generally ready to accept. Even a church will rarely be able to advocate the ideal solution of any grave issue that is in serious dispute among "good citizens"; all it can ordinarily do is to crystallize and register the consensus of opinion of its membership as a whole, at the time. Yet, even so, the idealists perform a valuable service. They at least keep awake in the rest of us a sense of our sins and deficiencies.

Idealists, the author continues, should realize that there is always the danger of failing to achieve the best that is really possible, because of an insistence upon goals that are now unattainable; *e.g.,* refusing to try to gain economic coöperation because this would fall short of a World Federation, which latter, though desirable, is impossible at the present time. We must be realistic and practical in our efforts at progress. It is usually better to secure half a loaf rather than no bread at all. However, a partial advance should not be accepted if that would arrest more sweeping progress in the near future. It is always better to choose the less of two evils: *e.g.,* a war rather than national dishonor—the alternatives between which Great British had to choose, both in 1914 and in 1939. While international morality lags behind the ethical codes of most modern communities, yet it does exist, and it shows some capacity for growth.

This book is timely and valuable. The author is right in saying that the general public in this country is not now ready to accept pacifism, and that pacifists should welcome and support moderate steps in international coöperation as better than no progress at all. He might, if he could have found a tactful way of saying it, have pointed out that if another wave of extreme pacifism should sweep over this land in the next few years, similar to that in the thirties, and again prevent adequate military

preparedness, the Russian government might be tempted to take advantage of the situation and precipitate a third world war.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Signs of Hope, by Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 125, $1.

This is an effective little book. Written in a manner which must have made good listening, these five lectures, originally delivered at Sewickley, Pa., Pomona College, and the National Presbyterian Church, also make attractive reading. The signs of hope discerned by the author are, first, the rise of a horizontal fellowship, second, the vitality of the new theology, third, the emergence of lay religion, fourth, the growth of redemptive societies.

Ecumenicity, that blessed word, is what the author means by a horizontal fellowship. Excepting the obvious chasm that separates Catholicism and Protestantism, he finds the presence of closer fellowship within world Christianity encouraging indeed. He fails, however, to mention the continued division which exists between Christianity and other world religions; nowhere does he mention the sharp and brutal conflict between such divergent bodies within Protestant Christianity as the Federal and American Council of Churches; no inkling is given of the theologically exclusive temper of traditionally conservative Christianity which rules out fellowship with many liberal Christians. Is it that these situations are not important? Or is it that they do not support his thesis?

The author denies that he is neoörthodox; yet much of his chapter on the new(?) theology is taken up with praise of the prophets of neoörthodoxy. The doctrine of original sin comes in for affirmative consideration under such terms as "chronic sin" or "indigenous sin." Apparently, changing the adjective has given this ancient doctrine a new content. Before this chapter is completed the author endeavors to qualify his support by pointing out the extreme and evil uses to which the pessimistic view of human nature can be put, but the general effect is that of carrying water on both shoulders. It impressed the reviewer as being a rather weak performance, if interesting.

The last two chapters are capably handled, though the effect is as if the writer were pleading instead of stating the case. No one will deny the importance of vital lay religion or of the need for blessed remnants, and everyone will applaud the part they play in contemporary religion. They are indeed signs of hope. But they are continuous—they existed before us, or what religion we have would not have come into being; that they are in the midst of contemporary religion is cause for rejoicing, but let us not whistle in the dark and be gratified by the echo we make.

This readable book is studded with sentences that are suggestive and memorable. But let the reader buy the book and see for himself! It is well worth the modest price, even if, perhaps *because,* the reader may not entirely agree with it.

HARMON M. GEHR

The American Tradition in Religion and Education, by R. Freeman Butts, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xiv, 230, $3.

When *The First Freedom* by Wilfred Parsons and *Religion and Education under the Constitution* by J. M. O'Neill appeared, some Americans recalled that a prominent American Roman Catholic scholar had written: "Does the church intend, should the power be hers, to change and modify the Constitution? Does she mean to discard the American principle of the separation of church and state? In fine, does she aim at being *the established church* of the United States? One cannot doubt . . . that the answers should all be in the affirmative."

In the *American Tradition in Religion and Education,* Professor Butts calmly and objectively demonstrates that religious freedom is of the essence of American liberty, that general freedom depends upon the preservation of equal rights of the religious conscience, that American constitutional government must guarantee religious freedom, that public education protects our common democratic values, that private education *when paid for by those enjoying its privileges* fulfills a useful function, that the various forms of union of church and state threaten both religious freedom and American democracy, and that the 175-year-old American principle of separation of church and state should be maintained in American education. It is thus the constitutional answer to recent attempts to revise the meaning of the religious clause of Amendment I. This study is sponsored by the Institute of Church and State and is also the fifth in the Beacon Studies in Freedom and Power which includes Paul Blanshard's *American Freedom and Catholic Power.*

The heart of the six chapters of the volume is the fourth, entitled: "The Principle of Separation in the Nation." Precisely what did the religious clause of Amendment I mean originally and to now? Is the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, so often affirmed since 1878, valid or the "fantastic" view of Mr. O'Neill? The verdict is emphatically in favor of the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the first Congress under the Constitution of the United States, Madison made two proposals on the matter of religion: one was concerned with the full maintenance of equal rights of conscience from the national point of view; the other, with that maintenance by the separate States. He won on both points in the House. The Senate was twice defeated in its attempt, under the leadership of New England, to introduce multiple-establishment. The joint committee of the Senate and the House compromised on the present reading of the religious clause of the First Amendment which committed only the Federal Government to free exercise of religious worship, civil rights of conscience, no establishment of any, several, or many religions, no coöperation between the national government and one or several churches, no "religious" taxes, no support, promotion, or sponsorship of Christianity. Hence, Christianity was *not* the foundation of the government of the United States, and the text of the Treaty with Tripoli (1796) clearly and correctly says so; so Jefferson told the Baptists in 1802 and the country in 1808 and, we might add, contended in his defense of the proposition that *Christianity was not of the common law of England.* By the way, the highest court of England in 1917 and again in 1919 confirmed this conclusion of Jefferson! What a prophet! For at least four decades James Madison is here shown to have fought for complete separation of church and state. He even insisted there should not be: 1. tax exemption for churches; 2. remuneration for chaplains of Congress or of Army and Navy *out of public funds;* 3. religious proclamations by the President of the United States.

Hence, the conclusion of the author after many pages of citation of sources seems altogether defendable: "As indicated throughout this study, 'establishment of religion' has always implied legal and financial support for religion. State support for one or for many religions, whether preferentially or impartially, is thus prohibited. Far from being a perversion of the original meaning of separation, the principle enunciated in the Everson case is the logical culmination of the authentic historical tradition of the principle of separation of church and state as it has developed from 1776 to the present time." Maybe what the Roman Catholic bishop, John England, told the United States Congress, 1826, might with profit be heeded today: "You have no power to interfere with my religious rights: *the tribunal of*

the Church has no power to interfere with my civil rights." "The decision upon the question of expediency as to the form of government for temporal or civil concerns, *is one to be settled by society and not by the church.*"

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

The New Renaissance of the Spirit, by Vincent A. McCrossen, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. x, 252, $3.

Professor McCrossen, of Marietta College, proposes that the City of Man become the City of God through general adoption of Roman Catholic organization and ideals. He interprets history as an alternation between spiritual and sensate ages: Greece and the Middle Ages were spiritual; Rome, the Renaissance, and the present era are sensate, abounding in confusion and violence. "Protestantism was a compromise between materialism and Christianity." Galileo's judges were justified in condemning his tests of value and his criteria of judgment, for God's ways may not always be fathomed by man.

Science has advanced materialism in a world of dullards like those in colleges and universities. Whitman, Whitehead, Dewey, and Ralph Barton Perry are among the "trite reiterators of the commonplace" who understandably feel at home in the United States, the academic cellar of which consists of economics, sociology, and speech, and the vocational cellar of which includes courses in tap-dancing, swimming, lumbering, and baking. This country because of its productivity, opulence, and unquestioned penchant for good deeds and benevolence possesses a bleakness of spirit which unfits it for any creative rôle in the new renaissance other than that of affording asylum and physical sustenance to European refugees.

Fortunately, continues the author, the renaissance is already appearing, led by the same peoples who produced the other one, namely, the French and Italians, who escaped the distorting influences of the Reformation. When it breaks full bloom, it it likely to flourish in such lands as Ireland and Portugal which have escaped modern perversions. The Russians, although on the whole uninspired and materialistic, have produced rare analysts like Dostoievski, Berdyaev, and Sorokin, and something can be said for Chesterton, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Huxley, and Spengler, but coming nearer to the truth, albeit in a negative rather than creative way, is the contemporary Spanish thinker, Ortega y Gasset. Yet for all these intellectual stirrings, the new renaissance may have to be ushered in by an apocalyptic stroke.

The book's specific citations and quotations come almost entirely from the Bible, Spengler, and the three noncommunistic Russians. It deserves thoughtful reading, although it would have gained strength had it been condensed to one half its length. Because of its uncompromisingly dogmatic approach one is surprised that its publisher chances to be the Philosophical Library. There is no reason to dispute Professor McCrossen's expectation that many present-day scholars will hesitate to accept his thesis. He looks to the future for vindication.

EARL CRANSTON

The Great Redemption, by Chester Warren Quimby, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. ix, 213, $2.50.

The subtitle shows that this book is "a living commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans." By a "living commentary" is meant not the learned, historical, philological elucidation of the author's thought but a practical attempt to set forth clearly for the "common reader" the original writer's main ideas with present-day illustrations and even with "homiletical exhortations." This volume is the product of popular lectures and sets forth the message of Romans as alive and applicable to modern man.

Professor Quimby divides his book into eight chapters followed by seven brief notes. He first surveys Paul's journeys and gives an excellent interpretative paraphrase of Romans which answers a series of eight qusetions, *e.g.*, "What is the gospel?" Then comes a description of imperial Rome, followed by chapters on the helpless plight of man, the wrath of God, the good news of God, the benefits of the great redemption, the problem of the unredeemed, and the Christian's daily life. The notes discuss the author's personal viewpoint and some of the usual problems such as the place of writing Romans, faith in the New Testament, and practical suggestions on preaching from Romans, together with a brief bibliography of nine books on Paul and Romans.

Written with unusual clarity and in vivacious style with telling use of repetition, personal anecdotes, italicized main points and competent summaries, this book makes Paul and the dominant ideas of his Roman letter as contemporary as last Sunday's sermon. Long hard study of Paul is reflected in pacing prose which fits the pulpit. Something of Paul's nervous energy and driving devotion, his keen human insights, his moral earnestness, his missionary zeal, his mystic life-in-Christ comes across these pages. The vitality of spiritual experience is here. The unending importance of Christian faith and conduct is hammered into the reader. The greatness of Paul's thoughts stands out. Ministers should readily find this volume an ever-present help in time of sermon trouble.

Largely freed from footnotes and Scripture references, the reader swiftly follows the thought as it moves back and forth between Paul and our day with its desperate needs. There is such a Quimby-cast to these structural ideas that even Paul, if he could read here, might say, "It is no longer I who live but Quimby who lives in me." However, this commentary is easier to read than Paul because it selects his high points and keeps them lighted by modern flares. These chapters largely by-pass first century thought and historical circumstances in the Jewish and Græco-Roman worlds. Apart from the chapter on Rome the reader faces his own day rather than Paul's. Each age must state its religious ideas in its own terms but every modernizer runs risks even with best will in the world. Professor Quimby has endeavored to take the basic views of the Roman letter and to adorn and apply them to our own day in a readable, interesting manner.

The author's enthusiasm leads him into absolute statements which often need qualification though it is well known that more accurate formulation may reduce the drive of an idea. It is doubtful that Paul "always" had pushed westward (p. 1) or that dangers in Rome paralyzed the heart of "every" household (p. 26). Certainly hellenistic culture cannot be condemned as "utterly degraded morally," when Stoicism is thoroughly known (p. 53). It is doubtful that persecution of Christians in Rome in Paul's day was commencing to be "widespread and official" (p. 34) or that Christian meetings were forbidden by law (p. 35). (See La Piana's *Foreign Groups in Rome*, in *Harvard Theological Review*, XX (1927), p. 4.) Paul does not discuss persecution of Christians in Rome and he does counsel obedience to governing authorities which are ordained of God (Rom. 13). Nor could the Romans of Paul's time have used Trajan's (A.D. 98-117) forum. Whether the Colosseum, dedicated in A.D. 80 by Titus, is "long after Paul's day" depends on the length of "long."

Even a brief bibliography for popular reading might well include Dodd, *Meaning of Paul for Today*, (again in print); Nock, *Paul;* W. Knox, *St. Paul;* Robinson, *Life of Paul*. For any future edition of this homiletic commentary some minor errors and omissions may be noted. In the outline Romans "13: 14:1-15" should read 14–15:13 (p. 16). Since the number of pages is given for each of the other books,

they should be added to Riddle's *Paul* (p. 213). *Handfuls* should supersede "handsful" (p. 59). The actualities of the early days of Rome *are* lost in the mists of antiquity (footnote, p. 17). An index would make this book more easily used.

DWIGHT MARION BECK

Protestant Churches and Industrial America, by Henry F. May, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. x, 297, $3.50.

This book by a teacher of American history at Scripps College concerns itself with the origin and development of the social gospel in the United States. Well do I remember the first talks that I heard on the subject in the years following World War I. Speakers would mention the names of Harry Ward and Bishop McConnell, but nothing was said of their predecessors. Professor May takes us further back to the year 1828 and carries the story on down to the end of the century. Major emphasis is rightly given to the three decades following the Civil War. The point of view is that of the general historian, but the author has a deep interest in the work of the church. As a son of the church, he tells of the efforts of our ancestors to meet the problems brought in by urbanization and the industrial process. Their successes and failures are sympathetically recorded. I think you will like this book.

To such a large field of investigation some limitation is necessary, and only the five major denominations are covered. The regions touched upon are the Northeast and to some extent the Midwest. Other regions of the United States are omitted. The eighteen chapters are divided into five sections, each covering a decade or at most two. The bibliography covers some twenty and odd pages. It includes many fugitive pamphlets which I have never seen mentioned elsewhere, and has been enriched by the pioneer work of C. H. Hopkins in this field. Tom Dixon to most of us is a writer of fiery novels about white supremacy. It is interesting to see him listed as the author of a work on the failure of Protestantism in New York City.

The first brief section tells the story from 1828 to the start of the War between the States. It was essentially a conservative period, and there was very little criticism of the social order on the part of churchmen. On the contrary, they were inclined to agree with Adam Smith that freedom of competition had produced the best of all possible worlds and that the economic order of America was especially blessed of heaven. "Labor organization," said they, "is a positive evil, and unemployment is necessary in order to maintain factory discipline." Teachers of economics were mainly clergymen. Not a few of them told their classes that a ten-hour law would only give the working population more time for vice and dissipation. To some of us who are inclined to think that labor is now running away with the wagon, it is interesting to see the color of the wheel horses at the start of the parade. In contrast with the present, they were horses of another color in 1828.

There are nine chapters which cover the next fifteen years. The war was followed by a period of complacency in which American Protestanism was interested in revivalism, temperance, sabbatarianism, missions, and the capture of the West for the church. There was little interest in the problems of men who worked for wages in the new factories. In the Church Congress of 1874 we find one speaker counseling the poor to be patient:: "Whatever you suffer here from the injustice of others will turn to your account in the hereafter. Be quiet. Whatever your hands find to do, do it, and be content with your wages. God will take care of the rest." The two giants of the period, Phillips Brooks and Henry Ward Beecher, were primarily interested in other matters.

Then came the two decades which shook America to its foundations and laid the

basis for the social gospel of which we heard much in our college days. Three great panics followed hard on the heels of each other, and each was accompanied by widespread violence. Radical labor organizations began to enter politics. The conscience of the church was deeply stirred, and a deluge of books and articles poured from the religious press. Each publication tried to state "the Christian solution" to the problem posed by the strikes. To add to the difficulties there was mounting evidence that working men were deliberately staying away from the church and its leaders. Gone was the complacency of the seventies. In desperation the church turned to lay leaders like Richard Ely for instruction and guidance. Ely went far and wide, speaking before church groups and interdenominational gatherings.

In the final section Dr. May gives a sharp-cut survey of the men and groups that fought for a better answer. He traces the thread that runs through the major denominations. I suggest that the reader look up the efforts made by his own group during the eighties and nineties. Men whose names and work have been forgotten are evaluated, as well as better-known people like Gladden, Potter, Huntington, Rauschenbusch, and many others. Among the men mentioned is one that I had forgotten, W. S. Rainsford, rector of St. Giles in New York. Because of his interest in the labor question, he lost Admiral Mahan from his church but still managed to retain J. P. Morgan. It was often a solitary battle with little help from governing boards, denominational headquarters, or from the rank and file of the church. Converts were few in the eighties, but twenty and thirty years later men like Rauschenbusch were being invited to the White House to confer with Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.

It has been much the fashion in recent years to criticize the social gospel on at least two points, the shallowness of its theological content and the oversimplification of its social analysis. Perhaps this was a task beyond the time and strength of the pioneers. Much remains to be done. Dr. May seems to think that the social message of the church still has a rôle to play," perhaps in a new, hardened, more mature form."

J. HUNDLEY WILEY

The Man Born to Be King: A Play-Cycle on the Life of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by Dorothy L. Sayers, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. x, 339, $3.75.

This elaborate, carefully articulated, and artistically and spiritually impressive dramatization of the gospel story is of interest in various respects. Gratification must first be registered that a portrayal for this medium has here been carried out by so intelligent, vital, and imaginative a writer. It will compensate for many turgid and sentimental treatments of the life of Christ offered to wide audiences today. The work is interesting for one thing as a venture in religious radio drama and no doubt should be heard in this form for proper appreciation. It has interest quite independently as a modern life of Christ. The handling of the materials of the four gospels by way of harmonization presents peculiar problems, and the author's remarks on these issues in her introduction and in the notes to the separate plays will interest the student of the New Testament. The reader or auditor will also note the skill with which the dramatic unity of the whole cycle is achieved, as well as the shrewd use of characterization throughout. Finally, the theological basis that governs all, candidly dealt with in the introduction, has its own significance.

The twelve separate plays begin with "Kings in Judæa" (the nativity) and "The King's Herald" (the Baptist and his circle) and conclude with four assigned to the Passion narrative and its sequel in the Resurrection. The intermediate episodes re-

quired more resource in selection and composition. Unity and continuity are given to the whole by what Miss Sayers calls the theme-structure: the recurrent conflict of the two kingdoms, the earthly and the heavenly; and the plot-structure: the rôle of Judas, which is most interestingly handled. The material and outlook of the Fourth Gospel are given precedence in the work, and the author is explicit in her confidence in and frequent preference for the tradition of this evangelist. The procedure of harmonization appears especially clearly in the last play where the Resurrection narratives of all the gospels are conflated. The playwright, as she says, "does not want to select and reject, but to harmonize." And while critics have disparaged elements in the Resurrection accounts, "the fact remains that all of them, without exception, can be made to fall into place in a single orderly and coherent narrative without the smallest contradiction or difficulty, and without any suppression, invention or manipulation, beyond a trifling effort to *imagine* the natural behaviour of a bunch of startled people running about in the dawnlight between Jerusalem and the Garden." In this connection Miss Sayers embarrasses some of us by invoking Morison's *Who Moved the Stone?* Evidently much of her harmonizing procedure is based not only on the aims of the artist but also upon a good critical conscience.

Our chief demurrer arises not with regard to the legitimacy of dramatizing the gospels as they stand—though we would like to see some equally able artist dramatize the gospel story on the basis of some defensible reconstruction of the historical Jesus. What troubles us is the strain created in presenting the theological Son of God of the Fourth Gospel as here in a setting of the commonplace, the homely, and the colloquial. Of course these belong in the gospel story. But the conjunction of these with "God" himself in the quotidian scenes—for so Christ is presented (see p. 295 and introduction, p. 5)—is painfully unreal. If it be answered that this is in various degrees the way in which Jesus is presented in the gospels themselves, we are still not satisfied. As a matter of fact, it is only in John that Deity is assigned to Jesus. And in the gospels the titles and powers of Jesus do not jar notably with the setting; though even here we must make some exception for John again. But the point is that in the highly realistic medium of modern radio drama the disparity shocks us and we shrink. An analogous difference has been observed often between the theatre and the moving picture. A play on the stage becomes quite a different thing on the screen; imagination gives way to realism. The defect of which we speak is felt most in the second and following plays of the cycle and hardly at all in those dealing with the Passion where the materials are more manageable and where the writing itself appears to excel. Yet in the Resurrection appearances, as in the miracles earlier, the effect of the realistic detail takes on the character of the thaumaturgic or suggests the seance.

In her introduction the author has some very good things to say with regard to the concrete historicity of the story, and the rights of the trivial, the comic, and the brutal. She also writes refreshingly as to the defects of the Authorized Version. She also defends the "shock" aspect of the events against pious believers who do not wish reality to break through the ritual spell. In other words, she has a full sense of what incarnation means, as is also evident in her *Mind of the Maker* and other writings. But like many with her theology, she does not appear to go all the way with this insight. Otherwise she would divest her hero not only of the Nicæan and Chalcedonian status and powers she assigns him, but at least of the Johannine casting, and even of much of the Synoptic aureole. The plays for all their power revolve about the question of who Jesus is rather than his cause, and this straitens the significance of the drama.

AMOS N. WILDER

Drawing-Room Conversion: A Sociological Account of the Oxford Group Movement, by Allan W. Eister, Durham, Duke University Press, 1950, pp. xiv, 236, $3.50.

Considering the fact that the author has been a student of the Oxford Group movement since 1936, and that he obtained "spoken and written testimonies" from over five hundred persons, and that he has "read everything published by the leaders," and that he attended "various types of meetings," the book is somewhat disappointing. Perhaps the writer realized that he failed to lift the veil of mystery from the movement. He says in the preface that the study is not definitive (p. xi), reminds the reader in the introductory chapter that the movement cannot be easily understood, and near the end of the book has the following: "It should be noted that we expect to do no more than to record Group responses taken at their face value" (p. 171). In trying to do two things at once the author has hit the target twice but missed the bull's-eye both times.

One purpose appears to have been the writing of a developmental account of the Oxford Group movement from its beginnings with the quiet "personal evangelism" of the former Lutheran minister and college Y. M. C. A. secretary, Frank Nathan Daniel Buchman, to the establishment of a postwar international centre at Caux, Switzerland. The movement is usually dated from a meeting in Christ College, Oxford University, in the summer of 1921. Later in the twenties it ran into opposition at Princeton University, and other places, on the grounds that it probed too much into sex matters. At the same time it was openly supported by a number of prominent persons in the United States and elsewhere. The Reverend Samuel M. Shoemaker opened his parish house at Calvary Church in New York City as headquarters from 1930 to 1941. From a "First Century Christian Fellowship," with house parties, it became the "Rising Tide" in the middle thirties, with a series of national assemblies. In 1938 the Moral Rearmament (MRA) phase emerged with a "World Assembly" in Switzerland in September of that year, and a rally in New York City on Sunday evening, May 14, 1939. Not much is reported for the period of World War II. Dr. Buchman had to rest from a heart attack, and the leadership of MRA in the United States fell for a time upon John McCook Roots, Jr. So far as the author could determine no full-time life-changers became conscientious objectors. Just about a page of the book is devoted to the postwar period. There is only the barest mention of the training centre at Mackinac Island, Michigan, and nothing about the Los Angeles assembly in the summer of 1948. Thus, as a history the book is sketchy and not up to date.

The second purpose of the study is that of suggesting "a possible basis for understanding and interpreting this movement by examining what seem, from a sociological point of view, to be its salient features" (p. 10). Here Dr. Eister resorts to the use of the *sect* and *cult* typologies used by Howard Becker and Leopold von Wiese in their *Systematic Sociology*, pp. 625-628. He undertakes to show that Buchmanism is not a sect but a cult. The sect is a rigorously organized group living apart from the world, while the cult is a loosely integrated group held together by "thrill responses." The leadership of Frank Buchman, the requirement of listening to God, and the adherence to the four absolutes—honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love—provide thrills for the participants. The emphasis of the cult is primarily on the individual adult. Because it has no well-defined ecclesiastical or denominational structure, participation is almost entirely at the emotional level. This means that the participants come and go, with only a few remaining long. The writer predicts that the movement "will disappear as it arose—gradually." This is hypothetical. It does not explain the Oxford Group

as distinguished from Christian Science, or the Mental Hygiene movement. The author writes as one who may have read the 168 specific references in his bibliography, but has failed to grasp the "why's" and "wherefore's" of the association. Sect or cult? The author does not know. Does anybody?

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

Judaism in Theory and Practice, by Beryl D. Cohon, New York, Bloch, 1948, pp. ix, 243, $3.50.

From the outside every religion presents the appearance of a strong, powerful monolithic body. Only to those who are born and live within a religion are revealed those subtle, and ofttimes evident, differences that rend the monolithic unity into groups, factions, and even hidden hostilities.

The Jewish religion is no different from other universal religions. Judaism as a religion does not exist. Up to the days of the French Revolution, when the ghetto walls which separated the little Jewish communities from the changing world about them fell, there was but one basic or normative Judaism. After the period of the Emancipation, Judaism had to adjust itself to the new world to which it became exposed. It then flowed on in three streams instead of one. The first stream to branch off from the mother stream which persisted as Orthodox Judaism, became known as Reform Judaism. It swung out far from the old channels, so far indeed that a reaction set in that ultimately formulated itself as Conservative Judaism.

This volume, by a well-known rabbi, does not pretend to be other than a convenient textbook for adults who wish to know something about Jewish religious thought today, especially that phase of Judaism that is Reform Judaism. He makes every effort to be fair in stating the points of view of both Orthodox and Conservative Judaism as regards ideas, customs, and ceremonies. So far as he can, he emphasizes the basic unities among them.

He discusses with clarity the origin and historic characteristics of the Synagogue; the theological problems relating to the God idea, Torah, and Israel; the ethical richness of Judaism both individual and social; and closes with chapters on "Institutions and Rituals" and "Holy Days." He adds a supplement on the important theme which engages the interest both of Jews and Christians, "Why the Jews Rejected Jesus." His conclusion in this matter expresses the reality found lodged in Jewish hearts. "The Christian community, for all its noble men and women in history and present-day life, has been a persecuting community. Jesus is its symbol. The Jews, inevitably, have recoiled from Jesus." . . . And, "Jewish scholars today—Montefiore, Abrahams, Klausner, *et al*—are glad to pay tribute to Jesus as a supremely gifted human being, who taught mankind precious truth, but they will not make him the central figure among the masters in Israel."

Undoubtedly, *Judaism in Theory and Practice,* if it be remembered that it is the expression of but one of the religious parties in modern Israel, will give the reader a concrete insight into the religious ideas and customs that help the Jew today to a religious way of life.

MORTIMER J. COHEN

Religion's Place in General Education, by Nevin C. Harner, Richmond, John Knox Press, ©1949, pp. 167, $2.50.

This little volume deals in a stimulating and provocative manner with a subject which in recent years has stirred public school leaders as well as religious leaders throughout the nation. Believing in the basic principle of the separation of church and state, the public schools have avoided teaching religion, and in consequence have been

called godless and atheistic. There are legal requirements in many states which provide situations for teaching religion. These include the reading of the Bible, released time for pupils to attend weekday religious education classes, as well as the required teaching of history, current social problems, literature and art, and programs in observance of Christmas, Thanksgiving, and other religious festivals.

The book consists of two parts: the first includes four studies which were delivered as lectures at two theological seminaries. The second part, added as an appendix, is the report of the Committee on Religion and Education of the American Council on Education. Dr. George F. Zook, in the foreword to the report, states in part: "While the subject of the relation of religion to education in the philosophical sense is a very old one, there has been no general agreement concerning how this matter of fundamental importance should be treated in American public education. This report should, therefore, be regarded as a first step in a program of studies and experimental activities which I trust may be developed under the auspices of the Committee." The two parts cover much the same material and thus emphasize and reinforce each other.

The first of the author's four studies seeks to establish the point that religion and education are indivisible, asserting in part, "Religion becomes educational, and education becomes religious. Religion and education become what they always should have been and always should be,—namely, two sides of a single coin. . . . Religion is not fully religion until it becomes educational. . . . Education is not fully educational until it is fully religious." This thesis is not convincingly made, nor will it likely be accepted by the great body of workers in our public schools.

The second and third studies deal with the place of religion in present education, and review certain current proposals to overcome the almost complete lack of any religion in the schools. Much of the blame for present conditions is based on our extreme individualism, the excessive divisions of American Protestantism, rendering any public teaching of religion virtually impossible. Yet attempts are being made to put religion back in schools, not as sectarian, but as definitely theistic. Released time religious education has been tried widely, but has encountered many difficulties, which, with the Supreme Court decision in the Champaigne Case, have raised questions about this plan. Character education as a plan of teaching religion is unsatisfactory. The parochial school is carefully studied, but the author concludes that the wide extension of parochial schools would "probably be the end of the public school system in America, sooner or later. . . . In the parochial school is a far-reaching threat to our religious liberty."

The real opportunity of finding a place for religion in the schools, vividly presented, lies in its natural inclusion in present curricula as an inherent part of studies of history, American life, or other subjects. The stream of church history and world religion should be studied, in their proper place, not ignored, as should the biographies of the great religious leaders of the world. The Bible and the Talmud should be studied as religious literature, in their proper time and place. The world of art, with its centuries of devotion to religious figures, and the great musical masterpieces offer inspiring material for school lessons. Our concept of democracy based upon respect for the individual, stems from the Christian concept of the brotherhood of man. Science likewise offers many media for religious lessons.

The committee report, which brilliantly analyzes methods of modern education, sums up the opportunity of the school in these words: "The first obligation of the school with reference to religion, is, we believe, to facilitate intelligent contact with it as it has developed in our culture and among our institutions."

For leaders of religious education, and public school leaders interested in projecting a program of religious teaching, this little volume is "must" reading.

FRANK R. MOREY

The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos, by Cecil Roth, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1948, pp. xvi, 250, $3.

This is a companion volume to *The House of Nasi: Doña Gracia* which dealt with the remarkable woman, Beatrice de Luna, her perilous adventures in Europe, her coming to Constantinople in 1553 where she settled and won for herself the name of "La Senora," or "Ha-Gevereth" ("The Lady") because of her charities and her concern with Jewish communal affairs throughout the Ottoman empire.

Her nephew, Joao Miguez, proved himeslf a worthy successor to his great aunt. Indeed, long before she died, Miguez, who married La Senora's daughter, thus becoming her son-in-law, had been closely associated with everything that she did. The volume, *The House of Nasi: the Duke of Naxos,* deals with his career as Jew, merchant, and statesman.

Originally, it had been intended that both these books should be one, because there is little information available concerning Joao Miguez. Much that we know about him is merely conjecture, part of it prompted not by authentic information so much as by reading the past through the needs and desires of today's Jewish life and problems. The Duke of Naxos' effort to found a Jewish colony in Tiberias has come to be interpreted as an act of Zionist devotion long before Zionism, as a philosophy of Jewish life, had been conceived.

Because of the slim resources upon which the author could call, this book should have been reduced to a chapter or two chapters in the companion volume. However, having decided to blow up what little he had into a volume, the author had to resort to "fillings" and "stuffings" to give the book a substantial appearance. Consequently, the author adds a great deal of irrelevant material that might well have been omitted; he repeats himself on a number of occasions; and he saunters over the century in slow and meandering steps.

There will always be two general attitudes towards the Duke of Naxos. On the one hand, he will be accused of being merely a shrewd merchant who sought the highest profits and greatest security the world of his time could afford him. In the light of this theory, he will be suspected of being willing even to use the misery of his own coreligionists to further his selfish interests, as in the resettlement of Jews in Tiberias. On the other hand, he will be praised as a far-seeing lover of his people who possessed also a romantic and dramatic flair.

Roth is a masterful writer who himself is dramatic in conception and execution of his task. He enlarges the portrait of Joseph, Duke of Naxos (Joseph was his secret name), until it becomes one of commanding importance. However, in Jewish history Don Joseph played a minor though interesting rôle. Taken together with Doña Gracia, this and the earlier volume help the modern reader to visualize the sixteenth century as the Jews who lived then experienced it.

MORTIMER J. COHEN

Doctors Courageous, by Edward H. Hume, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xiv, 297, $3.50.

The *Christian Century* (April 12, 1950) carried a message from the National Christian Council of China to the Chinese Christians. In it was this statement:

"The 200 or more hospitals run by the Christian church still comprise at least one-half of the medical services of the whole country. These hospitals shoulder a heavy responsibility for the healing and prevention of disease, while in the future they may become the foundation of an entirely nationalized medical service." This book, telling of thrilling and adventurous Christian service, may profitably be read with this statement in mind—especially the final chapter on China. It is altogether likely that both in the Orient and later in Africa the foundations of medical missions may prove to be the most unshaken of all that the missionary movement has achieved. Their molding influence in the future may be the greatest of all the missionary developments of the last century and a half.

The book tells the fascinating story of some of the great missionary doctors in Africa, the Near East, China, and India. It reveals the inevitable social changes that have gradually followed as the result of Christianized medicine, surgery, and nursing; the relaxing of the superstitious hold of the medicine men in Africa; the abolishing of foot-binding in China; the weakening of the caste system in India; and what the author calls the lifting of the veil for women in the Near East. It tells of the vast improvement in midwifery, the introduction of nursing schools and medical centres in a vast number of areas. There is an appreciation of the achievements of medicine in earlier centuries, especially in China and India, and a description of how it was checked by priestcraft and tradition. It recognizes that even with the witch doctors in Africa there was a certain science and wisdom. It reveals how much the world owes to medical missions for our advance in the understanding and control of tropical diseases and leprosy.

As a striking illustration of its picture and purpose there is a paragraph about Livingstone called "The Pattern of the Cross," in which it is said: "To trace Livingstone's journeys in Africa is to place the cross on its map"—south to north and east to west. This can be made a description of the heroic figures that appear in the book: Peter Parker in China; the Scudders in India; Samuel Zwemer and Paul Harrison in the Near East; Schweitzer in Africa, the greatest and profoundest Christian of our generation, whose reverence for life is a light of all hope in a world of great darkness.

Dr. Hume, himself a medical missionary of a great medical missionary family, was born in India in 1876. Because of his long record of research and teaching and healing, both in the Orient and America, and his reputation as an author, he is highly qualified to write on this timely theme; and his book is a contribution both to missionary knowledge and to missionary hope.

E. C. HERRICK

BOOK NOTICES

Outline of a Metaphysics, by Franklin J. Matchette, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. xv, 108, $3.75.

The author, a self-educated and highly successful businessman, lived from 1863 to 1943. During the 1930's he gradually retired from business, and devoted himself to philosophy. He read widely, and entered into discussions with professional philosophers. He gradually developed an interesting system of his own, which he stated in this essay, now given to the world by his nephew. This system seems most to resemble Leibniz among classical philosophers, and Wilmon H. Sheldon among contemporary thinkers. It is however an original system for which Matchette deserves full credit. God is the Absolute, outside of space and time, the first and final cause, eternal, immutable, creative, infinite, perfect, the supreme object of the worship of traditional religion. The relative world is more like the monads of Leibniz than the atoms of Leucippus, because of its teleological urge toward union with the Absolute. It consists primarily of zero-atom units stored with energy, and possessing the primary properties of motion, field, electricity, free energy, life, mind, and value, although at the lowest levels the last three are not observable by us. Secondary properties are due to combinations of zero-atom units, and include space-time and the properties of physical, chemical, and electrical phenomena. The evolution of the chemical elements, the emergence of the various forms of life, and the progress of man in history are all movements in the direction of ultimate union with God. Human acts are good or bad, right or wrong, according as they do or do not approach more closely to God. Upon the degree of man's proximity to God depend his virtue, worth, and felicity. The religious implications of this philosophy have not been developed in detail, Matchette's attention having been directed mostly toward its scientific aspects. However, the system is evidently largely motivated by religious interests. His nephew in the preface says that his uncle found comfort in this philosophy at the time of the death of his wife, which was a hard blow to him. One wishes that he had developed the details of his system more fully. If early in life he had gone into philosophy instead of business, it seems likely that he would have become one of the foremost philosophers of our time.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Mystery of the Kingdom of God, by Albert Schweitzer, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xv, 174, $3.

In 1901, now nearly fifty years ago, this volume appeared in German as Part II of a treatise entitled *Das Abendmahl.* This second part was also published separately under the title: *Das Messianitäts und Leidensgeheimnis. Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu.* It is hard to overstress its importance, even harder now that a half century has elapsed to justify the cold and calculating conspiracy of silence that met it and threatened to engulf it. In it was given expression Schweitzer's view of thoroughgoing eschatology as the key to the complex riddle of early Christianity and more especially of the activity of Jesus. Together with a volume from the pen of Wrede, which appeared in the same year, but with a very different thesis, it flatly challenged contemporary New Testament criticism by declaring the prevailing "liberal lives of Jesus" a complete fabrication and as unwarranted as had been the traditional and romantic productions of the past. In consequence Schweitzer was bitterly opposed by

both fronts. Five years later he published his larger work, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede,* which instantly aroused attention in England and was translated in 1910 under the title *The Quest of the Historical Jesus.* Now in 1950, in part, it is to be wistfully hoped, because of his many years of quiet proof that a man whose historical and theological views are damned as heretical can put to shame in Christlike devotion many of his critics; in part, it must be admitted, because of an almost unparalleled campaign of high-pressure salesmanship which descended upon the missionary doctor, he is headline news and the idol of mission-minded devotees and of the more nondescript horde who love to prostrate themselves at the shrine of success. Everything that has ever appeared from his gifted pen is now appearing and reappearing and being eagerly purchased. In some ways this is not without its humorous—if pathetic —side. Those of us who have known and admired and loved this fertile and devoted man through the years when he was not the rage and when he sorely needed a fraction of the encouragement and support which folks are now tumbling over their feet to give him may be pardoned if they see another and somewhat mordant parallel between him and the Master whom he has so courageously served. This present volume appeared, as has been already remarked, in 1901; it was translated into English in 1925; now it appears unchanged, though with reset type, once again. Those who have prized it through the years will continue so to do; that the new crop of worshipers, who must give the good doctor many a quiet chuckle, will find it what they expect may be questioned.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Christian Humanism and the Modern World, by Lynn Harold Hough, Toronto, Ryerson, ©1948, pp. 60, $1.50.

This little volume brings in print the Chancellor's Lectures delivered at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, in 1947, by Dr. Hough, long an exponent of Christian humanism which he defines as "the philosophy of man made in the image of God." The author insists that if religion is to become a power in the world, it must be based upon such a doctrine of God and of man as is found only in the religion of the Incarnation. This religion of the Incarnation "declares that man is so related to the creator and sustainer of his life that while man cannot become God, God can become man." In a stimulating chapter on Athens and Jerusalem, Dr. Hough points out that it was in Athens that man first discovered his humanity and learned that "the discovery of man's true nature was seen to point beyond himself to the ultimate reality of the universe." Just as Athens is thought of as the city of man, Jerusalem is to man the city of God. It was there that man experienced the presence of God as he was revealed in Jesus Christ. When the dead teacher, Jesus, emerged from the tomb alive forevermore, men realized that he had become a living Lord, the Lord of the individual soul and the Lord of the church. Christian humanism, to Dr. Hough, unites the significance of these two cities in a great intellectual, moral, and spiritual tradition that enhances the glory and dignity of man. "It is in Jesus and not in Socrates that man finds that lost understanding of the meaning of his humanity, whose distinctive notes were so definitely sounded in Athens." Humanism brings to science recognition of the importance of the scientist as distinguished from the materials with which he deals and the laws within which he operates so that "it is those qualities of the human mind upon which humanism insists which have made science possible, and these very qualities are definitive of the whole intellectual and moral and spiritual life of man." In the closing chapter on the Beloved Community, Dr. Hough deplores the tendency to put humanism on one side and social action on

the other, feeling that this comes from a misunderstanding of the true nature of each. Rather, he feels that social action is implicit both in Christian faith and in Christian experience, and that in the long run, Christian humanism will turn out to be the best friend of the Beloved Community, for it teaches us to think of men and women in terms of what they may become in Christ. Christian humanism is portrayed as having a definite contribution to make both to the mind and soul of the Beloved Community as it "keeps the individual man in personal fellowship with the living God through the living Christ." Many will be happy that these stimulating lectures have been put in print, emphasizing as they do the dignity of man and the availability of the God who "became flesh to dwell among us full of grace and truth."

THEODORE F. ADAMS

Enduring Satisfaction, by William P. McEwen, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. xxiii, 370, $4.75.

The author says in the preface that he has "attempted to reach those intelligent persons with little or no philosophical training, who, nevertheless, are interested in what philosophy may have to contribute to an understanding and solution of perplexing personal and social problems" and to afford them assistance "in their efforts to formulate a satisfactory design for living" (p. xi). This book is completely over the heads of persons of that description. It is, however, a valuable technical contribution to research in the philosophy of religion. It is a very carefully documented treatise upon a variety of subjects involved in or connected with such research, *viz.*: the latest developments in logic and epistemology that are significant for religion; fresh scientific evidence for teleology as versus mechanism; the most recent conclusions regarding the nature of matter, space, and time, and biological evolution; reflective self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-identity; emergent evolution; the future of western civilization. The author has read widely in the history of European philosophy, and cites effectively for his purposes Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Goethe, and others, as well as contemporaries like Einstein, Jung, and Santayana. He has some knowledge of oriental religions. His immediate personal obligations are to his teachers—chiefly Brightman (to whom the book is dedicated), Whitehead, and Bixler. The "enduring satisfaction" discussed is something which all of us can obtain in this rapidly developing universe through the cultivation of "an enlightened good will, æsthetic appreciation, intellectual curiosity, and consecration to a sacred cause" in loving coöperation with God. These details are all discussed at length in a manner for the most part convincing and inspiring. The author can easily render the service to college students, returned G.I.'s, and the other inquiring laymen whom he had in mind when writing the preface and opening chapter. He needs only to prepare a brief book in words of one syllable, stating his conclusions without a single quotation, citation, or footnote, and referring those critically disposed to the full documentary evidence given in his *Enduring Satisfaction.*

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Mystery of the Charity of Joan of Arc, by Charles Péguy, translated by Julian Green, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, pp. 216, $3.

Dear reader, this book is like no other you ever saw. It purports to be a play in one act, with three characters, but it has no action. One speech lasts for sixty-seven pages. It is evidently not meant for the stage. Its style of incantation and repetition makes it a burden to read alone, and sometimes during the reading aloud,

the repetitions become a bit ludicrous. When this is said, however, the rest must be to acknowledge it as a work of genius, and to counsel the cultivation of the right point of view for its profitable use. It is really a work of devotion, to be followed as one follows a guide to meditation. Read as such, the book yields its true riches. Searching and purging, indeed, are the meditations on the passion of Christ and on the sorrows of his mother. The historian as such is hardly the man to review it. Young Joan is revealed in her inner life, bursting with the growing and painful consciousness of her vocation of sainthood. Her little playmate rebukes her as too pious and too gloomy. Her more formally saintly elder tries to educate her in the deeper wisdom of the Catholic ages. But Joan must take her own way. The altars of Christ and the soil of France are being defiled, and only a saint, a special kind of saint on fire, can make things right. Charles Péguy, devout French Catholic who fell in battle in 1914, is coming more and more into his own as one of the profoundest Christian interpreters of the plight of modern man. This reviewer advises the reading of those two preceding books of his made into English by Julian and Ann Green. They are great books. *The Mystery of the Charity of Joan of Arc* will be read more understandingly if one has lived with Péguy in these other books.

JOHN W. BRUSH

Early Christians of the 21st Century, by Chad Walsh, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 188, $2.

This book is a more ambitious undertaking on the part of Professor Walsh than *Stop Looking and Listen*. He describes the ailments of our civilization and attempts to predict the nature of things to come. The diagnosis has about it the ring of sincerity, honesty, and reality. The author argues that our western civilization is dying and presents the symptoms and seeks for the causes. He thinks that the major cause is that we have denied our Christian faith by taking it in too light inoculations. The first part of the book is concerned with the symptoms: decay in literature, painting, music, and religion. The second part of the book undertakes to delineate the appearance of things to come in the twenty-first century. The author's thesis is that the twenty-first century may be marked by the revival of Christianity to a degree that will make it the great Christian century. He undertakes to show what would be the characteristics of a civilization instinct with a vital Christian faith. In this section he discusses the place of reason, free will, hope, the individual, society, internationalism, the family, education, the arts, and the church. One of the most significant chapters is the one which the author chooses to call "The Underloved." The definition of a Christian society "is one in which each member knows that he is meant to share in the creativity of God and has a genuine opportunity to do so." The author's theological bent seems to be to the right. He pleads for a positive approach to such problems as the relation of church and state and the place of religion in public education. On the whole this book is well worth a serious reading by all thoughtful students of our contemporary civilization.

SANKEY L. BLANTON

How to Think Creatively, by Eliot Dole Hutchinson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 237, $2.75.

Creative Thinking is a big word, and the title of this book is a little frightening. What the author really tries to do is to describe our commonplace, everyday thought processes—that is, when we think decently, do not ramble mentally. So the book should appeal to all of us and not merely to those who aspire to do big "creative"

things: write best sellers, paint passable pictures, and compose music worth hearing. In many respects it reminds one of an old-fashioned textbook of logic; explaining what takes place in our thinking when our brains undertake *das Leben zusammenzusetzen* (Heine). So it is a very simple book, even though it doesn't look that way! In the Preface the author confesses: "Let it be at once understood that in no way do I undertake *to explain* creative ability. No one knows at present how integrations of thought take place in the mind. . . . The problem can be dealt with only descriptively . . . we can study the objective experiences of those who are productive." And so there are copious citations, illustrations, especially from contemporary "creative thinkers." Especially helpful to young writers should be the chapters and paragraphs treating of "The Stage of Frustration," "The Emotions in Creation" (Harriet Beecher Stowe "felt that with the death of Uncle Tom the whole vital force had departed from [her]"), and "Putting Insight to Work." Curiously intriguing is a discussion of the effect of drugs as an aid in creative thinking.

MITCHELL BRONK

Young Christians at Work, by T. Otto Nall and Bert H. Davis, New York, Association Press, 1949, pp. 116, $1.75.

One does not have to argue at length in these days about the stewardship of all of life. There are only a few who would want to contend for the sacred versus the secular callings. It is much easier to say that a Christian must be a Christian at any job than it is to act as a Christian in the job. There are long-time traditions and practices, significant community pressures, the trends operating within an area of work which must be faced as one struggles to give a good accounting of his stewardship as a Christian on the job. One must look, moreover, within himself before he throws stones at others. Being a Christian on the job demands imagination beyond the easily accepted moral code. The authors have given us fifteen stories of young people who work at a cross section of jobs which help to keep the machinery of life going. A few chapter headings such as "I sell Office Systems," or "Credit-Granting is My Work," or "A Park is My Workshop," or "I'm a Trouble Shooter" will remind us that the authors did not try to escape the difficult situations in and through which young Christians try to make a living as well as live a life. There are a series of pertinent questions at the end of each story. Those working with Christian young people ought to find this book very helpful.

FREDERICK B. IGLER

Quaker Education: In Theory and Practice, by Howard H. Brinton, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1949, pp. viii, 114, $1.

Among many of the real contributions of the Religious Society of Friends have been those in education. Howard Brinton here presents an excellent survey of the activities of the Quakers in their educational endeavors. This is a reissue of an earlier volume, with statistics brought up to date and revisions in the text. Brinton properly begins with a discussion of the nature of Quakerism and shows how the doctrine of the Inner Light gives rise to "certain types of human relationships which become the social doctrines of the Society of Friends when applied to the larger community with which the special Quaker community is surrounded." The embodiment of the various social doctrines has given rise to ten educational policies as follows: *community,* 1. development of a sense of belonging to the Quaker community, 2. a religiously guarded education, 3. dedicated and concerned teachers; *harmony,* 4. nonviolent discipline and methods, 5. appeal to the inward sense of rightness; *equality,* 6. equal education of both sexes, 7. equality in education of

races and classes; *simplicity,* 8. moderation in dress, speech, and deportment, 9. scholastic integrity, 10. emphasis on practical subjects in the curriculum. Then follows a statement of how these policies have operated in the past and their possible direction in the future. Brinton does not prophesy but does say with some caution that in the future the Society will probably not develop a new educational philosophy but will rather seek new ways of applying the old one. There is an outline history of Quaker education which ends with a present statistical study. A reading of this excellent, although short, volume will go far in helping one to understand the Quaker philosophy and schools. One wishes more education could be characterized as Brinton has truly described that of the Society: "Here both the authority of the past and the reason of the present are transformed in the light of the inner and outer searching which looks toward the future. Quaker education need not change its old objectives. It need only seek a higher measure in their achievement. William Penn said, 'Men not living to what they know cannot blame God that they know no more.'"

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Growth in Prayer, by Constance Garrett, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. viii, 156, $2.

This is not just another book of encouragement to pray. Neither is it an explanation of what prayer is and why our prayers are often unanswered. Its aim is higher and its discipline more pronounced. Prayer, it asserts, may be a vocal, a mental, or a group experience, and learning to pray is a previous condition of learning how to pray. To this end the way of prayer is examined and the practice of prayer is encouraged. Valuable direction is given by the many prayers included. The obvious theme and real value of the book are in the help it gives to those who are concerned with the personal growth in prayer they desire for themselves or for those whom they would teach and lead. It would be difficult to imagine anyone who would achieve no growth in prayer by reading this book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses, by C. S. Lewis, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 66, $1.25.

This is a collection of five addresses and sermons delivered to various groups by C. S. Lewis. As the author acknowledges in the preface, there are some repetitions of his ideas already in print. The title essay reminds one of many of Lewis' longer books. This essay deals with man's innate longing for a future life. "Membership" deals with the value of the individual and society. "Learning in War-Time" will be welcomed by many who teach. The other two essays are "Transposition" and "The Inner Ring." Those to whom Lewis is already a favorite will welcome this small volume.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Christ's Victory and Ours, by Frederick C. Grant, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 85, $2.

This Lenten classic for Good Friday and Easter by the professor of biblical theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York, deals with the Seven Words from the Cross and has a final chapter on the Gospel of the Resurrection. Dr. Grant, one of the keen New Testament scholars of our generation, brings to his subject a mind which is both scholarly and devotional. The emphasis is constructive and while the book is intended especially for Lenten reading it carries a message of confidence and courage for all the Christian year.

JAMES D. MORRISON

Clouds of Thoughts, by Lucette M. Prichard, New York, Richard R. Smith, 1948, pp. 47, $2.

Mrs. Prichard is very earnest in her desires to emphasize the importance of quiet and substantial thinking as to life and its meaning for the thoughtful. She does not argue as to the worth of intensive meditation or prolonged residence in mystic blessedness. She merely demonstrates in a series of a score of illuminating veins the breathing of the spirit toward its own satisfaction in the Eternal Goodness. This little but attractive gift book will grace not only the parlor tables of the elect but the mind and moods of genuine folk who search, perhaps in solitude, for the abiding greatness of life.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

On Being Your Best, by G. Curtis Jones, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xiv, 129, $2.

Dr. Jones' book is a collection of religious talks delivered over the radio. It is designed to arrest the attention of the unchurched and unthinking. It is rich in quotations from sources both old and new. It is easy to read. It is hardly probable that the book will make any permanent contribution to religious thought. It would be helpful to those who are interested in popular addresses on religious topics.

SANKEY L. BLANTON

Flagellant on Horseback, by Richard Ellsworth Day, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1950, pp. 253, $3.

This is a popular account of the life and work of David Brainerd. The author is constantly inserting himself into the narrative to "light it up." It detracts from the story, which in and of itself has enough native interest to go along without these asides. To add interest some forty illustrations are included, many of which, however, add but little understanding to the narrative. For further reading a straightforward list of books or a bibliography would have helped. There is no index.

EDWARD C. STARR

Finding My Way, by J. Irving E. Scott, Boston, Meador, ©1949, pp. 344, $3.

This book presents in an interesting manner the methods by which a student beginning his higher education may gain an understanding of college life. It deals briefly but well with problems which concern most students: campus activities, how to study, examinations, term papers, social and religious life, vocational choice and adjustment. There are appended bibliographies for further reading in the specific areas. There are also self-testing devices which should be of value to students. This is a book that can be given with confidence to the young person who asks: "Tell me, what can I expect in college?"

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Twelve Laws of Life, by John Calvin Slemp, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1950, pp. 112, $1.50.

Many teachers and not a few preachers will welcome this "study of the Ten Commandments and related teachings of Jesus" for its stimulating effect upon their own presentation of the material. It is not easy, in fact it seem almost impossible, to teach or preach the Decalogue in any strikingly new manner, and the author wisely disavows any such purpose. Rather, he brings together pertinent examples and illustrations, correlated biblical passages, and his own religious insight and pedagogical skill, to present a meaningful and stimulating discussion of these laws of life. The questions for thought and discussion that make up the appendix are the most conventional and perfunctory part of the book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOKS RECEIVED

**St. Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul* and *The Teacher,* edited by Joseph M. Colleran, Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1950, pp. 255, $3.

**Goals for American Education: Ninth Symposium,* edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, New York, Harper (for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion), 1950, pp. xiv, 555, $5.

**Christianity and History,* by Herbert Butterfield, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. vii, 146, $2.75.

**New Testament Manuscript Studies,* edited by Merrill M. Parvis and Allen P. Wikgren, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1950, pp. 220, pl. xxxii, $3.

**Great Expressions of Human Rights,* edited by R. M. MacIver, New York, Harper (for Institute for Religious and Social Studies), ©1950, pp. xvi, 321, $2.50.

**Responsible Christianity,* by Justin Wroe Nixon, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 190, $2.50.

**Out of My Later Years,* by Albert Einstein, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. viii, 282, $4.75.

A Pictorial Gospel, compiled by Eliot Hodgkin, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 212 (illustrated), $3.50.

This is a superbly beautiful life-of-Christ-in-art. On the left-hand pages are arranged in traditional order essentially all of the incidents from the four gospels, printed in a slightly modernized form of the King James; in the right-hand pages are illustrations of the opposite pages. These paintings and drawings come from all periods, from mediæval manuscripts to modern times. Some are well known; others have rarely appeared; none are overfamiliar. The result is a volume of distinct charm and should have wide appeal.

**Aus frühchristlicher Zeit,* by Hans Joachim Schoeps, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1950, pp. viii, 320, DM 21.

**The Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians,* by William Neil, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xlvii, 204, $2.75.

**Orientation in Religious Education,* edited by Philip Henry Lotz, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 618, $6.50.

A Guide to the Preparation of a Thesis, by Bruce M. Metzger, Princeton, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1950, pp. 24, 30 cents.

The title fairly characterizes this useful little pamphlet. It contains information for all stages of the work—the selection of a suitable topic, format, footnotes, bibliography, and title page.

**Rural Prospect,* by Mark Rich, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. viii, 183, $1.50.

**Diary of a Dean,* by W. R. Inge, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 228, $3.50.

**Preaching in the Great Tradition,* by Ray C. Petry, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1950, pp. 122, $2.

**Reflections of a Wondering Jew,* by Morris Raphael Cohen, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. viii, 168, $2.50.

**The Heritage of the Reformation,* by Wilhelm Pauck, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. 312, $4.

**The Golden Dawn,* by J. Ray Shute, Monroe (N. C.), Nocalore Press, 1950, pp. 78, no price.

**His Honor the Heretic,* by J. Ray Shute, Monroe (N. C.), Nocalore Press, 1950, pp. 76, no price.

**The Lion and the Lamb,* by Gerald Kennedy, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 233, $2.50.

**Moral Values and Secular Education,* by Robert E. Mason, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. viii, 155, $2.75.

**Essays in Zen Buddhism,* by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 383, $3.75.

**Parables of Crisis,* by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 255, $2.75.

**The Way to God,* by Maxwell Silver, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. x, 303, $3.

**Who Is Peaceful?* by Wolfgang J. Weilgart, New York, Exposition Press, ©1950, pp. 71, $1.

**What Would You Do?* by Daniel Johnson Fleming, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. viii, 183, $2.25.

**Nicholas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom,* by Matthew Spinka, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1950, pp. 220, $3.50.

**Conflicts in Religious Thought,* by Georgia Harkness, New York, Harper, rev. ed., ©1949, pp xix, 326, $3.

**The Book of Isaiah: Vol. II,* by Julius A. Bewer, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 74, 75 cents.

**The Illusion of Immortality,* by Corliss Lamont, New York, Philosophical Library, 2nd ed., ©1950, pp. xvii, 316, $3.95.

**The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo,* translated by George Boaz, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, pp. 134, $3.50.

**Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology,* by Hans Schaer, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, pp. 221, $3.50.

**St. Athenasius' The Life of Saint Anthony,* edited by Robert T. Meyer, Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1950, pp. 154, $2.50.

**Church and State in the United States,* by Anson Phelps Stokes, New York, Harper, ©1950, 3 vols., pp. lxix, 936, 799, 1042, $25.

Atoms of Thought: An Anthology of Thoughts from George Santayana, edited by Ira D. Cardiff, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xv, 284, $5.

A collection of paragraphs, most of them very short, many of them unforgettable, culled from the writings of a philosopher who has never found it necessary to try to prove the profundity of his thought by expressing it in unintelligible jargon.

**An Introduction to New Testament Thought,* by Frederick C. Grant, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 339, $3.75.

**Journal in the Night,* by Theodor Haecker, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, pp. xlvi, 222, $3.50.

The Apostolic Preaching, by C. H. Dodd, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 96, $1.50.

These four lectures were delivered in 1935 and published the following year. This is the fifth reprinting. The titles of the lectures are: "The Primitive Preaching," "The Gospels," "Paul and John," and "Eschatology and History."

**Religious Beliefs of Youth,* by Murray G. Ross, New York, Association Press, 1950, pp. xviii, 251, $3.

**Altruistic Love,* by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. vii, 253, $3.

**The First Book of Maccabees,* edited by Solomon Zeitlin (with an English translation by Sidney Tedesche), New York, Harper (for Dropsie College), ©1950, pp. xvi, 291, $4.

**The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice,* by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper (Hoeber), ©1950, pp. 185, $2.50.

**The I Ching,* rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes from the Richard Wilhelm translation, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, 2 vols., pp xliii, 395, 376, $7.50.

* To be reviewed.